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This thesis is an investigation into the notion of care and what role it can play for developing a concept 
of the political based on care. It is a systematic attempt to lay a foundation and sketch out the 
premises and ramifications in which a full-fledged philosophical theory of a politics of care may be 
grounded. In chapter I, the thesis traces the etymological and historical development of the notion of 
care showing that care has always been an important ingredient to philosophical thought, although 
not entering mainstream philosophical theories. Furthermore, in chapter I, it is argued that care is an 
essential ingredient to human life. Chapter II investigates the notion of care in relation to ethics and 
how a comprehensive ethics of care may look. It discusses the roots of care ethics, its theoretical and 
ontological foundations as well as guiding principles that are important in order to develop care into 
an ethical theory on par with utilitarianism, deontology and justice theory. Chapter III discusses care 
with regard to the political and how it may contribute to a contemporary comprehension of politics as 
politics of care, preventing harmful relations between agents, and furthering human flourishing. A 
tentative concept of care politics is sketched out toward the end of chapter III. Several theoretical and 
practical challenges to care politics are discussed over the course of chapter III. Throughout the thesis, 
the notion of care is discussed and applied to practical examples both from the private and public 
domain such as the European refugee crisis, global warming and general as well as specific relations 
between agents. The thesis concludes that in order for care to play a significant role both as a theory, 
that is, as a political concept, as well as a practically guiding political notion, the fundamental 
categories and ontology on which our current concepts of the political are based have to be changed.  
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INTRODUCTION - TOWARD A POLITICAL NOTION OF CARE 
In this thesis, I will investigate whether or not care can function as a political concept. That is, a 
concept that can be applied to understanding as well as guide political actions. In the discussion, I 
will focus especially on care as a concept for guiding private and interpersonal actions, that are 
typically discussed within the domain of ethics, as well as relations and actions between the 
individual, groups, institutions, the state and abstract actors such as corporations, which are typically 
understood within a framework of the political. Some of the most pressing problems of our time 
such as poverty, hunger, war, the effects of climate change or the current (as of 2015/16) refugee 
crisis are created by the relations of systems that are in their own turn created by human beings and 
that should be able to be solved by human beings through political means. Thus, the question I will 
ask is what role care can play in contributing to the understanding and solving of the most pressing 
political problems of our time. 
I am not the first to commence such an investigation and I am in debt to thinkers such as Virginia 
Held (2006), Joan Tronto (1993), Elisabeth Conradi (2001) and David Engsters (2007) who sought to 
rethink care on a conceptual level in order to make it fit for politics. Although a discussion of all of 
them would be beyond the scope of this thesis, I find it important to point out that each of them has 
contributed significantly to the field and that they have laid a solid foundation for broadening the 
notion of care toward the political. However, this thesis attempts a partly different approach by 
investigating the historical, etymological and ethical dimensions of care in order to rethink the 
political entirely from a perspective of care. 
The notion of care has been revived for and reintroduced into mainstream philosophy by Care Ethics 
over the last three decades as a new and different way of thinking on, about and within moral 
philosophy and our human (inter)actions. The “voice of care”1 has been claimed to be equally 
important as the “justice perspective” of liberal human rights theory,2 and deontological, utilitarian 
or value based approaches within ethics. In chapter I, I will discuss the history and etymology of the 
notion of care and argue that care has always been understood as integral to living a human life. 
From there the discussion of care ethics, its origins (Gilligan) and development into a full-fledged 
ethical theory (Pettersen) will lead to an account of care ethics that can already be applied to many 
kinds of political decisions. In chapter III, this thesis attempts to rethink the political from a 
                                                          
1 This refers to Carol Gilligan's book In a Different Voice, 1982. 
2 Sander-Staudt, 2015. 
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perspective of care (Sluga) asking whether care ethics can successfully be expanded to encompass 
politics and whether it will be possible to develop a meaningful notion of care politics. It is an 
attempt to rethink what has been called the “classical”3 concept of the political where politics is 
understood as the sovereign rule over a territory and its people, or government of the state as we 
have learned to say, with politics understood as a collective search for a way to best live together, 
that is, a common good. 
The ethics of care was meant to be a new type of ethics. One that would shift the focus from what 
many of its thinkers, such as Gilligan and Pettersen, perceived to be male dominated, universalist, 
top-down, justice and deontological theories toward a more relational ethics based on particulars 
and the situatedness of the moral agent within empirical as well as human, societal and political 
structures. Nonetheless, developing care ethics into a concept for the political presents us with 
several problems the most challenging being that we have to change the ontology and very 
categories in which our classic understanding of the ethical and political are grounded. This makes it 
difficult to think of care from within the above mentioned traditions that tend to reduce the richness 
of care to a mere norm, principle of justice, value or good. In this way creating the possibility for care 
to be incorporated into and being able to be critiqued on the grounds of traditional moral and 
ethical theories. 
This thesis will thus aim at rethinking care not only on a conceptual, but also on an existential level, 
always having in mind its significance in politics. This will lead to the understanding of politics as a 
search for the common good (Sluga) which will be discussed in chapter III. For Sluga, care structures 
and especially the care of the common, an understanding of politics that has its roots in pre-Socratic 
philosophy and the thinker Protagoras, are essential to understanding politics as a common human 
undertaking, the concerted search for the common good. 
The main argument of this thesis will be that care politics is difficult if not impossible to comprehend 
under traditional philosophical theories. It requires a completely different way of thinking about 
ethics and politics. Under current conditions where the classical understanding of politics is that of 
the government of the state, i.e., the rule of the polis, care will always turn out to be paternalistic 
and maybe even abusive. The same is true for care ethics. As long as care is seen as part of an ethical 
undertaking supposed to provide norms, values or precise rules4 to guide our actions it is prone to 
                                                          
3 Sluga, 2014, p. 5. 
4 Tove Pettersen who I will discuss in chapter II, is aware of some sceptics, such as Noddings (1984) negative 
position toward the notion of care being able to provide moral principles. Anyhow, she explicitly states that 
she does not see care ethics as providing rigid and inflexible rules, but as a “guide” See Pettersen, 2008, p. 43 
& p. 48 note 14. 
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betray its unique approach toward ethical dilemmas and how we may solve them. My approach will 
be more moderate, attempting to show that when comprehending the notion of care from a 
relational ontology it can serve as a compass to orientate ourselves in the topography of the moral 
and political decisions now and in the future.   
Thus, care can play a major role in understanding politics through a new vocabulary, as the care of 
the common. A search for a common good. Not a universal, untimely, and absolute common good, 
but a temporary and changeable common good. We may then be able to characterize this search as 
a caring activity, the care by the community for the community. A political community that makes it 
possible to include on a conceptual and practical level all human and other beings that we are able 
to care for. 
Why am I departing on such an adventurous journey? Why should we care about care at all and can 
the notion of care really contribute to and broaden our understanding of the political let alone 
provide us with a comprehensive concept of the political? In the end, care seems to be an 
indefinitely relative notion that withdraws itself from precise definition.5 How could such a malleable 
concept be the whetstone for discussions on how we should live and act, how we should organize 
how to socially and politically live together in the best way in this, in our human, world? More simply 
put; would the world really be a “better” and more just place if everybody cared? There are 
important theoretical and practical reasons why I find such a project worthwhile. As human beings, 
we cannot do without care. We need care to flourish and develop into what and who we are both on 
an individual and a societal level. However, care does not only pertain to satisfying our most basic 
needs, but is a “pervasive and normal”6 feature of human life concerning our actions toward each 
other as individuals, groups and institutions on all levels of relations. The existential significance of 
care is also reflected its history. The notion of care is ancient and can be traced back to the recorded 
beginnings of human society. Care has been prominent throughout history in the works of the 
Roman poet Virgil, the German poet Goethe, who seemingly took it from Herder, as well as in the 
philosophical works of Seneca Protagoras, Plato, Hume, Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, 
Gandhi and Heidegger.7 Nevertheless, even though the notion of care was of significance to these 
thinkers it has never influenced or made a noteworthy impact on mainstream philosophy until the 
1980s.8 First over the last 30 years and with the publishing of Carol Gilligan’s book In a Different 
                                                          
5 Kohlen & Kumbruck, 2008, p. 3. 
6 Sluga, 2011, p. 5. 
7 Reich, 1995. 
8 Reich, 1995, p. 359. 
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Voice (1982) has the notion of care been introduced into mainstream philosophy through the ethics 
of care where it has been significant in challenging impersonal, abstract and rationalist systems of 
thought throughout western history. It is a deeply engaging notion that has the power to connect 
thinking, feeling and acting in a way traditional rationalist approaches in philosophy lack. In just 
three short decades care in its ethical form has been developed into a discipline that is changing the 
way we “evaluate personal relationships, professional conduct, public policy, international relations 
and global issues”9. This is truly remarkable for such a young philosophical enterprise.  
The second answer that can be given to why it may be worthwhile to attend to the notion of care, or 
more bluntly, the question “Why care?” is that some empirical studies provide strong indications 
that it may work.10 Employing care as a central guiding feature to our practical dealings with one 
another both within the private, the public and the political field consistently produces empirically 
measurable results proving that not only we ourselves, but as well those around us including our 
family, friends, and human beings we are not even related with, live “happier lives”, and that the 







                                                          
9 Pettersen, 2011, p. 52. 
10 Bowman (2013) presents empirical arguments showing impressively how certain kinds of capitalisms, 
especially capitalisms in states that care for the well being of their citizens, the so called  welfare states, such 
as Sweden, Norway and even Germany (Bowman’s examples) fair constantly better than the USA in terms of 
the well being of their citizens. Another inspiring example is the IHDI, the income inequality adjusted human 
development index. While countries such as the USA do quite well on the HDI (the not for income inequality 
adjusted human development index) ranking 3rd in 2013 and 5th in 2014, they do much worse on the IHDI 
ranking 16th in 2013 and 28th in 2014 at the lower end of countries submitting these kind of data. The Nordic 
countries and Germany achieve top rankings in both categories. See as well UNDP, 2014, p. 168.  
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CHAPTER I - TRACING CARE 
Although care approaches toward decision making and interhuman conduct have been associated 
with women and their reasoning regarding private dilemmas11 since the introduction of the notion of 
care into ethics by Gilligan’s In a Different Voice12, Tove Pettersen, among others, has successfully 
expanded the categorical boundaries and broadened the understanding of care beyond an 
exclusively female scope and toward a notion of care being able to guide our human decision making 
and conduct both within the private and the political domain.  
Thus, I am not the first to attempt to rethink or broaden the understanding of the notion of care. 
Even though some care thinkers have attempted to argue that care ought to have a universal focus 
(Leininger)13 on a theoretical level including not only human beings, but material objects, plants, 
animals and the environment (Tronto)14 the recent mainstream discussion of care is preoccupied 
with care ethics, predominantly from a female perspective (Gilligan, Noddings, Pettersen). My 
strategy in this chapter will be to review what we know about care from philosophy by looking at 
how the understanding of care has been influenced by different thinkers, notions and philosophical 
concepts throughout history. In order to do this I will discuss three fields that contribute to our 
contemporary understanding of care. I will trace the etymology and history of care in chapter I, and 
focus on the discussion of the ethics of care in chapter II. While the history and etymology of care 
may provide us with a genealogy and an idea of how and why we understand care the way we do, 
the discussion of care ethics does reflect our contemporary understanding and discourse of care on 
a practical and theoretical level. Toward the end of chapter I, I will summarize the insights and 
sketch out what I believe to be important ingredients of care, before I will proceed to the discussion 
of the significance of the notion of care for ethics in chapter II and mapping out a tentative concept 
of care for politics, which I will call care politics, in chapter III. 
 
ETYMOLOGY OF CARE: CARE IN LANGUAGE 
Care is notoriously hard to define. Kohlen and Kumbruck point out that even in English literature 
care is used in a wide variety of contexts with no single definition. Care or caring can mean anything 
                                                          
11 Pettersen, 2011, p. 51. 
12 Gilligan, 1982. 
13 Leininger, 1998. 
14 Joan Tronto argues for an extension of care beyond pure human relations. Cf. Kohlen & Kumbruck, 2008, p. 
21. Warren Reich (1995) shows in his historical studies that care is a fruitful notion pertaining to all that relates 
to our human existence. 
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from „value, virtue, attitude, ideal, behavior, skill and process“15. They cite Janice Morse and her 
colleagues who found that there "is no consensus regarding the definitions of caring, the 
components of care, or the process of caring.” In her article, Morse argues that “different 
perspectives appear contradictory” and lack analysis and discussion of “different meanings and 
perspectives associated with the term caring.” Moreover, from the literature she has examined, “it is 
difficult to discern the differences between the terms caring, care, and nursing care”16 
This is further complicated by the way we use the word care in everyday language. The etymology of 
the noun care gives us its Old English roots caru or cearu meaning sorrow, anxiety, grief, but also 
burdens of mind, i.e., serious mental attention. From Proto-Germanic we get karo for grief or care in 
the sense of lamenting. However, in Germanic languages such as Dutch or German the word has 
developed to mean stingy, scanty or frugal, whereas it has transformed from cry to lamentation to 
grief in English. The meaning of charge, oversight and protection is first attested to the 15th century. 
Care as a verb comes from Old English carian, cearian meaning to be anxious, to grieve in the sense 
of feeling concern or interest. Its Proto-Germanic meaning karo cognates with Old High German 
charon and Old Saxon karon meaning to lament, to care, or to sorrow. Respectively it cognates with 
chara and kara meaning sorrow, wail or lament. Kara in Gothic is an expression for sorrow, trouble 
or care which we still find in the modern use of the German Karfreitag17 (Good Friday); mourning 
Friday. It’s Proto-Indo-European root is gar for cry out, call or scream which cognates with the Irish 
gairm shout, cry and call.18 The Oxford English Dictionary argues that care’s original meaning is “in 
no way related to Latin cura”19 and that its positive connotations, such as having an inclination 
toward in the sense of having fondness for someone or something, seem to have developed later 
during the 16th century as opposites to the earlier negative meanings. 
Drawing on the history of the origins of the word care, we get its primary meaning to be anxiety, 
anguish, or mental suffering. This seems to be quite the opposite of how we understand care today. 
Nevertheless, we are still be able to find both negative and positive connotations in the modern use 
of the word, although they tend to fall within quite different categories.  
                                                          
15 Kohlen & Kumbruck, 2008, p. 3. 
16 Morse et al, 1990, p. 2. 
17 The Christian religious holiday mourning the crucifixion and death of Jesus Christ. 
18 "care" Harper, Douglas R, ‘Online Etymology Dictionary’ ([Lancaster, Pa.]: D. Harper, 2015) 
<http://www.etymonline.com> 
19 "care, v." OED Online. Oxford University Press, September 2015. Web. 23 September 2015. 
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Neither in German nor in Norwegian20 are there any terms that capture the rich and full spectrum of 
the meaning of the word care. It seems as if the vocabulary pertaining to care in these languages is 
more specialized on the one hand, but captures only certain facets of meaning on the other hand. 
The German verb sorgen captures both an emotional aspect as well as care’s meaning referring to an 
activity where competence or (professional) skill is needed. Sich sorgen um pertains to to care about 
(emotional aspect), while sorgen für pertains to to care for (competency aspect). So while the 
German verb may capture the most important aspects of to care, the noun Sorge usually expresses 
more burdensome aspects of care.21 Furthermore, the German umsorgen or Fürsorge or Norwegian 
omsorg refer to the professional aspect of care such as in health care. We find this in that these 
languages respectively translate ethics of care as Ethik der Fürsorge or Omsorgsetikk, thereby only 
capturing certain features of an ethics of care. 
In our modern use of the word, care may have both negative and positive connotations. In German 
notions of care can be found in the positive connotations of tendence, nurturing, fostering, custodial 
care, parental care, healthcare, medical care, assistance, mindfulness, attentiveness, gratuity, 
tactfulness, carefulness or caution. The Latin caritas, literally means charity or benevolence for the 
poor and represents our western Christian dimension of care. Furthermore, word field analyses have 
shown that Caring pertains to terms of Late Antiquity such as “presence, availability, advocacy, 
dependability [and] commitment”22.  
If one is on the receiving end, care may also be perceived in a negative sense implying surveillance, 
duty, trouble, effort or burden. Traditionally care has often been linked to a notion of dependence in 
opposition to autonomy and freedom. For who would want to be in need of care instead of being 
independent and free?23 Negative connotations have been traced historically and shown in form and 
content by comparing caring and curing. Kohlen and Kumbruck argue that there is a factual 
historically grown polarity between the male ideas of cure or healing and female ideas of nursing, 
tending or care. These opposites can be understood as having different hierarchical status. Especially 
when cure is directly related to social roles of control, power and high societal status that are 
traditionally attributed to male responsibilities in society. While care, in contrast, is attributed with 
female traits of dependence and being subject to directives. This distinction is expressed most 
                                                          
20 The author’s preoccupation with German and Norwegian is explained by the fact that these are the two 
languages the author is most proficient in. 
21 Kohlen & Kumbruck, 2008, p. 2. 
22 Ibid., p. 3. 
23 Cf. Pettersen, 2008, pp. 57-58. 
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clearly in many health systems where male physicians often have a higher status since they are 
charged with healing the patient, while women are overrepresented in the field of nursing where 
they are to take care of the patients until they are healed by a male physician.  
In the history of our western thought, we find this distinction represented by two myths. The 
Christian myth of creation and the myth of cura from Greco-Roman mythology.  
 
HISTORY OF THE NOTION OF CARE 
As all our words, ideas, concepts and practices we are using today, care has a history prior to when it 
was revived by Carol Gilligan’s book In a different Voice (1982) for mainstream philosophy as the 
ethics of care.24 The virtual lack of attendance by care ethics scholars toward care’s role in 
philosophy prior to Gilligan’s book is surprising, because in the history of the notion of care we find a 
broad range of different illuminating and challenging understandings, meanings as well as 
conceptions of care.25 We have already found two conflicting notions of care when we traced its 
etymology. As mentioned above, care can have a negative connotation pertaining to dependence 
and lack of freedom on the one hand, and “worries, troubles, or anxieties, as when one says that a 
person is burdened with cares”26, on the other hand. Nevertheless, care can also have the positive 
meaning of attentative tending, conscientiousness or commitment towards needs, i.e., to “provide 
for the welfare of another”27.  
Warren Reich points out that these opposite meanings can already be found in Graeco-Roman 
culture. The Roman poet Virgil placed the ultrices Curae, the “vengeful Cares”, at the gates to the 
underworld. The vengeful Cares personified the burdensome kind of care that is dragging humans 
down. In contrast to this heavy weighing and down pulling force of care, the stoic thinker Seneca 
saw care as “the power in humans that lifts them up and places them on a level with God.”28 For him 
care meant concern or solicitude with strong “connotations of attentiveness, conscientiousness, and 
                                                          
24 Since a full investigation into the history of the notion of care would go beyond the scope of this thesis we 
will focus on some representative pieces that will further clarify the various notions and at times conflicting 
character of care. 
25 Reich, 1995, p. 319. 
26 Ibid., p. 349. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., p. 350. 
9 
 
devotion”29. Seneca argued that while the good is perfected in God due to his nature, it can only be 
perfected in humans by care or cura. Thus, care, to Seneca, is the key to realizing our full human 
potential, to “becoming truly human”. Reich notes that this existential understanding of care as key 
element to our humanity as well as the dual opposites of care as solicitude and care as burden have 
shaped our western thinking of care and can be found in the myth of Cura (or Care) that belongs to 
Roman mythology.30  
Cura was a Roman deity whose name can mean both care and concern in Latin. We can find a 
translation of the myth in Heidegger’s History of The Concept of Time: 
"Once when 'Care' [the Latin reads Cura] was crossing a river, she saw some clay. Thoughtfully, she 
took up a piece and began to shape it. While she was meditating on what she had made, Jupiter came 
by. 'Care' asked him to give it spirit, and this he gladly granted. But when she wanted her name to be 
bestowed upon it, he forbade this, and demanded that it be given his name instead. As they were 
arguing, Earth [Terra] arose and requested that her name be conferred on the creature, since she had 
given it a part of her body. They asked Saturn to be the judge, and he made the following seemingly 
just decision: "Since, Jupiter, gave it spirit, you shall have that spirit at its death. Since you, Earth, gave 
it the gift of a body, you shall receive its body. But since 'Care' first shaped this creature, she shall 
possess it as long as it lives. But since there is a dispute among you about its name, let it be called 
'homo,' for it is made of humus (earth)."31 
While the notion of human beings as being entities born of two worlds, the spiritual (reason) and the 
earthly or empirical world, is already present in this myth it is not the unification of both or the 
dominance of one over the other that are essential for living a human life. Rather, they provide 
ramifications, a point of departure (origins), stages of transition (life as process), and destination 
(destiny). To truly live a human life is to give oneself to care. Reich argues that this claim should be 
important to the care philosopher because it provides a different myth of origins. Here, Reich points 
to Judith Shklar who argues that myths of origins have been “a typical form of questioning and 
condemning the established order, divine and human, ethical and political” 32 and “to establish 
radical moral claims about power and the social order”33. Several prominent political and moral 
philosophies, Reich argues, are based on myths of origins that emphasize adversarial struggles as the 
starting point for human societies; Light vs dark (cosmogenic myth), good vs evil (Christianity), 
                                                          
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Heidegger, 1985, pp. 302-3. 
32 Shklar, 1972, p. 130. 
33 Reich, 1995, p. 350. See as well Shklar, 1972, p. 131ff. 
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Apollonian vs Dionysian (Nietzsche), reason vs inclination (Plato, Kant). In contrast to these myths, 
the myth of Cura provides a different starting point for human society and what it means to be a 
human being.  
On the one hand, the myth may be interpreted in a dialectic way as the genuine struggle between 
two forces essential to human life. An earthly or bodily element that pulls us down to the ground - 
the concern or worry for our physical bodies - and a “spirit-element” that pulls upward to the 
heavenly or divine - the moral life or living a good life. On the other hand, it is the uplifting sense of 
care as attentive solicitude that dominates the myth of Cura. It is a powerful allegory emphasizing 
that the most basic fact about human life is that humans are cared for and possess the capacity to 
care. Moreover, Reich argues that the myth provides a unique reinterpretation of the notion of 
power because the myth paints the picture that only those who are cared for from birth will 
“develop the nurturing power to care for self and others.”34 Thus, care binds human beings together 
and becomes the glue of society; a guiding principle of how we are to live together and an indication 
of care’s importance for moral philosophy and politics. 
In the myth of Cura, the first human being is called homo, or human, “for it is made from humus 
(earth)”35. Had it been named after the most powerful gods it would have been a symbol of the 
human being, being dominated by such power. Thus, the myth suggests that solicitous care may 
protect humans from oppression and manipulation by an enslaving power. It is care that brings the 
first human into existence. Care is inherent in creation, existence and even death; it gives, attends to 
and sustains the human life, and eases its passing away. In this way, the myth of Cura provides an 
account of “how care is central to what it means to be human and to live out a human life”36. 
Moreover, it also enables us to rethink the role and importance of care in human life by providing a 
genealogy of care. Therefore, care, Reich argues, provides us with an alternative way to interpret 
and a tool to understand the meaning of human experiences regarding the basic characteristics of 
human life and what it means to be human.37 
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INFLUENCE OF THE MYTH OF CURA 
Reich shows that the myth of Cura is not only important as a narrative that has influenced poets, 
writers, artists and philosophers of all centuries, but that it has also been embedded in practices 
such as the cura animarum. Cura animarum, or the care of the souls, refers to the Christian tradition 
of caring for spiritually, mentally or physically troubled persons and retains many of the above 
sketched out features of true solicitous care.38  
In the past, the notion of care has appeared in the spotlight on different stages throughout history. 
The German poet Goethe used the major themes from a poem titled The Child of Care, which he 
took from his teacher Herder, to create the dramatic poem Faust, his own masterpiece. In Faust, 
Goethe portrays both the heavy and dark sides of burdensome care, as well as care’s positive and 
uplifting function. The narrative demonstrates how terrible internal and external harm can be the 
result of selfish care for one’s own goals while ignoring and shutting out “a sometimes worrisome 
and painful concern for people and institutions”39. The chief message of the poem is that care should 
not be avoided in living a human life. Rather, the dark and destructive side of care must be 
converted into a “positive, solicitous concern for people and institutions.”40 For Goethe, this striving 
is essential to the pursuit of living a truly human life. It relates to the human condition in a 
fundamental way, for conscientious and devoted care may offer moral salvation, as it did for 
Goethe’s main protagonist Dr. Faust. In Faust, Goethe does not merely develop a notion of private 
care as “interpersonal devotion”, but sketches out what care can mean in a political context, thus 
being of interest to political philosophy. At the end of the poem and his life Dr. Faust has become a 
rich man and powerful ruler whose main concern becomes whether he will be able to “show 
solicitous care as a ruler”41. We can also find the same concern in Plato’s dialogue Statesman, where 
he discusses how a ruler should care for the community. I will come back to the discussion of Plato’s 
notion of care in a political setting in chapter III. 
 
                                                          
38 An elaboration of the care of the souls tradition within Christianity would go beyond the scope of this thesis. 
For a discussion see Reich, 1995, pp. 350-352. 





EXISTENTIAL CARE: TO CARE IS TO BE HUMAN 
The notion of care can also be traced historically in the philosophy of Søren Kierkegaard and Martin 
Heidegger. For Kierkegaard, Reich explains, care is the key to understanding and to living an 
authentic human life thus offering “creative philosophical explanations”42 of themes from both the 
myth of Cura and Goethe’s Faust. Furthermore, Reich argues that Kierkegaard influenced existential 
thinking profoundly in that his notion of the concerned thinker “became the central theme of 
existentialist philosophy and theology”43.  
Interest, concern or care are important ingredients to Kierkegaard’s notion of consciousness. He 
uses the notion of consciousness to contrast what he calls disinterested reflection. Such reflection 
has “no concern with, or interest in, the knower”44, but is merely a disinterested process of 
categorization of objects and “classifying things in opposition to each other”45. Consciousness on the 
other hand is concerned with contradictions, conflict and the “collision of opposites” that one may 
discover in reflection. In contrast to disinterested reflection, care for the knowing human being is 
inherent in consciousness. It is through concern or care that the naked objects of disinterested 
reflection are brought into “a real relationship with the knowing subject”46. The care for truth, that 
is, a concerned relationship to truth, is the foundation of Kierkegaard’s epistemology according to 
Reich. Kierkegaard deems it to be morally wrong, “a refuge from the chaos and pain of life”, 
amounting to “cowardice and escapism” to “adopt the stance of the impersonally knowing subject 
rather than that of the concerned human being”47. 
Consequently, it is through care human beings exercise both commitment and freedom for it is in 
the practice of care individuals make a concerned choice. Thus, for Kierkegaard it, is only through 
care or concern that action is possible. Such care is found in the individual for it is “as soon as I have 
to act, interest and concern is laid upon me, because I take responsibility on myself … “48 In other 
words, ethics without a someone caring for its objective, i.e., ethics without a concerned human 
being interested in how to live his or her own life, is not possible. Reason may play an important role 
                                                          
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Kierkegaard, 1958, p.150. 
45 Reich, 1995, p. 353. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Kierkegaard, 1958, pp. 116-117; Reich, 1995, p. 353. 
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in analyzing rules and deducing norms that help us guide our decisions in order to live a moral life, 
but any ethics, any purposeful action, always starts by an act of care by a self-reflected and 
concerned human being. Hence, for Kierkegaard, care is the foundation of all ethics. An ethics at 
whose root stands the caring and concerned human being as situated, always within relations to the 
world and to others, always in a state of flux and process of becoming, caught in the contradictions 
from reflection, concerned with his or her integrity that can only be shaped through decision and 
action,49 but with absolutely no security to know any ultimate justification or final outcome of his or 
her decisions and actions. 
Kierkegaard does not only discusses the existential and ethical dimensions of care, but creates a 
connection between positive and negative care by turning the experience of being burdened with 
cares into reasons not only for caring for oneself, but as well “seeking the care of others.”50 These 
thoughts, according to Reich, fall within the care of the souls literature because humans, even 
without having any other persons to care for them, will always find consolation in that they are still 
cared for by a caring God. Furthermore, the capacity of humans to care for material things and being 
weighed down by them seems to have a common element with the capacity to care for others and 
being cared for. There is always the danger that it can turn out to be a negative and hindering care. 
The need for security, our fears for our material and mental well being now and in the future, can 
lead to a burdensome care that will ultimately trap us in a struggle for absolute self-sufficiency. A 
struggle that will wear us out, weigh us down and that we are bound to lose if we get trapped in a 
“care-ridden state of mind”51. A state in which we are giving into an exaggerated habit of worrying 
too much about an uncertain future. On the other hand, Kierkegaard finds in it a potential to 
overcome the worrisome care for ourselves and to find consolation in the care of others, be it the 
human or spiritual other in the form of God. Thus, in worrisome care one can find a sign that human 
beings are able to care and being cared for in general. This care may be for other human beings, 
material things or even ourselves. Let us keep this capacity for care in mind for now. I will come back 
to it in chapter II. 
Kierkegaard is useful for thinking on care in yet another way, for he elaborates also on a special kind 
of anxious care, a care that is so strong that it has the power to overwhelm the individual human 
being with an existential Angst. It arises when a potentially deadly sickness reaches its decisive point. 
                                                          
49 Cf. Reich, 1995, p. 353. 




The point at which the question arises whether the sick person is “confronting life renewing itself or 
the looming decay of death”52. The anxiety or fear of death inherent in the climax of the disease can 
move the sick person toward reducing his or her resistance against accepting the care of others for 
the alternative would be a forlorn and terrifying death. It is often in the experience of imminent 
death, be it by disease or other catastrophic life events such as war or natural disaster, that move us 
to rethinking how we want to live our life and that may even provide strong enough motivation to 
take action on such reflection. 
Finally yet importantly, Reich shows that Kierkegaard was very clear that caring for someone else “is 
not always a gentle art”53. The care of a doctor for the health of a patient, for example, may require 
the physician to demand the patient to take responsibility for his or her own health by exercising 
regularly or going on a special diet. These, sometimes quite authoritative demands are nevertheless 
an expression of care and concern for the caree54 or in this case for the sick patient.  
Another influential existential thinker contributing to our understanding of care is Martin Heidegger 
who actively discusses and reinterprets the myth of Cura as an alternative version of the Christian 
creation myth. According to Reich, Heidegger even cites the myth of Cura as ”primordial 
justification”55 or naive interpretation of his philosophical conception of Dasein, i.e., he views care as 
the fundamental way of being human. In the myth of Cura the human being is created through Cura 
and the female virtue of care, while in the Christian myth of creation the woman is created second 
and from a rip of the man. Furthermore, Heidegger notes, the “double sense of cura” in the myth of 
Cura, which “refers to care for something as concern, absorption in the world, but also care in the 
sense of devotion."56 In this reading, it is the female notion of care that is primordial to our human 
existence and not the male as in the Christian creation myth. Cura or Care is life giving, life sustaining 
and promoting the flourishing of human life through the primacy of care. In other words, I read 
Heidegger as saying that we can only live authentic human lives if we give ourselves to care. Care is 
that which provides the basic “structures” for human life and what makes our human being-in-the-
world possible.57 
                                                          
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 A caree is a person cared for, as opposed to the carer who is the one that cares.  
55 Reich, 1995, p. 354.  
56 Heidegger, 1985, p. 303. 
57 Cf. Ibid. 
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INFLUENCE OF EXISTENTIAL CARE 
This notion of existential care has also influenced thinkers in other disciplines. In psychology Rollo 
May made Heidegger’s views “more accessible to the average reader by pointing out their 
psychological and moral implications”58. May regarded care as the capacity to feel that something 
matters and that this capacity for care “is born in the same act as the infant”59. For May believed 
that if human beings do not experience care in the earliest stages of their development they would 
not develop a capacity for care during later stages of life, and thus not become caring human beings. 
Only if our biological and psychological needs are addressed when we are infants may we fully 
develop the capacity to feel that something matters and to become interested and devoted human 
beings. It is again a notion that is already present in the myth of cura as well as Kierkegaard’s 
discussion of care.60 Care is what makes us human. It is, for May, as it was for Heidegger, the “basic 
constitutive phenomenon of human existence”61. If we lose or do not develop care in our relations, 
we lose what it is to be human.  
Furthermore, for May, care or caring includes an element of shepherding or tending and solicitude 
toward the welfare of both my own self and others. Remember, that this was the chief concern of 
the politician Dr. Faust had become at the end of Goethe’s masterpiece. May argues that, 
evolutionarily speaking, care may be nothing more than a palliative reaction to the biological 
sensation of pain.62 If we are not careful, we will hurt or injure ourselves. Thus, the care for one’s 
own well being must biologically and psychologically precede the care for others. However, even 
though care begins with one’s personal experience of pain, it enables us to recognize in ourselves 
the pain of others and others’ capacity to feel pain as we do.63  
There may even be a biological-psychological explanation for the human capacity to feel the pain of 
others as their own. In Psychology, mirror neurons have been observed in animals, primates and 
indirectly in human brain activity. They are triggered both when one acts and observes the same 
action performed by another. The theory argues that mirror neurons, mirror the behavior of the one 
                                                          
58 Ibid., p. 355. 
59 Ibid. 
60 See discussion on pp. 8-9. 
61 May, 1969, p. 290; Reich, 1995, p. 355. 
62 May, 1969, p. 289; Reich, 1995, p. 355. 
63 Tove Pettersen sees the cause for the universality of care in a similar line of argument; That care is based on 
the capacity to participate in others feelings and thus activates shared human experiences such as pain, 
suffering, as well as the relief from such experiences by care. See e.g. Pettersen, 2008, pp. 55-57 & Pettersen, 
2011, p. 58. 
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acting in the observer, inducing in him or her the same state of mind, emotions and feelings as in the 
observed. Thus, the observer is in an emotional and mental state as though he or she would feel 
pain or act him or herself. It is believed that mirror neuron systems in the human brain play an 
important part to which extent someone is capable of showing empathy.64  
It is the capacity to reflectively experience pain that lets us connect to other human beings on the 
basis of care (pain alleviation) and that lets us perceive others as belonging to the same community 
of human beings. The identification of a common humanity from our capacity to care is, to both May 
and Heidegger, the foundation of any ethics. Only if I do care, will I become conscious of the 
suffering of others including myself. I will be concerned for the well being, just and fair treatment, or 
moral status only of that which I care about. If May and Heidegger are right, then care is the pre-
condition for any moral interest. It comes as no surprise then that both thinkers view moral 
conscience as the recognition of “the call of care".65 Thus, Reich points out, that for both of them 
morality has its psychological roots in care, that is, “in the capacities of the human being to 
transcend the concrete situation of the immediate self-oriented desire,” and to decide and act 
beneficial “in terms of the welfare of the persons and groups upon whom his own fulfillment 
intimately depends”66.  
As I come to discuss in chapter II, this way of identifying ourselves with other human beings has the 
power to overcome dual ways of thinking about morality in terms of good/evil, right/wrong, or 
just/unjust. It dissipates conflict-furthering distinctions between I/you, we/they or friend/enemy and 
dissolves the conflict between the traditional notion of altruism vs egoism that is essential to the 
discussion of mature care later in chapter II. For the notion of mature care construed in the way 
Tove Pettersen sees it overcomes these binary distinctions.67 
The understanding of care as being at the roots of ethics may already now point us to some of its 
political implications. For if, care is truly essential to living a human life then it must be preserved 
and furthered continuously over and across generations. Care, thus, becomes a generational task. If 
May is right that the capacity to care is developed in the child by its parents taking care of the child it 
is always the preceding generation that lays the ground for the next generation. Only if we care for 
our children will they develop the capacity to care for their own children and so on. That thought is 
                                                          
64 Cf. Keysers, 2011. 
65 May, 1969, p. 290; Reich, 1995, p. 355. 
66 May, 1969, p. 268; Reich, 1995, p. 355. 
67 See my discussion on p. 49ff in chapter II. 
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the reason why, according to Reich, Erik Erikson has argued that taking care of future generations 
should be institutionalized and given continuity, not only in private institutions such as the family, 
but in “extended households and divided labor”68, and ,we can add, other public and state 
institutions such as kindergartens, schools and universities. For Erikson, caring is “the generational 
task of cultivation strength in the next generation”69.  
Thus, Reich interprets Erikson to say that the task to care for the next generation is best achieved by 
political means because it is political communities including “social and political leadership”70 that 
have to organize the continuity of care. Consequently, care widens the focus of a strictly ethical 
understanding of care for it is not only the capacity to care for other human beings, for my children, 
my parents or my partner, that is important, but also the capacity to care for that, which makes 
these relations possible. To realize the shared responsibility of caring for this planet and all life on it 
as creatures of this world. If, for example, I do not care about the well being of the planet I can 
hardly claim to care about the livelihood of human communities. Because by destroying the livability 
of the planet I make human and other life impossible. If I do not care about a healthy environment 
that makes human life possible, I cannot claim to care about other human beings for I accept that 
they may not have the chance of living a healthy life. If I do not care about the protection of our 
natural environment, that includes plants, microorganisms, animals and their habitat, I will not care 
about the continued existence of the human race. For by destroying them I accept that the 
necessary conditions for human existence will be destroyed, too. Thus, if I do not care about any of 
these things, I can hardly claim to care for myself, that is, for my own existence and living well. 
Thinking of care in such a way gives us a clear understanding of its reflective power. For by caring for 
the other, be it human beings, animals, plants or inanimate objects (that which makes animate life 
possible), I always care for myself and my own existence at the same time. And vice versa, if I care 
about my own well being and livelihood I will realize that these depend on the favorable conditions 
created by a larger framework, i.e., the biological and humanly created structures that define my life 
in a political community, and thus I will realize that these structures need attention and care so that I 
can participate in shaping them in favorable ways.  
Nevertheless, philosophically this insight presents us with a challenge many care approaches are 
facing. Essentially, it says that through care, we become more caring, or in other words, that if we 
would all care more we would live in a more caring society. The biggest problem with this argument, 
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in addition to being logically problematic, is that it does not provide an account of how we can 
become more caring.71 I see two strategies to address this challenge. The first, is to comprehend 
care as a pedagogical concept and educational project. That care is always in need of further caring 
and that we have to learn to care in an adequate way.72 The second is to address the problem of the 
how from the perspective of Erikson's approach. Erikson’s framework of care is based on a very 
Nietzschean idea, the idea of preservation and enhancement, or flourishment, of the species.73 
According to Reich, Erikson argues that it is our task to strengthen and develop the capacity to care 
in the next generation.74 The development of this capacity to care is characterized by a dialectic 
process of negative and positive aspects of development, that of generativity and rejectivity. These 
two opposing momenta of self-absorption vs generativity, that is, the conflict between self-interest 
and the extent to which we are concerned with and respond to the next generation, create a 
continual process of development and change. This process will ideally lead to the emergence of 
individual growth and a strong capacity to care through an “active adaptation that requires that one 
changes the environment, including social [norms] and institutions, while making selective use of its 
opportunities.”75   
On the one hand, generativity is, for Erikson, a sympathic strength that is characterized by one's 
willingness to include others in one’s generative concerns. On the other hand, rejectivity is the 
antipathic inclination not to embrace others in one’s own generative concern. Rejectivity, for 
                                                          
71 Engster, 2004, p. 118. 
72 See my discussion of the pedagogical core of care in chapter III on p. 92f. 
73 Nietzsche, in my opinion, is often misconstrued as putting the enhancement of one species as the highest 
good. His Übermensch is often wrongly presented as an enhanced and thus better human being. Although a 
thorough discussion of Nietzsche’s philosophy goes beyond the scope of this thesis, I want to point out that 
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Nietzsche from a monist point of view may be characterized as a single animating principle, that lets us 
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Will to Power is Nietzsche’s way of overcoming a binary mode of understanding traditional ethics. Even though 
Nietzsche believes that moral and human development can only be achieved by the destruction and re-
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point that the notion of care may offer an alternative understanding of how we can preserve and enhance 
humanity. It is not through the Will to Power, but through care and care structures that we can preserve, 
strengthen and develop the capacity for care in the next generation. 
74 Reich, 1995, pp. 355-356. 
75 Ibid., p. 356. 
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Erikson, simply expresses that “one does not care to care for”76 others and that one may even hold 
hostile attitudes toward them.  
Since human beings are finite entities with a limited capacity to care, care will always be selective 
and thus lead to a certain amount of rejectivity. Erikson argues that it is through “ethics, law and 
insight”, and we may add through politics, that we have to determine the allowable amount of 
rejectivity. While it is perfectly alright in most western countries to freely express one’s thoughts and 
opinion in principle, the freedom of expression is usually limited by safeguards that are supposed to 
hinder violent or destructive effects to society, such as the principle of hate speech.77 Thus, 
according to Reich, Erikson believes that "religious and ideological belief systems must continue to 
advocate a more universal principle of care for specified wider units of communities"78 if we are to 
reduce rejectivity among people as well as peoples. This can happen in “small but significant [caring] 
gestures” of everyday life or express itself in “global struggles against uncaring attitudes”79 that have 
destructive effects on the development of communities. On this account, it would be the task of 
politics to find out how this process can best be facilitated by political means, for example, by 
creating societal structures and institution that promote care both domestically as well as globally. 
The idea that to care for another is to facilitate growth and flourishing goes all the way back to the 
myth of Cura and has been picked up by thinkers such as Nietzsche and Erikson. It is also a 
prominent notion in the philosophy of Milton Mayeroff who holds that to care is “to help the other 
grow, whether the other is a person, an idea, an ideal, a work of art, or a community”80. By helping 
others grow, one enters into a mutual relation because the caring action is beneficial to both.  
A good example for such a mutual relation is the relation between a parent and the child. While the 
caring parent would want the child to develop and grow in a certain way, for example, to become a 
good piano player, a good scientist, an excellent doctor or simply a good human being, this is only 
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possible when the parent respects the child to grow in her or his own way, too. Too much authority 
in telling the child what to do and how to achieve it, mainly for the sake of the parents, will most 
likely lead to passive dependence or rebellion. Thus, caring in this instance will require a certain 
degree of trusting the caree. The relationship is mutual beneficial because the parents provide the 
child with the necessary means to develop and flourish, while at the same time the positive 
development of the child progressively effects the well being of the parent. To learn to care for 
someone or something other than oneself is thus an integral part of helping other persons to 
flourish.  
Anyhow, flourishment or human growth should not be understood as a “series of goal-oriented 
services”81 or static aims that are to be achieved. Rather, Mayeroff sees caring first and foremost as 
a process. If, for example, a parent regards the child becoming a successful doctor as a mere means 
to a future service, that of securing the parent’s own need for support when getting old, the parent 
does not take the process of the development of the child serious in its own right. To support 
someone’s development and flourishment for its own sake is an important ingredient to caring 
without which it becomes impossible to care. Being cared for in such a way will not only further trust 
in the caree as well as the carer, but lead to moral development. Since one is trusted not to merely 
conform to established norms, but to make one’s own decisions, based on self-chosen and in 
experience grounded ideas and values, such care will ultimately lead to a higher degree of moral 
autonomy and self-determination. 
Furthermore, Mayeroff thinks, that it will support the development of responsiveness in the caree as 
well as in the carer. It is this element of responsiveness that is of special interest to ethical and 
political dimensions of care, because the responsibility that arises from the attentive devotion to 
one’s own children, it can be argued, is different in kind from the obligations or duties derived from 
external norms or principles. While the care for my own children comes from devotion, relational 
commitments and concern for the well being of myself as well as for my child, to care for other 
persons outside of my family or political community usually derives from external sources such as 
customs, national and international law or principles of justice and equality. Such external 
motivation can be tricky simply because, for one, it may seem too far removed from everyday life to 
bear significance on how I live my life and two, one would still have to explain why one should follow 
such abstract principles and how these principles motivate the (moral) agent to act on them. 
However, caring engages an agent not only on an abstract and intellectual, but as well on an emotive 




level, thus, providing stronger motivation to care based action.82 Caring, thus, has the power to 
order “other values and activities of life around itself, resulting in an integration of the self with the 
surrounding world.”83 Hence, care, for Mayeroff, plays a fundamental role to our human condition. 
To be cared for and feel that we are trusted, truly loved and needed by another corresponds to the 
feeling that life has meaning.84 
 
INGREDIENTS OF CARE 
Reich, in his investigation into the history of care, cites several concepts that have parallels to the 
notion of care and that have been of importance to several philosophers and their thoughts on 
morality. Sympathy, empathy and compassion are all important to the notion of care and have 
achieved a moral significance of their own in the works of David Hume, Arthur Schopenhauer, Adam 
Smith, Max Scheler (sympathy/empathy), and Joseph Butler (compassion). Sympathy as the capacity 
that lets us identify with how someone feels does indeed bear some resemblance with elements of 
care. It is a prominent feature of care for both May and Mayeroff. Nevertheless, care is a much 
richer notion having both “a deeper role in human life,” being “broader than sympathy in its tasks,” 
and entailing “a more committed role with other people and projects.”85 
Attention is another important ingredient in the notion of care. It can be argued, that there is no 
care without attention. Only if we pay attention to someone or something can we be said to care for 
that person or thing. In other words, concerned or solicitous attention is a precondition for care, 
whereas care cannot be reduced to mere interest and attention, because it would lack the element 
of me acting on that interest. It is precisely the strength of care that it provides motivation on an 
emotive rather than a purely abstract level by linking feelings and emotions with a mental state to 
explain how and why one can decide to act. To care about a refugee is to pay attention both to the 
situation that person is in, his or her needs as well as my own, and how to care in the right way. The 
French philosopher Simone Weil argued for attention to be “the central image for ethics”86. It is an 
effort we have to prioritize often at the cost of suspending our own thought or action in order to 
care for someone or something. For Weil, attention as an effort of caring contemplation is the 
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condition for any moral undertaking and can give us an alternative approach to moral principles such 
as equality and justice. According to Weil, equality is not an abstract principle or concept from which 
action is to be deduced. Rather, it is a certain way of looking at, i.e., giving a certain kind of attention 
to others and ourselves.87  
This line of thought reminds of the discussion that care is at the roots of questions such as what it 
means to live a human life and how to live together in this world. Justice, fairness and equality are 
truly important principles, but they are of merely theoretical and academic interest and useless for 
politics if we do not care. I will only be concerned with a fair and just treatment of others if I 
acknowledge them having the same rights as I do on a practical level. I will care to help refugees 
fleeing war or disaster and coming to my country only if I care about their right to life as well as their 
existential experiences stemming from concrete and life-threatening circumstances. It is not enough 
to acknowledge their basic human rights on an abstract and from action detached level. Rather, it is 
my capacity to care that will ultimately move me to action by making me realize that other such as 
refugees are human beings just like me, trying to avoid pain, suffering , insecurity and death. 
I do not want to argue that we can do without principles such as justice, fairness and equality. They 
are indeed important guiding principles and studying them has high educational value. So these 
principles play indeed a major role, but they serve only a theoretical function as long as they are not 
applied to our private and political actions. And this simply presupposes that I do care.  
In addition to the notions of sympathy-empathy and attention, I will argue that a third main 
ingredient to care is the idea of vulnerability. Most ethical approaches presuppose the notion of a 
strong self or strong and autonomous agent. A concept of the person as being able to decide his or 
her own fate and to determine his or her own actions. This, although an ideal we may strive for, is a 
somewhat problematic presupposition. For it seems as if a strong self cannot simply be 
presupposed, but must be developed. Thus, it is important to pay attention to how a strong and self-
sufficient self may be developed, as well as we have to make space for the notion of a vulnerable 
and weak self88.  
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VULNERABILITY AS THE FOUNDATION OF CARE? 
Even though, Reich does not include a comprehensive discussion of vulnerability into his article on 
the history of the notion of care, I believe it does play an important role for how he thinks of care in 
moral and political terms. In a very short two page paper on the importance of vulnerability for 
bioethics Reich outlines his belief that vulnerability may very well be “the single most important 
idea” for our “moral discourse”89 in the near future. Political and ethical questions that arise at the 
intersections of technology and human life on the individual as well as the societal level may 
threaten our humanity. These threats can take various forms such as the existential threat of global 
warming, technologies of government replacing the need for politics, global and total surveillance 
threatening democratic societies, artificial intelligence and robotics replacing the need and habit of 
human care and decision making, or social media and virtual realities completely absorbing the 
individual human being. Thus, Reich argues, that in order to keep a human perspective in an ever 
faster developing world, we need to rethink ethics and politics from the perspective of vulnerability 
and care.  
For Reich, ethics for too long has been dominated by principles of autonomy and reason that came 
to prominence during the Enlightenment. He argues that the idea that “human perfectibility is 
infinite and human faculties will constantly improve through science and reason90 have pushed 
moral concepts such as dependency, a weak self and vulnerability into the background of the moral 
discourse.  
Realizing the role of vulnerability in ethics and politics presupposes a certain impulse in the moral 
thinker and political theorist. The impulse to not look for final solutions, security and guidance in 
abstract and theoretical principles, but to embrace the empirical uncertainties of our human 
existence by allowing ourselves “a sense of wonder regarding human mortality, woundedness, 
fragility, dependence, and victimization.”91 The notion of care, Reich thinks, has the power to 
reintroduce vulnerability into ethical and political discourse as a philosophical concept, because it 
regards vulnerability as fundamental to being human. Furthermore, according to Reich, the single 
identifying feature pertaining to the human condition is our constant need for care by self, others 
and society. We are who we are as persons and what we are as a society only through care and care 
structures. This need for care is universal, since all humans need care. It is grounded in our own 
                                                          





vulnerability and interdependence with other human beings and the community. Human 
vulnerability is that which makes a universal experience of human suffering, pain, and, thus, need for 
care, possible. In its most extreme form vulnerability is also the foundation of exaggerated forms of 
care such as existential angst or anxiety. Consequently, vulnerability provides a strong emotive 
thrust toward decision and action. 
 
WHAT KIND OF IDEAS AND NOTIONS ARE PHILOSOPHICALLY IMPORTANT TO 
THE NOTION OF CARE? 
Before we continue, I will summarize what one could learn from the history and etymology of the 
notion of care so far.  
All humans have the capacity to care. This capacity is not limited to other human beings, but can 
extend to everything from living and sentient beings, such as humans or animals, to plants, nature 
and material objects as well as immaterial objects such as religious or philosophical ideas.  
As human beings living in more or less organized societies and communities we are to a large extent 
defined by the care we receive and are able to give. In other words, we become who we are as 
human beings, as a society, as a race through care and care structures. 
Care develops reflectively. Only by caring for others will the capacity to care be developed in them. 
Thus, care is a generational task with a strong political element. Furthering and developing care 
across generations can only be guaranteed through private (family) and political institutions 
(educational, social, health, and palliative). 
Care links two strong components that have the power to move human beings to action; reason and 
emotion. It shifts the focus from freedom as power or autonomy in the individual or sovereignty in 
the state toward the biological, psychological, societal and philosophical constitutive characteristics 
of our human condition. Thereby, opening up another perspective onto the world, a perspective 
giving priority to vulnerability, sympathy and attentiveness as the ultimate source of all moral or 
political principles.  
Furthermore, the history and etymology of care shows that care can have several different meanings 
that fall within two main clusters: 1. worrisome, burdening concern (the dark side of care), and 2. 
uplifting and solicitous care (the light side of care). Thus, making caring decisions does not 
necessarily lead to positive effects in itself. The history and etymology of care shows impressively 
where the notion of care comes from and how it has developed in thought and culture throughout 
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the ages. However, our understanding of care still lacks important elements if we are to arrive at a 
comprehensive theory of care that can be influential both within the ethical and political domain.  
In my opinion, we still lack a more theoretical discussion of a concept of the human being, or the 
agent both in form of the carer as well as the caree, and an analysis of the various care relations. If 
care really can extend to humans, animals, plants, spiritual and material objects the question arises 
what kind of caring relations would we have to all these different things. In order to elaborate on 
these questions I will now turn to the field that has reintroduced the notion of care into mainstream 

















CHAPTER II - REFLECTIVE AND MATURE CARE: AN ETHICAL 
NOTION OF CARE 
CARE ETHICS: THE RE-EMERGENCE OF CARE 
The notion of care has always been a minority tradition of thought and practice. At least when 
compared to more established and discussed moral and political theories such as deontology, 
utilitarianism and justice theories. Thus, Reich points out that when he wrote the article on the 
History of The Notion of Care (1995) there was no “formal and systematic ethics of care”92 in the 
sources he examined at that time. On page two in her 2008 book Comprehending Care Tove 
Pettersen quotes Reich taking him to say that “an ethics of care was none existent”93 prior to 
Gilligan’s 1982 book In a Different Voice. I believe this an overstatement. Reich, as we have seen 
above, does indeed show that the notion of care has played an important, albeit limited, role in the 
history of western thinking as well as ethics and politics. However, he emphasizes that although 
being of major importance for Christianity in the care of the souls as well as for German romanticism 
exemplified by Goethe’s Sorge, it never came to prominence within mainstream philosophical 
thinking.  
In any case, we take from the history of the notion of care that care has not always been understood 
through a purely ethical lens. The myth of Cura has influenced our western culture and we can still 
see its bearing on the meaning of care today. However, care and tending played an important part 
for social and political life with regard to both thought and practice long before the Roman poet 
Virgil or the Stoic philosopher Seneca. It was care as part of the political, which was already of 
peculiar importance to the pre-Socratic thinker Protagoras as well as to Plato. Hans Sluga goes as far 
as to say that care was at the core of a pre-Socratic understanding of politics through the 
Protagorean notion of politics as the care of the common.94 The care of the common was a political 
notion of a radically democratic care or concern by the people and for the people of pre-Socratic 
Greece. Sluga argues that Plato took this democratic notion of care and twisted it into his own 
project where the care of the common was not to be understood as a practice by the people, but as 
the task of an expert ruler, Plato’s philosopher king, to provide and tend to the needs of the people. 
The comprehension of care as the care for the common may provide us with a notion of care that 
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may inform and enlarge care as it is conceptualized within the ethics of care into a political concept. 
We will come back to this discussion in chapter III. 
Although not discussing the importance of care for Plato’s and Protagoras’ thought, Reich, by 
emphasizing the historical context of care, shows quite impressively what kind of bearing the notion 
of care can have on politics and an “ethics of care”. He challenges care ethics and politics on at least 
two fronts. One, by explicating the dark side of care, and two, with regard to care’s development 
into a full blown ethical/political theory.95 Anyhow, Reich agrees with Pettersen on the importance 
of Gilligan’s book in that he, too, acknowledges that it was In a Different Voice that opened 
mainstream philosophy for dealing with the notion of care.96 In this picture, Pettersen’s project fits 
in as continuation of the tradition of the ethics of care in attempting to investigate and provide a 
formal and systematic account. “The formal structure of the ethics of care, its philosophical content, 
implicit premises, the soundness of its arguments and its significance for more traditional moral 
theory”, she argues “are far from exhausted.”97 
Before we will turn toward Pettersen’s attempt of a formalized ethics of care, let us see where 
Pettersen comes from in terms of her thinking on care by giving some attention to Carol Gilligan’s 
account of care. 
 
CARE ETHICS: A DIFFERENT OUTLOOK 
According to Tove Pettersen, it was Carol Gilligan’s book In a Different Voice98 that opened academic 
mainstream philosophy to the notion of care, especially in the field of ethics. One of the strengths of 
Gilligan’s work is that it establishes a connection between moral philosophy and moral psychology99, 
that is, the study pertaining to human capacities and development. Pettersen as well as Gilligan 
think that moral psychology, should be of major concern to the moral philosopher because if ethics 
or moral philosophy is concerned with what we ought to do, the ought must be within our human 
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capacity to act on it.100 If the moral voice demands from us actions we do not have the capacity to 
carry into execution it cannot be said to provide a useful guiding principle for human conduct. 
Even though, Gilligan speaks of an approach towards ethics characterized by care, she never 
developed a full-fledged theory of care.101 Tove Pettersen takes up the project to further develop 
Gilligan’s groundwork on care into a full-blown ethical theory. We will thus turn to why Pettersen 
thinks that care is important to ethics shortly. 
First, let us sketch out Gilligan’s findings in order to understand where Pettersen comes from in 
terms of her ethics of care.102 Gilligan was a research assistant of developmental psychologist 
Lawrence Kohlberg who invented what he called the stage theory of moral development103, a 
“hierarchical stage model that was meant to measure moral development and moral maturity.”104 In 
Kohlberg’s empirical research male participants tended to score consistently higher within his 
hierarchical model than female participants leading Kohlberg to the conclusion that men are in 
general more morally developed than women. In response to Kohlberg, Gilligan started her own 
research program in which she showed that women were neither morally inferior nor superior to 
men, but simply different to their male counterparts. The main difference was that women’s moral 
and cognitive development typically focused on values of relation, connectedness, interdependence 
and care. Gilligan argued that traditional moral theories were prejudiced toward values of justice, 
which were typically more important in the moral development of men and thus could explain 
Kohlberg’s findings whose stage model was prejudiced toward the same male values. 
Kohlberg’s stage model consisted of three stages and six sub-stages of moral development. It is a 
hierarchical model with the lowest stage being the “pre-conventional” stage. The “conventional” or 
middle stage is representative of most adolescents and adults while the “post-conventional” stage is 
the highest stage of moral development that is not always achieved by individuals. Kohlberg 
subdivides each stage in two sub-stages of moral development. At stage one, the child learns to not 
damage property, harm other people or break rules. In this stage, the child acquires a notion that 
                                                          
100 Pettersen, 2008, ix. 
101 Ibid., x. 
102 The following section on Lawrence Kohlberg’s theory of moral development and Carol Gilligan’s reply is 
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103 Cf. Pettersen, 2008, p. 3. 
104 Ibid., p. 1. 
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the right thing to do is to follow rules made by authority, which is accepted on the basis of avoiding 
pain by punishment and “the superior power of authority.”105 This “heteronomous” (to follow laws 
or rules given by others than oneself) stage of moral development is characterized by an egocentric 
“socio-moral” perspective. That is, non-consideration of others’ interests and the non-recognition of 
their divergence from one’s own interests. At stage one the child often confuses the actions 
demanded by an authority, such as a parent, with his or her own and has not yet developed the 
psychological capacity to reflect others’ interests. Rather, the child understands actions to a high 
degree as physical conduct. At stage two, the child acquires basic reflective concepts such as a 
primitive concept of reciprocity. Now, the right thing to do is to act in a way that helps one’s own 
interests and to let others act in a similar fashion. Morality becomes instrumental in that it is 
understood as being useful in “serving one’s own interests” at the same time recognizing the 
interests of others: If you help me, I’ll help you. At this stage, the child develops a concrete concept 
of the self, adopting an individualistic socio-moral perspective realizing that the interests of others’ 
may conflict with the child’s own needs.  
Stage one and two constitute the “pre-conventional” stage, which defines the development of 
children up until the age of nine. During stages three and four the child enters the “conventional” 
stage which is representative of the moral development of most “adolescents and adults in most 
countries.”106 The “interpersonal normative morality” that is developed at stage three is 
characterized by a “good boy/nice girl” orientation. To act according to what is expected of one, as 
well as to be a morally good person in the eyes of others as well as in one’s own eyes is the primary 
moral motivation. The socio-moral perspective at this stage is characterized by a relational approach 
of being and individual within relationships and shared interpersonal feelings become of moral 
concern. Early signs of a contractarian understanding of morality become visible as expectations and 
agreements rather than personal interests are prime motivators for moral conduct. Thus, “caring for 
the other, belief in the Golden Rule and the desire to maintain rules and authority that support 
‘good behavior’ may also be reasons for acting right.”107 At stage four the moral agent enters into 
what Kohlberg calls a “social system morality” or “law and order” attitude. To fulfill one’s duties and 
to act according to (moral) laws is the (morally) right thing to do. The well being of a community or 
society along with the desire to uphold social order is what motivates the agent to act morally. A 
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necessary precondition for doing so is that the agent develops a capacity to differentiate between 
“interpersonal agreements and motives” and “a societal point of view”108.  
The “post-conventional” stage is the highest stage of moral development. It is comprised of the two 
last sub-stages; stage five and six. Stage five is defined by what Kohlberg has termed the “Human 
Rights and Social Welfare Morality”. At this stage the moral agent develops the capacity to evaluate 
the lawfulness of societal laws, social systems and moral rules according to their ability to further 
and preserve values of basic human rights and the well being of communities. To act morally is to act 
according to these rules for as long as they protect and promote human and societal welfare rights. 
The political community or social system is viewed from a contractarian point of view as a freely and 
voluntarily entered contract. Thus, stage five is clearly characterized by deontological (act according 
to laws, rules) as well as utilitarian features, since the reason to act according to laws protecting 
human rights and social welfare values is to “the welfare of all and the protection of everybody’s 
rights.”109 Furthermore, the agent’s socio-moral perspective at stage five is that of rational 
individuals who realize the moral significance of the social attachments’ and contracts’ underlying 
rights and values. Finally, there is stage six which is together with stage five only achieved by a 
minority of adults and usually developed between age 20-25. It is characterized by “universal ethical 
principles” and freedom to follow these self-chosen moral principles (autonomy) or laws that are 
interpreted as “universal principles of justice”. The moral agent’s believe in the validity and universal 
applicability of such principles is what commits him or her to accept them as action guiding rules of 
conduct. 
Kohlberg used the above sketched out stage model to evaluate his research subjects’ moral 
development and maturity. The higher a subject scores, that is, the higher the stage of moral 
development of the moral agent, the more mature is he or she deemed to be. Kohlberg’s research 
was mainly based on the participant’s response to theoretical and abstract moral dilemmas they 
were given. Nevertheless, Pettersen points out that there are a couple of problems with Kohlberg’s 
model both philosophical as well as empirical. A Number of Philosophers have argued that there is 
no empirical evidence supporting stage six.110 Another major shortcoming of Kohlberg’s research is 
that only boys served as research subjects until the early 70s. As soon as girls started to participate it 
became evident that their approach toward the moral dilemmas given to them was different to that 
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of the male participants. While the boys generally scored higher on Kohlberg’s model than girls, 
because they approached the moral dilemmas from a perspective of justice, valuing independency 
and abstract reasoning. The girls based their approaches to resolve the moral dilemmas on ideas of 
“responsiveness and connectedness with [concrete] others, on preventing harm and maintaining 
relationships”111 and thus achieved a lower score and were deemed to be less morally developed. 
Hence, Kohlberg who viewed his theory to be universally applicable drew the conclusion that girls 
were in general less morally developed than boys were. That fired Gilligan’s warning lights. She 
blamed Kohlberg’s stage model of moral development to be sex-biased and in favor of a certain kind 
of moral reasoning (the male way) at the same time being unable to appreciate the female way of 
solving moral dilemmas. 
 
GILLIGAN’S CRITIQUE OF KOHLBERG’S THEORY 
Gilligan criticized Kohlberg’s theory on three grounds. First, she argued that Kohlberg overtook 
prejudices pertaining to the sex-bias from preceding theories of moral psychology and development 
that determined his interpretation of the empirical data. Well known psychologists such as Jean 
Piaget, who characterized the different behavior of women as variance to the norm (male behavior), 
and Sigmund Freud, who saw women as castrated men112, lay the foundation for Kohlberg’s 
academic prejudices toward female behavior. Women, Gilligan argued, were only of interest to the 
extent to which they were similar to men. Female behavior was thus seen as an anomaly and 
empirically insignificant. Pettersen believes that this empirically flawed version of the sex-bias can be 
traced back to Aristotle who ordered sexual differences in a “hierarchical order, in favor of men”113. 
The second criticism was that Kohlberg’s empirical foundation for developing his stage model was 
solely based on male participants, thus undermining its universality114. Gilligan’s third criticism is 
directed toward what Kohlberg assumed to be “the core of morality and moral development”, the 
deontological foundation of morality, i.e., that morality is to be understood as “a matter of rights 
and duties”. By choosing a deontological ethical framework Kohlberg, according to Gilligan, was 
guilty of giving preference to traditional masculine values and skills such as “the ability to abstract 
from the particular, to deduce from rules and principles rather than focusing on context, to put 
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reason over emotions, to rely on a concept of self as independent rather than interdependent 
etc.”115 Although Gilligan acknowledged that there were differences in men’s and women’s moral 
reasoning these differences should not be taken to express moral inferiority or superiority. But 
Kohlberg who himself admitted to having used a justice perspective on morality could not interpret 
moral behavior outside of his frame of reference other than having to stem from moral inferiority or 
divergence from the norm.  
Hence, Gilligan in In a Different Voice put forth, two primary hypotheses; first, that there are (at 
least) “two different types of moral reasoning, the care and justice perspective.”116 And second, that 
the care perspective typically pertains to women, while the justice perspective is typically held by 
men. “Typically”, according to Pettersen, does not mean that all men hold a justice perspective on 
morality and that all women universally apply care ethics. Both perspectives can be used and applied 
by both sexes and neither perspective is either “biologically determined [or] unique to women”117. 
Rather “typically” says that women more often hold a care perspective, while the justice perspective 
is more often found in men.118 Gilligan believes that the development of these two perspectives can 
be traced to early human experiences.  
 
THE SELF: WEAK VS STRONG, CONNECTED VS SEPARATED 
In Gilligan’s attempt of grounding these two hypotheses, one can clearly see the trajectory of several 
ideas and features of care that we were able to identify from the history of the notion of care. Most 
prominently the notion of a relational or connected self and vulnerability or a weak self. Gilligan 
argues that “predispositions towards justice and towards care can be traced to the experience of 
inequality and of attachment that are embedded in the relationship between child and parent”119. In 
such relations where there is an asymmetrical allocation of power between carer and caree humans 
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experience vulnerability to “oppression and to abandonment”120. There are two important 
conceptual notions that Gilligan identifies. The process of rejection and attachment in early human 
development and vulnerability. 
Both notions are present in the history of the notion of care and Gilligan grounds her explanation of 
the development of the two different stages of care in earlier discussed thoughts on care by both 
Rollo May, Erik Eriksons and Milton Mayeroff. Gilligan makes two ontological assumptions 
concerning human nature. One, that “no child can survive without being in a relationship” and two, 
that, thus “interdependence is a common human experience”121. Both assumptions are grounded in 
the universal experience of human vulnerability. For in contrast to certain other animals or plants 
human beings are dependent on the nurturing care of others if they are to survive and flourish. We 
can truly hear the voice of Cura in these assumptions.122 
Even though Gilligan sees the early childhood experience of being related as a universal feature she 
sketches out two main ways in which the human self can develop from there on; one, to become a 
connected and interdependent self or two, a disconnected and independent self. How does this 
happen? According to Gilligan123, the infant’s relation to his or her primary care-taker provides the 
child with a basic capacity for care. A capacity that is developed through the child’s participation in 
relationships that are “sharing features of the early parent-child relationship”124 such as trust and 
intimacy, as well as the desire to create the same features in these relationships. In many instances, 
the primary care-taker is the mother of the child and believes that although the experience of 
vulnerability and the need for care is the same on the most basic level, a difference evolves in the 
relationship between boys and their mother and girls and their mother. Since girls are of the same 
sex as the mother they identify to a larger degree with the mother’s concerns and way of relating to 
female issues of mothering and caretaking. Hence, girls develop a higher sensitivity and a self-
concern toward “early childhood issues in relation to their mother”125 the result being women 
developing a capacity for identification and their self being connected with others. This connected 
self enables them to feel the empathy, and attentiveness needed to care for their children. 
                                                          
120 Ibid., p. 5. 
121 Pettersen, 2008, p. 10. 
122 See e.g. Chapter I, Influence of Existential Care. 
123 Gilligan’s point of departure is Nancy Chodorow’s object-relation theory. Cf. Chodorow, 1978.  




In contrast to girls, boys early on go through a process characterized not only by attachment, but 
also by rejection. Their unconditioned identification with female and care issues as well as the male 
infant’s attachment to his mother is altered by his mother’s treating him as an opposite already in a 
very early stage. This leads to experiences of detachment and separation and eventually the boys’ 
development of a separated and autonomous self. Hence, the “relational basis” for care taking is 
enhanced in women, while it is repressed in men, since “they experience themselves as more 
separate and distinct from others.126 Consequently, men typically conceive morality as reciprocal 
rules organizing how we relate to autonomous others and giving prevalence to principles of justice in 
these questions, while women who tend to conceive of the self as connected give priority to 
responsiveness and relationship that characterize a morality of care. In other words, while care 
tends to be the ideal for the connected (female) self, justice tends to be the ideal for the 
autonomous and disconnected (male) self. In summary, early childhood separation from the primary 
care-taker is the cause for differences in the development of the self, of how we perceive others and 
our relationships toward others.127  
To me, Gilligan’s account is another way of showing that the categories in which we think about the 
world influence how we perceive it. However, these categories are not something that is hardwired 
into our biological make up or given a priori; rather they are a product of and can be affected by a 
certain development128. A development that may lead to various starting points. Starting points that 
in turn present us with specific moral problems.  
Consider the starting point of traditional moral theories such as deontology. If I do perceive myself 
as an individual, i.e., the smallest indivisible entity, disconnected and self-law giving (autonomous) 
then one could argue, that one always will end up with the problem of finding principles or rules that 
are to tell me how to act, relate to and how to live together with others. I find this comprehension to 
bear resemblance to a certain scientific view of the world and the categories that are used in e.g. 
particle physics, which attempts to uncover the laws that bind together atoms and particles, i.e., the 
smallest indivisible entities, in a larger system. While in physics, it is thought that these laws are 
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universal and effective with absolute necessity; traditional moral theories leave it to the individual 
whether or not he or she wants to act according to the (moral, societal and political) laws necessary 
for binding humanity together. This is proclaimed freedom of choice is typically referred to as free 
will. The final justification of such laws is, in natural as well as human sciences and philosophy, 
depending on the belief that there is some ultimate justification or grounding principle giving validity 
to the laws we deduce from it. Without such an ultimate ground there is an infinite regress with 
regard to the principles we deduce.  
Here it is possible to see parallels between the traditional moral theories' and the traditional 
scientific theories' quest for the ultimate grounding principle. While it is the assumption of, for 
example, a highest good, God, or pure reason that serve as the ultimate justification in normative 
theory from which we deduce the principles of justice that are supposed to function as moral and 
political rules governing our behavior and organizing society. The same role falls to the not (yet) 
proven, but necessary to exist Higgs field in particle physics. The Higgs field produces a particle, the 
Higgs boson, which according to the standard model in physics is itself massless, but responsible for 
all the mass in the universe. It gives mass to all other particles and thus creates the forces necessary, 
such as gravity, for keeping particles together, which are not explainable without the Higgs boson. 
Since the Higgs boson is the ultimate ground on which particle physics is based and has some of the 
same properties God has in many religions, most notably the power to give existence to all particles, 
is “invisible” in itself, but necessary for the standard model in particle physics to be true, it has been 
called the “God particle”129.  
Anyhow, even though physicists believe to have observed particles with some of the same 
properties as the Higgs boson it is not yet proven to exist. Moreover, even if it were proven to exist, 
its final confirmation would not achieve what physicists hope it would achieve; the ultimate 
grounding of the standard model of how we think the world works. Rather, it would continue the 
infinite regress by raising more questions such as what gives the Higgs boson its properties.130 Thus, 
to stop the infinite regress it is necessary for particle physics to presuppose an ultimately grounding 
principle (the Higgs boson). At the same time, this presupposition is hard to ground itself in anything 
else but the models logical need to prove the ground of its own existence or the belief that there 
must be such a principle for particle physics to be true. And as in particle physics, it is the believe in a 
final and presupposed ultimately grounding principle such as the highest good, God, or pure reason 
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that is to stop any infinite regress in the moral theory that is at the heart of traditional normative 
philosophy.  
However, the same argument I have made concerning the Higgs field can be made about ultimate 
principles of justification with regard to normative theory. The belief in a priori principles such as a 
highest good, pure reason or God is necessary for grounding traditional normative theories and to 
stop infinite regress. Philosopher have invented worlds131 where such principles are claimed to exist. 
But, neither are human beings purely reasonable nor do humans solely act based on rules or laws 
deduced from a priori principles. Traditional moral philosophers who developed major deontological 
theories are typically aware of that132, yet, they maintain that morality ought to be grounded in pure 
a priori principles. Anyhow, while the (logical) need of such traditional normative theories for an 
ultimately grounding principle to exist is comprehensible, it does not prove its existence as such.  
Care ethics is aiming to provide an alternative, a different starting point, in that it lines out a 
different approach and attempts to create awareness that such quests (of ultimate justification) 
typically stem from the basic assumptions and beliefs our (moral and scientific) theories are based 
on. The underlying argument is that if we were able to change the categories through which we 
understand the moral agent and moral actions we will end up with a different understanding of 
reality and the problems that are of (moral) significance to us. A shift in our moral outlook, point of 
departure or categories that influence how we understand our-selves as human beings can provide a 
different perspective and avoid the need of universal justification or logical problem of infinite 
regress. I will argue that the notion of care provides such a perspective. 
The care perspective hinges on the notion of a connected or related self in contrast to traditional 
moral theories such as deontology that are typically based on a notion of the self that is 
disconnected and self-lawgiving. The notion of the related self is based on the observation that 
human beings are always already in relations to others and that this understanding of ourselves can 
either be developed or repressed. If one does not perceive oneself (one’s self) through the 
perspective of traditional moral theories, that is, to be a disconnected and autonomous individual, a 
separated entity that can only exist together with others if there are forces or laws governing one's 
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existence in a community, then one does not end up with the same philosophical problems such as 
grounding one’s moral position in some ultimate principle of pure reason or justice. Rather, 
perceiving one’s self as connected will lead to regarding “relationships in the responsive and 
connected way”, tending “to use a morality of care”, and typically “holding care as an ideal”133. This 
insight is of major importance for the discussion of the ethical concept of care and developing a 
comprehensive understanding of care ethics, to which I will return shortly. 
 
GILLIGAN’S DIALECTIC MODEL OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT 
Gilligan takes Chodorow's psychological account of rejection and attachment in human development 
leading to either a disconnected or a related self, respectively, and transforms it into a dialectic 
(philosophical) model of moral development. This model is based on Gilligan’s own empirical 
research into the moral implications of abortion in which she found that her female participants 
typically start by first taking into account their own interests when attempting to make a decision.134 
In the women’s decisions, it is initially their own needs and basic survival rather than the interests of 
others that are the most important concern. However, a shift of perspective occurs in most women 
toward considering “the needs of others, on the costs of their own interests.”135 In order to make a 
final decision the women then typically take into account both their own interests as well as others’ 
interests through another shift of perspective. Hence, Gilligan speaks of three levels of the 
developmental process. The first stage of exclusively focusing on survival, to a focus on goodness 
and the interests of others on the second stage, toward a final “reflective understanding of care as 
the most adequate guide to the resolution of conflicts in human relationship”136 on stage three. 
Pettersen compares the three different stages of moral interest to three different types of care. 
Stage one is characterized by self-care, stage two by caring for others’ expectations as well as social 
norms, while at stage three both one's own interests as well as others’ interests are taken into 
account. We could describe this stage as reflective care. Both Gilligan and Pettersen link the different 
stages of care to what we call egoism (stage one) and altruism (stage two) in order to emphasize 
that both stages are naive and extreme forms of care. Both egoism and altruism are non-reflective 
and immature forms of care that will lead to all kinds of philosophical and practical problems. Pure 
                                                          
133 Gilligan, 1988, pp. 36-44; Pettersen, 2008, p. 12. 
134 Cf. Gilligan, 1982, pp. 106-127. 
135 Pettersen, 2008, p. 13. 
136 Gilligan, 1982, p. 105. Own emphasis. 
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egoism and self-concern will always neglect the interests of others, not taking into account that the 
achievement of my own goals is usually to a certain degree dependent on the fulfillment of the 
interests of others. Unlimited and unconditional altruism will inevitably lead to self-sacrifice 
subjugating one’s own interests to others. Thus, it is the third form, the synthesis of self-concern and 
other-interest that keep each other in check, which characterizes the reflective care of stage three. 
Gilligan calls it “mature care”.137 Mature care implies “balancing between the interests of self and 
others” and to consider the “consequences to everybody involved”138 in one’s actions. It is neither 
egoism nor altruism but the notion of mature care that characterizes a moral action and is at the 
heart of an ethics of care according to Gilligan and Pettersen. I will return to a discussion of mature 
care shortly after we have sketched out some of the theoretical features of care ethics. 
 
A CONCEPT OF CARE FOR ETHICS 
I now turn to a discussion of how Pettersen attempts to develop the notion of care into a 
comprehensive moral theory. I will therefore have a closer look at how care ethics conceptualizes 
the moral agent, relations between agents and what Pettersen thinks should be the core principles 
of care ethics in order for it to function as a moral theory. Furthermore, I will discuss how Pettersen 
tackles some of the criticism care ethics is facing as a theory by drawing on her discussion of mature 
care. It is in this discussion it will become clear that care ethics is not to be understood as caritas 
(selfless help) and thus must be distinguished from altruistic care. In the last sections of chapter II, I 
will also discuss how care ethics can help an agent to make decision and act upon them as well as 
some of the challenges the practice of care faces. Finally, the chapter will conclude with a discussion 
attempting to breach the gap between the moral and the political domain by drawing on Pettersen’s 
concept of mature care and how care ethics can help us analyze the current (2015/16) European 
refugee crisis. 
In her article The Ethics of Care: Normative Structures and Empirical Implications Pettersen (2011) 
describes care as an ideal or idea “capable of guiding not only private conduct, but human 
interaction in general139 and develops the concept of mature care based on Gilligan’s findings. 
Mature care, she argues, is characterized “as a relational activity”140 and by a “reciprocal mode of 
                                                          
137 See discussion of mature care on p. 49ff further down. 
138 Pettersen, 2008, p. 14; Gilligan, 1982, p. 54. 
139 Pettersen, 2011, p. 51. 
140 Ibid., p. 52. 
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thinking with regard to the moral agent”141. So how does Pettersen’s version of care ethics view the 
moral agent? 
 
THE MORAL AGENT 
Care ethics, according to Pettersen, perceives the moral agent based on a “relational ontology”, that 
is, it sees the moral agent “not primarily in terms of independence, equality of power and influence, 
enjoying almost unrestricted freedom to enter and dissolve contracts”, but as always already 
interconnected with other moral agents. Thus, being “vulnerable and dependent, often in 
asymmetric ways”142 and in contrast to theories that view the moral agent as an autonomous, rule 
creating and following person. According to Pettersen, the notion of the related moral agent, that is, 
the moral agent as always already situated within existing relationships of different kinds when 
faced with moral judgment and decisions, is based on the notion of the related self. While she thinks 
that there is a tendency of the traditional deontological, justice & utilitarian moral theories to be 
based on a model of the self as “separated and independent of others”143. 
To Pettersen the care ethics way of looking at the moral agent is useful because it captures 
“significant features of man’s interaction in general, such as reciprocity, dependency, connectedness 
and asymmetry.” These features, she argues, are present in all types of relationships to various 
degrees and, thus, enable care ethics to capture “features of intimate and private relationships” 
easily overlooked by rationalistic theories on the one hand. On the other hand, “it extends to moral 
agents outside the private domain - at work, and in the social and global arena”. 
Thus, according to Pettersen viewing an agent as related may have impacts on how we think about 
politics. Thinking of nations as malleable entities that are “relational, mutually dependent, but often 
unequal in power and resources” proves to be more fruitful than capturing them as sovereign states 
that are “self-sufficient and equal in strength”. Moreover, Pettersen thinks that the relational model 
allows us to expand our understanding of the moral agent to “not only individuals but also groups, 
institutions and nations.”144 Hence, care ethics, she argues, manages to capture not only interaction 
between individuals, but also “interaction between groups, institutions and individuals”, that is, 
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143 Pettersen, 2008, p. 43. 
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interaction on a political level. Thus the care perspective, especially Pettersen’s version of care 
ethics, seems to blur strict lines of demarcation between ethics and politics. This will become even 
clearer in Pettersen’s discussion of relationships. 
 
RELATIONSHIPS 
Our relationships and interactions do not only transcend borders between the private and the 
public. They, too, transcend boundaries between the individual and the collective. Pettersen calls 
these relationships inter-category, since they are between various categories of groups. Another 
type of relations, Pettersen uses are intra-category relations, that is, relations within categories. 
Examples can be the relations” between friends, between independent citizens or equally powerful 
states.”145 Inter-category relations are characterized by uneven access to power and resources and 
unevenly shared vulnerability to abuse. They are often weighted in favor of one particular side. Even 
though these “mixed relations”, as Pettersen calls them, are embedded in everyday life the agent's 
involvement is often involuntary and may even be coerced. In such asymmetric relationships 
between agents one side may even have complete power and dominance over the other. These 
asymmetrical relationships can be compared to unequal relationships between “parent and child, 
nurse and patient, teacher and student, to mention a few.”146 
Anyhow, Pettersen emphasizes that this does not mean that there is reflective or mature care in all 
human relations. Rather, our human relations extend in all possible directions with some of them 
promoting care and some of them furthering abuse, violence and conflict. Nevertheless, Pettersen 
believes, that this is precisely the reason why we should study all kinds of relations, because it will 
alert us to characteristic features other ethical theories might be blind to. Here, Pettersen 
emphasizes features such as “harm caused by lack of care, the agent’s vulnerability and dependency, 
and how they are situated in particular power- and resource situations”147. 
Moreover, the ethics of care with its focus on relations and interactions is attentive to harm caused 
by the way society is organized. We can describe such structural violence by the “lack of care 
between unequal parties”148. A state’s unequal treatment of its native population or a global 
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corporation employing children as laborers may count as such abusive and harmful examples. At 
least indirectly, because the corporation example is also an example of a (possibly) private actor that 
is able to engage in abusive and harmful practices because the basic social structure allows for such 
behavior. However, it could also be the system of law of a nation state, treating non-citizens 
differently from its own citizens. This is the case with many asylum laws granting asylum seekers no 
right to work, financial, health or other support once their application has been rejected. Efficiently 
rendering their existence in the country they applied to illegal and impossible by taking away any 
support structures needed to survive in modern income based societies. Such legislation often does 
not provide a possibility for the asylum seeker to appeal the decision made by the court. And even if 
the possibility is granted in most cases it is effectively impossible for the asylum seeker to object to 
any such ruling precisely because of the lack of money, and other support he or she would need for 
being able to continue living in that country. 
This is, for example, the case with Norwegian immigration laws. Any asylum seeker or refugee is 
entitled by the law to appeal any decision of deportation made by the Norwegian immigration 
authorities. While this may sound fair initially. The practical problem is that after the decision is 
made the person in question does not have the right to a lawyer or medical care. Financial support is 
cut and the asylum seeker will thus not be able to support him- or herself nor have the means to 
legally acquire the money for a lawyer or to pay the courts. In some cases, civil society may step in 
and provide a support structure, by collecting money, providing shelter and food. Lawyers choose to 
defend their client, the asylum seeker, without getting payed. Doctors may choose to follow their 
Hippocratic oath and treat the asylum seeker “illegally”, risking to get their license revoked. Should 
the asylum seeker be able to gather enough support to appeal the case, and win on the next higher 
level of jurisdiction the case may very well be taken through all the levels of the legal system. Even if 
the state loses every single trial along the way to the highest level of the juridical system it does not 
have to pay for the asylum seeker’s expenses for having a lawyer, leading the case, or paying the 
courts before losing on the highest level. All this time the ruling is not final and the asylum seeker 
has to come up with the means to proceed with the case. In the rare case the asylum seeker wins 
the case on the highest level of the Norwegian legal system there is a special law in place that will 
allow the immigration authorities to change their rationale behind why they rejected the asylum 
seeker in the first place. Effectively changing the whole case against the asylum seeker so that it has 
to be sent back to the lowest level of the juridical system and start all over again. This, I take to be a 
clear example of structural violence where there is a legal system in place making it almost 
impossible for an asylum seeker to make use of his or her legal right to effectively appeal to a 
decision made by the immigration authorities. Putting the asylum seeker under immense stress and 
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causing psychological and indirectly physical harm. This unfair system is known to the authorities, 
yet, it is kept in place.149  
In the above example one can find a structure in place that intentionally inhibits and violates a 
possible care relationship with a human person in need. It violates this human being's basic human 
rights, such as the right to life, and places them under national law, i.e., this nation’s strategic 
immigration policy considerations. A clear example of structural violence because such immigration 
laws are part of a state's constitution, that is, the legal framework thought to enable peaceful 
coexistence in this state.150  
But can the application of the notion of care from an ethical point of view, that is, as a followed code 
of conduct, then lead to a more caring environment, for example, with regard to the asylum case? 
Pettersen does indeed believe so. The claim of care ethics is not that it will provide us with a 
universal standard, norm or test we can apply to such situations in order to determine precisely 
what is the right thing to do. Rather, it alerts us to the complexities and possibilities of both 
furthering care or promoting abuse. For the care ethicist it may not even be a morally better act to 
grant a refugee asylum when this leads to a brain drain effect in the long term. Take the current 
refugee crisis in Europe. Many of the refugees arriving in European countries come from Syria. Most 
of them are war refugees, but Syria is, or rather was, a comparably well developed country with a 
working health system, an education system and professional university education. Many of the 
refugees coming to Europe are skilled workers, some with higher educations and good qualifications. 
Industry and trade are welcoming them as cheap and willing labor and thus they are deemed to be 
“useful” to the countries they apply to for residence. In some cases, the granting of residency and 
employment of refugees as laborers has been attempted to be justified by granting them a lower 
legal status, less (work) rights and less payment than the state’s citizens would get for the same kind 
of work.151 Effectively these refugees are a cheap and highly skilled workforce for western countries. 
But by granting these refugees residence western countries may “steal” the skills and education that 
will be desperately needed for rebuilding the Syrian state after the war has ended. In other words, 
caring for refugees by granting them residency and employing them might benefit the host country, 
but hurt the home country in the end. This example is not to be understood as an argument for or 
                                                          
149 A detailed account and discussion of the systematic discrimination of asylum seekers and refugees by 
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2013. 
150 In the case of Norway, the UN has repeatedly criticized attempts to introduce more restrictive immigration 
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against immigration in case of refugees, but as showing the empirical complexities, implications and 
limitations to promoting caring relationships a care ethics approach can alert us to. 
Anyhow, Pettersen argues that one should not think of care ethics as a test that one can simply 
apply to these kinds of problems. Rather care ethics may provide an analytical tool that can be used 
in order to create a map152 for my actions. This map does not precisely define which path is the right 
one, but it can give me a sense of direction and it may even contain certain suggestions on what 
paths are possible to go. Even though a map will always be an abstraction, offering only a very 
limited amount of information it is possible that by studying the map, I will acquire the necessary 
information to make a decision. It may very well be the wrong decision for once I take my analyzing 
gaze off the map, the world around me may present itself completely different from what I thought 
it looked like by studying the map. Thus, the map retains some degree of uncertainty and any 
decision based on the information the map offers can never be final or absolute. Along the way new 
sideways, trails or paths and possibilities that I was not aware of may open up to me. Due to these 
uncertainties, a moral map like any other map when used in concrete situation also demands of us 
to keep an open mind, to look at the situation at hand and to change our plans and conduct if 
necessary. Care ethics attempts to deal with uncertainty, not by getting rid of it, but by embracing it 
as an essential part of the ethical challenge.  
The point is that care ethics does not take the burden of making decisions away from the moral 
agent, whether it is an individual, a group, an institution or a state, but leaves it up to the agent’s 
judgement and ability to act on this judgement. 
Another decisive feature of the notion of care is that it is grounded in the capacity to participate in 
others feelings. 153 Based on this capacity care activates shared human experiences and emotions 
that have the potential to overcome binary distinctions between I/you, we/they, friend/enemy or 
citizen/non-citizen as in the refugee case. Agents analyzing and acting from a care perspective will 
be more likely to identify with others and to recognize that such dichotomies cannot be grounded in 
the experience that all human beings are both in need of care and able to care. 
 
CORE PRINCIPLES OF AN ETHICS OF CARE 
Looking at the moral agent as related the care ethicist seems to be well equipped to be attentive to 
and able to identify and analyze relations characterized by harm. This is an important component of 
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care ethics and complements what Pettersen calls the theory’s normative core value. According to 
Pettersen, care ethics has two main core values. The first value is “the universal condemnation of 
exploit and hurt”154. Gilligan (1982) argues that in many of the cases she studies this value or 
guideline is not particular helpful for the agent facing a difficult moral decision. It will often be 
contradictory to other moral perspectives concerning the same situation. Let us consider the refugee 
example again. Care ethics will alert me to the fundamental fact that the refugee example is a typical 
asymmetrical relationship where one party, the state, has the power and may be in the position to 
care - to extend help - while the other party, the refugee, is existentially dependent on that care – 
and receiving help. From a care perspective, we may want to help the refugees coming to our 
country in order to avoid them being hurt or exploited. After all, refugees are one of the most 
vulnerable groups of human beings often without protection by their “home” state, identification 
documents or any supportive structures. But, from a legal perspective our main goal may be to 
guarantee stable conditions, work and welfare goods for our own citizens who are granted such 
rights by the state’s constitution. Wanting to help refugees may be possible to a certain extent, but 
where should we draw the line before this help becomes destabilizing to our own country? How 
many can we take in and provide for? This, although not the author’s own line of thought, is a 
legitimate way to frame the problem and the questions that arise from such a case raise important 
and legitimate concerns on how we may prioritize in such extraordinary, morally challenging 
circumstances. Should we always help the ones in need? In which way should we help? We may 
even come to the conclusion that it is not our primary goal to help citizens of other states, but first 
and foremost the population of our country. This conclusion may be drawn from a certain way of 
framing the problem on utilitarian or justice theory grounds. If we are to maximize the total well-
being of our own population, the population residing within the borders of our territory and having 
the legal right to do so, we might have to conclude that inflicting harm to others, i.e., refugees 
seeking asylum, is a necessary evil in order to do good for the citizens of the state we are responsible 
for. But, the same conclusion may be drawn from a care perspective in that we may conclude that 
our special responsibilities for our fellow citizens have priority. First, we have to take care of 
ourselves before being able to take care of others. Much depends on how we frame and analyze the 
moral problem that presents itself to us. Pettersen thinks that care ethics is more likely to alert us to 
this fact because it does not look for a final solution, but keeps the uncertainty of the situation at its 
heart. Furthermore, it can be argued that a decisive feature of the notion of care is that it activates 
shared human experiences and emotions that have the potential to overcome state/citizenship 
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borders by motivating agents to identify with others. Leading to a recognition that dichotomies of 
citizens/non-citizens or we/others cannot be grounded in the experience that all human beings are 
both in need of care and able to care. Through tapping into shared experiences and feelings and 
identifying with others we may overcome giving priority and having a narrow concern for our own 
and disregard for others’ well-being. 
Employing universal principles such as human rights attempts to yield the same result concerning 
other moral theories such as justice theories. The main difference is that these principles are 
typically deduced from abstract assumptions such as the universal worth of the human being, while 
care ethics claims to base its universality in concrete human experiences and emotions. This is a 
dimension, traditional ethical theories may not be able to capture in the same way care ethics does. 
On a different level, the same could be said concerning private moral dilemmas where different 
ways of framing the problem, a difference in facts we pay attention to, or applying different moral 
theories may yield different solutions to the problem.155 Again, it is important to emphasize that 
Pettersen does not think that care ethics will provide us with a set of rules or principles that will 
solve these problems for us. Rather, it may provide us with tools to view the situation from various 
perspectives and different moral approaches. Care ethics may at its best give us a sense of direction 
on what to do in order to avoid exploit and hurt, but judgment of what to do will always be left to 
the moral agent. Both judgment and resulting conduct will be fallible and may even turn out to be 
disastrous.  
The ethics of care approaches moral dilemmas from a maxim of non-violence and that “no one 
should be hurt.”156 Care ethics will not make the uncertainty of the moral dilemma go away by 
alluring us to seek certainty in mathematical models, principles of right or some absolute truth. It 
will take the uncertainty of the situation for granted and preserve it in the analysis of the dilemma as 
well as the decision that will be made. Providing refuge for hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers 
may lead to too much pressure on welfare goods, and anxiety among the native population of a 
country, violent acts against refugees and finally to destabilization of the help providing state. Not 
providing refuge may condemn thousands and thousands of human beings to certain suffering, hurt 
and even death.  
But how then, is care ethics more useful to us than other moral theories if all that it does is to simply 
state that everything is uncertain and that our traditional morality and (morally) guiding principles 
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do not really matter? The most important answer to this question may be that care ethics has the 
power to create a more understanding, positive and caring environment by tapping into shared 
human experiences. It lays the foundation for comprehending that we are who we are through care, 
at the same time creating a politically favorable climate to care for human beings in need by alluding 
to that all human beings are comparable on the most basic level. Thus, playing on similarities 
between ourselves and others, between citizens and refugees and the universal experience of care, 
rather than creating an environment of fear and alienation by emphasizing differences to the others. 
I belief this to be a unique benefit of care ethics because it alerts us to harmful actions, relations and 
structures on the one hand, and facilitates actions that promote human flourishing on the other. 
The second core value of care ethics in addition to avoiding “hurt against others”157 is the “universal 
commitment to human flourishing”158. The commitment to human flourishing might give us some 
indication as of how care ethics is meant to provide us with a compass to navigate the uncertainties 
inherent in our ethical dilemmas. Pettersen is aware of the resemblance the two core values, i.e., 
the universal condemnation of exploit and hurt as well as the universal commitment to human 
flourishing, have with the principle of non-maleficence and the principle of beneficence, respectively. 
However, care ethics, she cautions us, “involves more than [the negative duty of] refraining from 
harming”159 as the principle of non-maleficence demands. Many times, it may require of us to 
actively interfere in order to avoid harm. Such active participation will also present us with some 
practical and philosophical problems. The principle of beneficence, for example, does in itself not 
provide any indication to how actively we should participate, i.e., how much we should care. What 
are the limits of our obligation towards refraining from doing harm, intervening to prevent harm and 
enabling human flourishing? How are we to know how much can be expected of the moral agent 
and will this be the same for individuals, groups, institutions and states? Or, as Pettersen puts it, 
what is the “limitation to the extent of our obligation to produce good”160? 
Could it be that the carer cares too much and reduces himself to what Kant called a means to an 
end? Putting others’ interest before one's own may morally be praiseworthy but to give up oneself 
totally and to always subjugate one’s own aims, plans and actions to the one cared for can neither 
be realistically expected nor wanted from any moral agent. Furthermore, the principle of 
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beneficence may also be interpreted as the obligation to maximize the total production of good. If 
that were the case it would justify arguments for producing good for the majority of a people while 
allowing exploitation of and infliction of harm to a minority on the grounds that the maximization of 
the overall well-being of the society through exploiting the minority would be a beneficial and thus 
desirable outcome. 
I see at least three relevant major ethical problems. One, if the universal commitment to avoid 
exploit and hurt is understood as the principle of non-maleficence one can only derive negative 
duties from it; do not hurt, do not exploit. Two, if not limited, the principle of beneficence may very 
well lead to exploitation of a statistically “irrelevant” few, i.e., a minority, or it may lead to, three, 
self-sacrifice.161 All of these outcomes are undesirable. Being aware of negative duties will only tell 
us what we should not do, but cannot provide a guide for positive action, for what we should do. 
Exploit of a minority for the good of a majority would undermine the claimed universal applicability 
of the ethics of care. Self-sacrifice will eventually undermine our ability to care and thus cannot be 
wanted to be a core value of any sound ethical undertaking. Care ethics attempts to tackle these 
problems by both expanding the principle of non-maleficence on the one hand, as well as restricting 
the principle of beneficence on the other. In order to include a “reasonably limited commitment to 
actively working for” the prevention of harm and the promotion of human flourishing162.  
Pettersen seeks to achieve this by coupling both principles, so that they expand and limit each other. 
She calls this the “expanded principle of not hurting”. In other words, her formula is as follows:  
● Principle of non-maleficence +  
● Principle of beneficence = 
● Expanded principle of not hurting 
 
In this scenario, the principle of non-maleficence is expanded by the principle of beneficence. 
Creating a positive obligation to intervene in order to actively prevent hurt and exploit. Whereas the 
principle of beneficence is restricted by the principle of non-maleficence to avoid exploitation and 
hurt of the statistically few as well as oneself, i.e., self-sacrifice. 
The expanded principle of not hurting lays the foundation for what Pettersen calls the concept of 
mature care. Pettersen’s discussion of mature care is her way of arguing that any ethical approach 
demanding self-sacrifice or the sacrifice of others, and it doesn’t matter how “statistically 
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insignificant” they are thought to be, is incompatible with what she calls a mature concept of care or 
mature care.163 Mature care basically says that care does always pertain to oneself as well as to 
others. If I am to give all my food to the world’s hungry, I will die of starvation and thus cannot care 
for the hungry anymore. Therefore, I have to feed myself if I want to feed others. The same is true 
for care. In order to be able to care for others, I need to care for myself, too. The argument could be 
made that to care for myself is a prior condition for being able to care at all. This reciprocal mode of 
thinking is derived from the relational model of care, as discussed above and in the history of the 
notion of care, where one always already exists within a care structure. We can find such reciprocity 
quite explicit in many cultures where it is expected that parents care for their children as long as 
they are able to, and, in turn, their children care about them once they acquire the ability and means 
to do so. We may even argue that all human societies are based on such reciprocal relations of care 
when it comes to participating in society. This is also supported by the generative myth of Cura 
where it is argued that we become truly human, that is, that we realize our full human potential by 
being cared for and in turn caring for others.  
This is true for pure material or economic relations as well as immaterial relations such as education. 
Materially speaking we are born and need to be cared for by others in order to survive in society. We 
need food, shelter, warmth all of which we cannot provide for ourselves, but need caretakers to do 
so. Once we acquire the ability to care for ourselves and for others we are supposed to become 
caretakers ourselves. Even if we do not have children, many societies have institutionalized systems 
of care relations where we become “passive” or “indirect” care takers by paying taxes so that care 
may be organized on a professional and societal level. Through these care structures care becomes 
the generative and political task Erik Erikson demanded.164  
Education serves as another example. We are in desperate need to learn in order to survive. We are 
born into an asymmetric constellation where we are the receivers of knowledge or education for 
many years. In the process, we need teachers that care for our intellectual and practical skills and 
their development and we need care structures, i.e., educational systems and institutions such as 
schools and universities that enable us to learn and flourish. Once we master a certain level, we may 
become teachers ourselves. We may choose a different line of professional work, but contribute to 
the education system through paying taxes. Even outside of the school or academic system we now 
become important to society for what we know, and our know how. We become mentors to interns 
or new colleagues at work. The symmetry of our position shifts from being the one in need of care, 
                                                          
163 Ibid., p. 55; Pettersen, 2008, pp. 14-16, 41-43. 
164 See chapter I, pp. 16-17. 
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to being someone who can care, e.g., through teaching, for others. That does not mean that we 
move from one end of the scale completely toward the other end. Through all of our human life, we 
will to certain degrees be at the receiving end as well as at the caretaking end. We are not all-
knowing and have to constantly learn new things throughout life. We go through various stages 
presenting us with ever new challenges to be understood and dealt with. In all this time, we are 
dependent on someone to care for us in one way or another. We are born as infants in desperate 
need for care, grow up and become more independent and abler to care for others. If we are lucky, 
we grow old, become fragile, and will once again be in need of care.  
If the system of care is a hierarchical one, we may very well start at the bottom and move toward 
the top while we progress. Think of a hierarchical education system where the person that is 
perceived to have the most knowledge, the expert, is at the top, while the freshman is all the way at 
the bottom. If the system is more egalitarian there may be a more level positioning of teacher and 
student. It will usually be based on the notion that even though a teacher has knowledge in some 
specific fields he or she may very well be able to learn something from the student in a different 
field. So that both teacher and student have more than one role to play. This is effectively 
exemplified by the gap of knowledge between most teachers and their students pertaining to the 
digital world. Even though it is thought to be the teacher’s task to teach the students how to use 
digital tools such as computers, or the internet, the students’ knowledge in this field often surpasses 
the teachers’ by far. However, even if the student might be more proficient in using computers, 
knowing where and how to search the internet, etc. - in this way often becoming a teacher himself, 
and the teacher becoming a student - the teacher may still be able to educate the student with 
regard to critically examining sources or to using these tools for productive purposes, such as 
learning the ten finger touch system in order to be able to write faster on a computer keyboard.  
 
MATURE CARE: PETTERSEN’S ETHICS OF CARE 
Pettersen’s notion of mature care is thus comprised of several ingredients. It is the notion of 
reflective care, which Gilligan already called mature care, and the expanded principle of not hurting. 
Pettersen’s mature care is thus different from Gilligan’s mature care (which I called reflective care 
above) in that it is comprised both of a method for analyzing a situation (reflective care) and a 
guiding principle for action (expanded principle of not hurting). 
Thus, drawing on Pettersen, a fledged out care ethics is comprised of the following elements:  
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● Relational ontology (agents as always already within relations to others, reciprocity of 
interest). 
● Reflective practice (mature care) and epistemology (the capacity of care in human beings 
develops through being cared for and caring for others, care knowledge is different from 
theoretical knowledge in that it pays attention to emotive components, larger societal and 
structural frameworks enhancing or limiting human conduct, care knowledge cannot be 
deduced from principles of right or from pure reason, care knowledge is universal in that it 
takes into account the carer as well as the caree, it draws on shared human experiences and 
feelings). 
● Guiding principle (expanded principle of not hurting) that preserves the element of 
uncertainty emphasizing the role the agent plays in acting upon the information available to 
him or her. 
 
WHO CARES FOR THE CARER? ON THE IMPORTANCE OF SELF-CARE (FOR OTHER-CARE) 
Pettersen thinks that one of the biggest challenges to care ethics is that care is traditionally 
understood as care-giving and that it is strongly associated with a notion of self-sacrifice or 
altruism.165 Furthermore, self-sacrificial care-giving is typically discussed as a strongly gendered 
practice and tightly linked to a feminine voice. There are two major problems with such a prejudiced 
understanding of care. One, it does not adhere to reciprocity with regard to the interests of both 
carer and caree. In other words, it does not take sufficiently into account the needs of the carer. 
Two, a biased understanding of care may be detrimental to developing a concept of care for ethics 
and politics alike. 166 It will thus be important in the following discussion to differentiate care ethics 
from care giving and the altruistic notion of self-sacrificial care.  
Pettersen attempts to achieve this by redefining and replacing traditional and gendered notions of 
care by her concept of mature care. Care giving, in the traditional sense, is that a moral agent takes 
upon herself the task to care for another. Here the moral agent can be a person, a community, a 
legal entity such as a corporation or a state. However, care understood as mature care is never only 
care for an other, but always care for one’s self. Because it is only when I care for myself that I will 
be able to enter into a caring relationship with others. This relational ontology is a profound 
                                                          
165 Cf. Pettersen, 2008, pp. 14-16; Pettersen, 2011, pp. 56-57; Pettersen, 2012, p. 376. 
166 In his article on Contemporary Ethics of Care Reich and Jecker support Pettersen’s analysis that traditional 
prejudices related to care and the "close association of care with gender and with the feminine voice may 
hinder efforts to develop a broader human understanding of care, such as the understanding of care that 
emerged earlier in human history." Reich & Jecker, 1995, p. 372. 
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difference compared to other moral theories that are based on a conception of the moral agent as 
autonomous individual or a sovereign state. If care is practiced from the perspective of an 
autonomous or sovereign agent it will always end up to be perceived as a “mono-directional 
activity”167. The reason for that is that the carer will be viewed as the agent possessing the power 
and independence to care for the caree, while the caree will be perceived as the dependent, passive 
and powerless receiver of care. In its most extreme form the non-reciprocal understanding of carer 
and caree will thus end up to be viewed as either altruism (pure selfless care for an other) or egoism 
(absolute and sole care for oneself). 
Pettersen’s concept of mature care attempts to avoid the altruism-egoism problem by being 
grounded in the above discussed relational ontology.168 Conceiving of the moral agent as always 
already being within relations, and understanding the agent’s relational web as multi-directional 
fabric of relations is to say that all interests, both of self and other, are taken to be of equal 
importance. Mature care is about having “as much care for oneself as for others”169, at least in 
principle. This presents us with another challenge, one which in my opinion is the strongest criticism 
directed at mature care as a principle guiding our decisions. The issue of knowing which interests, 
experiences and point of views of which agents we are to take into account when making decisions. 
How are we to orientate ourselves in the “hodge-podge” of empirical facts, as Immanuel Kant 
described it, and seemingly infinite number of relations that surround our existence? Kant’s answer 
to that question was to design “a pure moral philosophy completely cleansed of everything [...] 
empirical”170. Care ethics in the form of mature care attempts to find a different answer. Mature 
care is not about identifying universal and absolutely true principles from which we then deduce 
norms and laws guiding our actions. It does not follow the Kantian impulse of withdrawal from the 
empirical world, but attempts to engage and interrogate every feasible facet of it.  
But how can we attribute equal importance to absolutely all relations? Pettersen’s argues that 
within care ethics the notion of equality is to be understood differently from how it is typically 
understood in liberal theories. For the care ethicist, equal importance of all relations refers to the 
relation of self and others. This is a different debate from the debate about special relations and 
responsibilities, for example, towards family vs. strangers. Rather, the ethical importance of the 
                                                          
167 Pettersen, 2012, p. 376. 
168 This is not to say that Pettersen avoids the discussion. Indeed, she discusses the egoism-altruism problem in 
most of her writings on care ethics. Cf. Pettersen, 2008; 2011; 2012. 
169 Pettersen, 2012, p. 376. 
170 Kant, 1964, p. 37. 
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concept of equality within care ethics is to convey that one should not enter into personal, 
professional, local or global relationships “with a perception of one’s own or others’ interests as 
more or less valuable.”171 Mature care is the practice of finding intermediate states between total 
self-sacrifice, i.e., of putting others’ interests before one’s own, and brutal selfishness, i.e., of putting 
one’s own interests over all others. Hence, Pettersen finds in this an Aristotelian approach of finding 
a “golden mean” between two extremes, in addition to it being a question of excellence or virtue.172 
Only through practice of care, engagement with other persons and the material dimensions limiting 
our action in the empirical world will we become better carers and more proficient in balancing 
between too little or too much concern for others or ourselves.173  
Pettersen identifies one particular Aristotelian virtue to be of major importance to mature care, the 
virtue of friendship.174 In his discussion of friendship Aristotle argues that such relations can be tricky 
to understand, because they can be of asymmetrical character, i.e., that the parties to the relation 
are not equal. Nevertheless, he argues for relations to be considered “friendly”175, if they aim for a 
virtuous mean between caring too much for oneself or for an other person, such as a friend. 
Aristotle divides relations characterized by friendship into three different categories, defined in 
relation to what they aim for. Relations of friendship can be defined according to their utility or 
usefulness, pleasure or to the extent such relations pursue the good for both parties. While he 
considers friendship for utility and pleasure to be inferior, since they merely regard others for what 
they can do for me (they provide pleasure or are useful to me in achieving my own goals), he thinks 
of relations based on what is good for everyone involved to be characteristic of true virtuous 
friendship. Such relations are thus characterized by "reciprocity and mutual goodwill between the 
agents"176 and care for the friends themselves and not for what they can do for me. 
Pettersen considers the unwillingness or inability to balance concern for others against one’s own to 
be “immature”, or as Aristotle would put it, not excellent with regard to feeling and acting out of 
                                                          
171 Pettersen, 2012, p. 377. 
172 Cf. Pettersen, 2008, pp. 125-132. 
173 Pettersen specifically argues that although she says that mature care can be understood as a virtue, she 
does not mean or want to “reduce care ethics to a version of virtue ethics”. Rather she views it as an ethical 
theory of its own. Cf. Pettersen, 2012, p. 377. 
174 As discussed in Aristotle’s (2000), Nicomachean Ethics books IV and VIII-IX. 
175 Aristotle uses the word “friendship” (philia) in lack of a better term. He is not entirely satisfied with using it, 
but thinks that it is the most adequate description of virtuous relations to others. Book IV, chapter 6. 
176 Pettersen, 2012, p. 377. 
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care. Mature care, for Pettersen, is thus a “skill” that can be developed not only in women, but 
potentially in everyone. It avoids a narrow focus on pure self-interest or on a single (or too few) 
particular other(s).177 
The practice of mature care thus gives priority not only to the interests of others, but to an equal 
extent to one’s own interests. Nevertheless, Pettersen emphasizes that in order for human beings to 
develop their capacity to care into the practice of mature care self care is truly important and a topic 
that is typically omitted from the discussion of care. It is based on the experience that even a carer 
needs care.  
This can be exemplified by the case of mental health professionals such as psychiatric and mental 
health nurses taking care of victims of extreme violence or extraordinary life catastrophes. Nurses 
tending to these victims often meet human beings in extreme shock like conditions with extreme 
and exaggerated feelings, emotions and irrational thoughts. Anxiety, fear of death, total loss of 
reality and intensely antisocial behavior are commonly found in people who have experienced the 
unthinkable. Tackling such an overwhelming amount of difficult blows of fate, and human beings at 
their worst mental and emotional states, requires extensive training and professional care skills from 
nurses, in addition to the possibility to get professional, mental and emotional help for themselves. 
Many times the need of help for the helper is overlooked, leading to high numbers of burnout, work 
absence and early retirement rates in these professions.178 This shows that in these cases, as well as 
in other healthcare professions, and concerning the ability to care in general, taking the needs of the 
carer into account is just as essential as tending to the needs of the caree.179 A notion that can be 
expressed in the question who will help the helpers?180, which conveys the impossibility to care for 
others without caring for oneself. 
Caring for one’s self in order to be able to care for others is thus a necessary condition and essential 
practice for mature care. Furthermore, dissolving the altruism-egoism issue is supported by the 
argument of mirror neurons being responsible for an agent feeling pain or the need to care even 
without him or her directly being in pain or need of care personally.181 If the mirror neuron theory is 
                                                          
177 Ibid. 
178 Cf. McCarthy, 1985. 
179 Svendsen, 2009, pp. 4-6. 
180 In accordance with the question Plato poses in The Republic. “Who watches the watchmen?”. As well in 
Roman satirist Juvenal’s (Satire 6.346–348), Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?: Who will guard the guardians 
themselves? 
181 See e.g. Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004. 
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true, then altruism is never only altruism, and is indeed rendered impossible. For if mirror neurons, 
mirror the behavior of the one acting in the observer, inducing in him or her the same state of mind, 
emotions and feelings as in the observed, then to care for others, that is, to alleviate a carees’ pain 
or feeling of discomfort and to help them achieve a state of happiness would do exactly the same for 
the carer. Acting beneficial toward a person in need and seeing her resulting happiness instills in the 
carer the same positive feelings and emotions as in the caree. Thus, it can be argued that an 
altruistic action is never purely altruistic because it helps the carer and the caree (if being well or 
happiness is the aim of the action). Since the mirror neuron system is hardwired into our biological 
makeup, we cannot even do anything about it. Seeing others in a positive physical state such as 
happiness reproduces in us the same positive state.  
This is a problem for the traditional view of care where care is understood as self-less and mono-
directional activity (pure other care, similar to caritas). Such an altruistic approach could even deem 
it to be morally wrong if egoism or selfishness, i.e., the interest in one’s own happiness, alleviating 
one’s own pain or feeling well, would be the sole motivation for caring for and helping others. Due 
to the mirror neuron system in humans caring for a caree and helping him or her to flourish or be in 
a less hurtful state automatically mirrors this state in the carer. Thus, one’s own happiness can never 
be entirely excluded as motivation for a caring action. Anyhow, non-altruistic motivations are not a 
problem for the concept of mature care. Mature care does not give priority to purely altruistic 
motives; rather it embraces caring actions where the interests of all involved are taken into account 
within the expanded principle of not hurting. Consequently, both Gilligan and Pettersen are clear 
that any concept of mature care must not be misconstrued as other directed care, but “implies a 
balancing between the interests of self and others”182. 
In essence, Pettersen derives the notion of mature care from the inclusion of the relational and 
reciprocal mode of thinking into the core of care ethics. Care, thus, becomes an activity in which 
both carer and caree participate. Her underlying strategy in tackling many of the criticisms183 against 
                                                          
182 Pettersen, 2008, p. 14; Cf. Gilligan, 1993, p. 209. 
183 Such as the criticism that care will eventually always become paternalistic. However, care as a paternalistic 
concept comes from a certain understanding of how to view and deal with human interaction. In politics, as 
long as we understand it as rule over a territory and its people, that is, government of the state, any care may 
be comprehended in terms of top-down paternalism. Care becomes a mere administration of services 
provided by the state. The state or the one in the position to give care becomes the absolute provider of 
unlimited care, while the human being, the citizen of the state is on the receiving end. Pettersen explains 
several times that such a paternalistic understanding of care violates the normative core of care ethics and 
principles of mature care. She argues that interests of both carer and caree have to be considered equally and 
that any caring action must always fall within the constraints of the extended principle of not hurting. 
Nevertheless, in order for her argument to be relevant to politics and to tackle the criticism of political 
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care ethics is to change the categories through which we perceive the moral agent and that 
structure our understanding of morality as such. In changing these categories, moral problems will 
present themselves from a different perspective for the mature carer compared to other moral 
theories. In viewing the moral agent as related, the primary moral concern becomes how to create 
“good” relations that avoid hurting others and promote human flourishment, rather than finding 
principles that organize initially detached individuals existing together in a community under 
universal norms and laws. Even though, it is entirely possible to understand the notion of care as the 
prevention of harm and the encouragement of human flourishing from the perspective of an 
individualistic ontology, such a perspective would promote altruistic understandings of care and thus 
make it harder to define the limits of care. The “relational and reciprocal aspects of care [would] 
disappear”184 and it would be harder, if not impossible, to find limits to how much good to produce 
for, as well as restricting how much one is to actively prevent harm to others. 
 
THE MORAL DECISION OR HOW TO CARE?  
Finding out what others’ or for that matter one’s own best interests are is far from being an easy 
task and requires “attentiveness and responsiveness”185 to the situation. Attitudes we already 
identified in our discussion of the history of the notion of care as being essential ingredients to a 
moral concept of care.186 Agents in a relationship may not always know what is in their best interest 
or various motivations get them to conceal their true interests. They might not even have particular 
interest at all. Furthermore, our interpretation of the needs of a caree, even with the best 
intentions, might simply be wrong or incomplete. To assume the carer always is correct in identifying 
the needs of the carees is an extreme form of paternalism and subjugation to differences of power 
that can offend and overbear the caree. On the other hand, unreflected submittance to a caree’s will 
would amount to surrendering one’s responsibility, especially when granting that there might be a 
lot of insecurities concerning the caree’s own needs.  
So how then does one acquire the knowledge to make informed moral decisions within a mature 
care framework? Pettersen argues it is through developing and employing communicative and 
analytical skills. Anyhow, she owes us an explanation of how this takes place in practice. She merely 
                                                          
paternalism one does not only have to change the categories of how to understand the moral agent, but of 
how to comprehend politics. I will provide such an argument in chapter III. 
184 Pettersen, 2011, p. 56. 
185 Pettersen, 2012, p. 378. 
186 See e.g. p. 9, 22, and 25. 
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points out that it “will depend on the context”187 of the situation and suggests active involvement 
and ongoing reflection on “how one interacts with others, how well one understands and responds 
to them, as well as how one cares about oneself”188 as a fruitful point of departure. Since mature 
care is based on an ontology of “interactive, relational selves” continuous attentive reflection on the 
empirical realities of situations, relations, context of relations, how to respond to others as well as 
oneself is required of the moral agent. This reflective approach must, according to Pettersen, “focus 
on reciprocity” the whole way, also when identifying interests to ourselves and others. Since there 
are no “pre-given rules” the concrete actions that are to be carried out are based in the particular 
situation and relations important to the situation. Decisions made must therefore be “based on 
knowledge of the particular relationship between carer and caree”189 and are dynamic and 
adjustable always up for revision and change. This, Pettersen argues, leads to a “greater 
appreciation” of dialog and consent and reduces the risk of “paternalistic and exploitative caring”190. 
Anyhow, the question of how to decide in which way to act is further complicated by the necessity 
to not only include our own interests, as well as the interest of one or a few particular other(s), but 
to include a “wider relational context”191 in these decision. If we are to make informed moral 
decisions we must include not only the immediate relations between carer and caree, but also the 
web of societal and political relations, that is, the wider context within which these relations play 
out. Pettersen’s suggestions on how one is to achieve such an ethico-epistemological balancing act is 
to point out that by paying attention to the wider context of one’s actions one can more easily 
identify “structural conditions and problems”. The care agent’s task is not to make such problems go 
away by finding a quick-fix or easy solutions such as self-sacrificial care for a concrete other or 
applying pre-given rules of conduct. Rather s/he must become conscious of the limitations both to 
the carer’s own capacity to care as well as his or her knowledge of the situation and relations within 
the situation. The carer’s limited capacity to perceive reality (everything is filtered by our biological 
makeup and how we are able and accustomed to interpret this information) and knowledge can only 
be perspectival knowledge of particular situations. The same finiteness is true for the carer’s ability 
to care. A carer simply does not have the capacity to provide unlimited care to a single needy person 
because he or she must also care for others as well as for him or herself. Thus, a reciprocal approach 
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189 Pettersen, 2012, p. 378. 
190 Ibid. 
191 Ibid., p. 379. 
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to making caring moral decisions is meant to keep care within limits and prevent self-sacrifice and 
paternalism. 
When discussing the history of the notion of care I found that many authors (e.g. Milton, Mayeroff) 
include sympathy, empathy or compassion into their reflections on care. Grounded in our existential 
vulnerability I argued that it should be considered to be one of the main ingredients of care, 
although care being a much richer notion having both “a deeper role in human life,” being “broader 
than sympathy in its tasks,” and entailing “a more committed role with other people and 
projects.”192 Pettersen agrees with this argument and considers sympathy/empathy/compassion an 
important aspect of mature care, but argues at the same time for an extended principle of 
compassion.193 Unlike altruistic or self-sacrificial moral approaches, the trinity of 
sympathy/empathy/compassion is “not granted superior [moral] status” as an “other-regarding 
feeling”. Rather, to avoid self-sacrifice, i.e., the dark side of unlimited compassion, Pettersen argues 
it should be extended to be more in line with a mature concept of care. This principle of extended 
compassion entails empathic feelings, emotions and actions toward “more than one particular” 
caree and permits altruistic acts (if possible at all) only as an exception, not the norm. Pettersen 
grants that there should be the possibility for a carer to act in a self-sacrificial way every now and 
then, e.g. when parents need to put the needs of their children over their own. Anyhow, such 
situation must be limited in time to avoid negatively affecting both carer, immediate caree and the 
wider relations of care toward other carees. Self-sacrificial behavior should only be permitted as long 
as it happens within the extended principle of not harming and takes into considerations the wider 
web of relations of both carer and caree(s). Limiting sympathy/empathy/compassion is thus not 
seen as a lack of, but as a necessary element of mature care in order to avoid relations becoming 
harmful and exploitative.  
Furthermore, making moral decisions, Pettersen argues, should never be based on feelings, 
emotions or reason alone. Relying on either one will typically produce one sided, singular and 
prejudiced decisions. Decisions that are representative of immature care. Rather, the “involvement 
of both reason and emotion”194 is required for mature moral deliberation. In other words, the 
analytical process producing the knowledge required to make moral decision from a perspective of 
mature care, may separate reason from emotion for theoretical purposes, but both need to be 
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194 Ibid., p. 380. 
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considered in order to “grasp the practice of care”. Hence, mature care requires of the carer to 
employ both reason and emotion, while immature care is representative for a moral agent using 
only the one or the other. This means on the one hand that regarding both emotion and reason as 
important for caring implies that the moral agent can practice care for others her or she does not 
have compassion or other feelings toward. On the other hand it allows the carer to refrain from 
acting rationally if the rational thing to do would be “counterintuitive or contradict [the agent’s] 
emotions.”195 The mature carer thus consults with both “emotions and [...] intellect”196 the ideal 
outcome being “agreement between the two”. 
The reciprocal relation of emotions and reason as well as their equal footage with regard to caring 
are another instance of how the theory of mature care (re)interprets the principle of equality and 
reciprocity. Equality and reciprocity with regard to the interests of all the parties involved in a 
situation is, as I argued above, one of the major guiding principles of a caring practice. It does not 
mean that everyone should get the same amount of care or the same commodities. Rather, it says 
that both carer and caree should consider all involved interests as equally important. Depending on 
the context of the situation some interests might need to be given priority. Such privileging must 
nevertheless be limited to concrete situations and specific issues. It arises out of the asymmetry of 
the relations between carer and caree, that is, that one has to be in the position to care in order to 
be a carer. Think of asymmetry in the refugee example. The context of the situation put the refugee 
in a state where it becomes harder and harder to care for family and him or herself. A state is 
definitely abler to care (prevent harm and support flourishing) for refugees than the other way 
around and thus priority should be given to caring for human beings in such extreme circumstances 
who have to flee an existential threat. The same holds with regard to the asymmetry in a parent 
child relationship. Unless the parent is dysfunctional and the child old enough to be a carer the 
parent needs to assume the caring role. Especially the growth and flourishing of very young children 
is dependent on emotional and physical care and thus must be given priority.  In such cases, the 
carer is typically perceived as holding a higher degree of autonomy, power and freedom to act, while 
the caree does so to a lesser degree. The caree can be described as dependent on and left to the 
goodwill of the carer. One can see how such a situation may be described as bearing the potential 
for being abusive or paternalistic. Pettersen avoids this criticism by arguing that it is again reciprocity 
with regard to the “mutual recognition of respect for each other as human beings of equal worth”197 
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that is to be given preference. Such mutual recognition is one of mature care’s most important 
features that distinguishes it clearly from an altruistic understanding of care. 
Mutual recognition on the conceptual level creates the background for the empirical context within 
which care takes place. For Pettersen, mature care is not about caring for everyone to the same 
extent and in the same way. Rather, the empirical differences and facts about carer and caree are 
“highly relevant for how care is practiced”198 and must be taken into account when considering 
concrete situations. How to care and how much care that is to be provided depends on the situation. 
This is because relationships are different and thus the practice of care must be different. Relations 
of friendship where friends consider themselves equals demand different care than the relation 
between a teacher and a student, a parent and his or her disabled child, a political community and 
its members, or a state and a refugee. In order to care in a mature way one has to take into account 
the “contextually relevant factors” such as what kind of relationships that are important in the 
situation at hand and the empirical realities on the ground.199 
Furthermore, reciprocity in mature care would demand of all related parties to contribute to the 
relation being a caring one. How much the parties can be expected to contribute would again be 
dependent on contextual relevant factors and the kind of relation. Pettersen argues that it is fruitful 
to think of relations as being defined by a common goal, e.g., the caring relation between teacher 
and student as having the goal of the student learning more, or the relation between a nurse and a 
patient as having the goal of the patient becoming well again. In all such relations, reciprocity 
consists of both carer and caree “having to make an effort to achieve that goal”200. Such contribution 
can happen concerted or individually and in various forms such as exchange of “knowledge, 
information and emotions”. It always presupposes mutual recognition and commitment to the 
relation’s goal. Reciprocity is thus absolutely required, but limited in time and scope to the relation’s 
common goal.  
This presents us with an interesting problem for it is not always straightforward to agree on a 
common goal for a relationship. The real problems emerge when teacher and students do not agree 
on the same goals, a patient has a different idea of what s/he will need in order to become healthy 
again, or states in the international community disagree on the best solution to solve a violent 
                                                          
198 Ibid. 
199 Taking into account contextually relevant factors such as types of relations, empirical realities and the wider 
context are also important when thinking of care in a political context. See, for example, my discussion on p. 
82ff. 
200 Pettersen, 2012, p. 382. 
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conflict or the current refugee crisis. It seems to be typical of asymmetrical relations that one may 
not be as committed to the “common” goal as the other. Think of a student not wanting to learn, or 
not being interested in the stuff the teacher wants the student to learn, or a state not wanting to 
extend care to non-citizens such as refugees. How does one get both carer and caree to agree and 
being committed to the same goal?  
I believe there is no simple solution to this problem201 but it is possible to deduce the “mature” way 
to go from what we have said about mature care so far. Starting with recognition of the interest of 
all parties to the relation one would need to accept that there might be an initial conflict of interests. 
The teacher wanting to educate, the student not wanting to be taught, the refugee wanting 
protection, the state not wanting to grant it, the nurse wanting the patient to exercise, the patient 
wanting pills to fix his or her condition instead of self-effort based on good advice. Nevertheless, 
both carer and caree are linked in the concrete situation in that they have to solve a specific 
problem.202 Thus, recognizing the validity of their interests is essential in order to find common 
ground and a mature and caring solution.  
Furthermore, in many relationships, especially fairly restricted, instrumentally defined, goal-oriented 
professional relationships,203 the goal is given in that it is pre-defined and carer and caree are seen 
as mere parties that are entering in some sort of contract in order to achieve this goal. Teaching 
students skills and knowledge about topics important to society is already defined and given when 
both teacher and student enter into a relationship. Nursing or curing a patient is the pre-defined aim 
of a relationship between nurse and patient. Helping to get people back to work is the given task of a 
public official when dealing with somebody who has just lost his or her job. Providing protection 
from prosecution is the already agreed on task of any state of the international community. 
Nevertheless, I find it to be truly comprehensible that it cannot be expected of the parties to the 
relation to simply accept such aims solely on the basis that they are given. The carer provided with 
the task to educate, nurse, heal, or protect, can of course always force the caree to accept such 
goals, such conduct is easily identified as paternalistic, immature and harmful to any relation. 
Common goals must be mediated and communicated through a reflexive dialogical process. This will 
substantially increase the odds for both carer and caree to find common ground. Such 
communication takes time and requires resources and is sometimes not feasible in the real world 
                                                          
201 I did not find Pettersen elaborating on this issue in her writings 2008; 2011; 2012. 
202 It may also be the case that carer and caree do not agree on the problem either. The following discussion 
will address this issue. 
203 I will discuss such defined relationships in the next pages. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that, 
as discussed earlier, not all relationships are of this narrow kind. 
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due to empirical limitations. Nevertheless, failure of communication is a typical reason for why 
common ground cannot be found or potential care relations turn into harmful or exploitative 
relations. It would attest to immature care to simply always already presuppose agreement on 
common goals. Rather, reciprocity demands examination of interests of carer and caree as well as 
discussion of what goals are to be achieved within which limits.204 
According to Pettersen, limitations to the scope of how to care and what to care for will be different 
for different kinds of relations. While it may be acceptable, even necessary, to employ a wider scope, 
for example, for parents to care about “almost every present and future aspect of their offspring's 
well-being”205. The same will not be true for professional relations such as those between student 
and teacher, nurse and patient, state employee and citizen that are limited to specific goals. The 
care of a teacher may extend beyond simple conveying of information to the student and include 
pedagogic conduct and didactic preparation of knowledge. It may even include attempting to 
motivate students to learn more and acquire more knowledge, but only in so far as this contributes 
to the student’s education, and not beyond. In professional relations, one typically sees a subdivision 
of responsibilities such as having various specialized teachers to educate students on different 
subjects, or having various public departments that are to take care of a person with regard to 
various aspects of leading a healthy human life, such as the department of public health, public 
safety, traffic safety, social welfare etc. It can, however, not be expected from a professional carer to 
extend care beyond the specific relationship. A nurse, a teacher, or a public official are not expected 
to care about every aspect now and in the future of a caree’s wellbeing, education or social welfare 
once the goal of the caring relationship is achieved. This would go beyond the professional 
relationship and demand too much of a self-sacrifice from the carer and would thus not be an 
instance of mature, but of immature, care. Reciprocity with regard to limiting the scope of caring 
relations is thus an essential skill for the practice of mature care and “part of the caring 
responsibility” of the mature carer. 
But what happens if one party to the relation suddenly decides to not actively participate in the 
relationship anymore? Would it be ok for the carer to simply refrain from further care, since the 
caree has violated the relationship? The answer to this question is “it depends on the situation”. The 
mature carer would be guided in his or her actions by the principle of reciprocity in the form of the 
extended principle of not harming. So as long as terminating the relation would produce more harm 
                                                          
204 Sluga throws some light on the question what happens when people do not agree on common goals, which 
is usually the case in politics. See chapter III, p. 84ff. 
205 Pettersen, 2012, p. 382. 
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for carer and caree the mature carer would not want to end it. If ending it would be beneficial to the 
overall relation as well as flourishing of caree and carer, then the mature carer would terminate the 
relations even if the common goal has not been achieved, yet. Doing so only after taking into 
considerations the interests of both him and herself as well as the caree and communicating with 
the caree on the reasons for why the relation or commitment to the common goal was ended. A 
student who is not convinced that what s/he is taught is useful, important or necessary for his or her 
future may not want to enter into or continue the teacher student relationship. Anyhow, it could be 
expected of a mature teacher to at least attempt to motivate the student, through discussion and 
providing rational as well as emotive arguments, to continue with his or her education. Much may be 
solved through communication. The mature teacher being attentive to a student’s education may 
find it more fruitful to motivate a student by letting the student pursue his or her own interests. In 
this way the common goal of educating the student would be achieved, but not on the basis of pre-
given aims or the teacher/education system paternalistically defining the given goals, but by 
reciprocally treating both the carer’s (teacher’s) and caree’s (student’s) interests.  
At the same time, it is important to emphasize that even though a carer is responsible for his or her 
own caring acts, s/he “must not assume the responsibility for all the caring needs”206. There are 
situations where other people in the wider web of relations as well as the caree him or herself must 
assume at least some of the care responsibilities. Caring is a shared practice with “shared 
responsibilities” between individual, societal and political agents. Due to our human condition it is 
simply impossible for one person or one agent alone to attempt to meet all the needs of an other 
now and in the future. Such an unrealistically altruistic and self-sacrificial concept of care merely 
conceals the inter-human, legal, societal and political dimensions of care and must be rejected if one 
wants to avoid the carer being exploited and the caree being “treated a passive receiver”207. 
In cases such as the above case of teacher-student relationships it is important to take into account 
as much of the relevant pre-existing relations, complexities and empirical limitations of the concrete 
situation as possible. What are the reasons for the caree not wanting to participate in the 
relationship? Why is there disagreement between carer and caree on the aims of the relations? Are 
there other overruling interests, or harmful relations that may interfere with an otherwise 
potentially flourishing relation? For example, a student’s private relations at home or to other 
classmates. Asking the relevant questions and analyzing possible answers is not an exact science and 
will itself always depend on the context of the situation. Common goals are not to be taken for 





granted or assumed to be preexisting. Rather, such aims must be negotiated through dialogue and 
communication against the context of the situation. Employing the principles of mature care, that is, 
reciprocity with regard to interest, concerned attention to the empirical realities of the concrete 
situation, and the extended principle of not harming can provide a fruitful perspective on concrete 
dilemmas and guide decisions based on how they contribute to positive conduct and flourishing 
relations. 
 
MATURE CARE AND THE EUROPEAN REFUGEE CRISIS 
Consider the refugee crisis example again. When a refugee is asking for protection in another 
country he or she is in a situation of total dependence on the goodwill of the (immigration policy) of 
that country. Typically, the question of whether or not to accept refugees from other countries is not 
made solely on the basis of respect for refugees as human beings of equal worth (as legal documents 
such as the universal declaration of human rights and refugee convention demand). Nor is it made 
based on the fear of losing one's humanity when not providing care for refugees, but on strategic 
policy evaluations concerning factors such as cost of refugees to the state, difficulty of integration, 
destabilizing potential of taking in a large number of refugees, usefulness of refugees in terms of 
labor force, etc. The demand to solely base a country's political decisions on the universality of 
human rights or the absoluteness of mutual recognition of respect for each other as human beings 
of equal worth can be counterproductive in such cases. The reason for that being that such 
approaches do not take into account the empirical and political realities of the concrete situation. It 
is not feasible to demand from a small country with a limited economy to take upon itself the major 
burden of providing protection for refugees simply because it is the first country to which most 
refugees flee.208 If one asked whether such a demand would prevent overall harm and promote 
human flourishing, the answer would merely turn out to be “maybe so”. But, what about the 
harmful effects to that country's economy and societal stability? And what about the xenophobic 
resentment such a policy could produce? If the task of providing refuge for a large number of 
refugees becomes too large, it could destabilize that country's political order, leading to more chaos, 
                                                          
208 This is representative for among others the position of Bulgaria, Serbia and Romania. With regard to this 
argument, it is truly interesting to look at Lebanon, which, being one of the first countries to which Syrian 
refugees flee, has taken in an asymmetrically large amount of refugees. Around 1.5 million refugees from Syria 
alone, amounting to more than one in five people of its total population. On top of that, come more than 320 
thousand Palestinian refugees putting more than half of the Lebanese population in need of extensive aid and 
care. Source: UNHCR, 2015, p. 3. 
64 
 
misery and suffering.209 To say it with Pettersen’s words, it is immature and ignorant to demand 
from a state something the state cannot provide due to factually existing empirical limitations. In 
other words, as discussed earlier, in order for care to provide us with useful principles that will be 
employed by an agent such as a person, a state or a moral agent in general, it must provide us with 
possible actions that are within our capacity to act on.210 If the moral voice demands from us actions 
we do not have the capacity to carry into execution it cannot be said to provide a useful guiding 
principle for conduct. 
Rather, as I believe becomes clear with the current refugee crisis, such universal and absolute 
demands coupled with a perceived overwhelming amount of refugees will more likely lead to more 
fear, xenophobia, and a shift toward conservative and right wing politics.211 This shift can be 
observed in countries closing off their borders because they perceive refugees as a threat to their 
existence and domestic stability212 against which they have to “defend”213 themselves. 
But, how would care ethics be different from a pure human rights approach grounded in the 
universal equality and worth of the human being? Is it not true that mature care demands that we 
view the interests of the refugee as being equally important to our own and that we should respect 
the equal worth of refugees as well as their interests? This is true, but mature care differs in that it 
does not deduce from this pre-condition a universally moral obligation to grant unlimited care. It 
does not start from a universal right to care, that is, that all human beings have a right to be cared 
for. It merely states that if human beings are not cared for, the not caring will have certain 
detrimental effects on these human beings, their relations and capacity to enter into relations that 
promote human flourishing. Anyhow, care ethics still leaves the evaluation and decision whether or 
not one is to act upon such insight to the agent. At the same time mature care provides guiding 
principles in the form of the extended principle of not hurting (actively work to prevent harm, 
promote human flourishing) and the principle of reciprocity.  
                                                          
209 As the Lebanon example shows. 
210 Cf. chapter I, pp. 27- 28 & Pettersen, 2008, p. ix. 
211 Cf. Resnikoff, 2015; Abé et al., 2014; McHugh, 2015. 
212 Such as Hungary that has already closed off its border to Croatia with Slovenia considering to do the same. 
213 This was the wording the Romanian Prime Minister Victor Ponta used, when meeting with the Bulgarian 
and Serbian Prime Ministers in the Bulgarian capital Sofia prior to a planned European Union leaders summit 
on the current refugee crisis. He said "If there are countries which close their borders, or build fences, then we 
have the right to defend ourselves [against refugees] in a timely manner." Tsolova, 2015. Own emphasis. 
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If, for example, one would employ mature care with regard to the European refugee crisis one would 
need to analyze the nature of the relations between refugees and the potentially protection 
providing states and the ability of the various states to actually provide protection that is in line with 
the expanded principle of not hurting. Since a potentially refuge providing state is in a position to 
care for refugees, for example, by providing protection from war, prosecution, hunger and human 
suffering mature care would demand of this state to do whatever is within its powers to care.214 
Such an argument is grounded in mature care’s universal condemnation of exploit and hurt and 
draws on feelings, emotions and needs that are shared by all human beings. To be in a state of 
absolute vulnerability, without protection or the ability to provide for oneself will inevitably produce 
suffering and pain. To avoid such suffering care toward the needy is required. The basic idea is that 
everyone will be able to relate to such a situation and be able to picture herself in it and realize the 
need for care. Consequently, care does not only appeal to our sense of righteousness (it is the right 
thing to do to help a person in need), but also to our most basic human instincts, the instincts to 
survive and avoid pain, in order to persuade the carer to realize the need to actively care.  
One could hold against such reasoning that states are not people and cannot experience pain or 
suffering. This argument largely depends on how one understands a state. If a state is understood as 
a political community made up with relations between agents that is to provide the necessary 
conditions for such relations to exist and flourish, one could argue that the relations and agents 
within the state and thus the state itself can indeed get hurt and take damage. Not in the same way 
a single human being can get hurt, but if the state’s primary function is to create conditions 
favorable for the web of relations to exist and flourish, avoiding such damage would be one of the 
state’s primary goals. So in a way a state that is made up of political systems, people and relations 
would be able to relate to the experience of pain, or crisis in a comparable way to how persons can 
relate to such traumatic experiences. Threats to its existence create a state of emergency that is to 
be avoided.  
 
                                                          
214 It is, at least in part, an empirical question to what extent states are in a position to care and many states 
would argue that they simply have no resources to do so. I am aware of the fact that my following argument is 
grounded in me claiming that states are in a position to care. Anyhow, I believe this to be a legitimate claim 
because although the empirical dimension to which extent states can care for refugees will put certain limits 
on a state’s ability, it is not the motivation for providing care. Rather, the motivation is the recognition of 
refugees being human beings in need, requiring protection, and care regarding their basic human needs in the 
same way a state’s citizens do. See, for example, the discussion on reflective experience of pain on p. 16 and 
the discussion of the core principles of care ethics on p. 43ff. An empirical argument could be made with 
regard to the fact that Lebanon definitely does not have the resources to take in more refugees. Yet, they 
continue to continue to care for refugees fleeing Syria by providing shelter, food and protection despite 
creating shortages for their own citizens. 
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This line of thought could also provide a basic understanding for why states are able recognize not 
only the needs of related persons in crisis such as refugees, but of other states that may experience 
crisis and are in need of care, too. It can pave a wider and more inclusive understanding of why 
some states struggle more than others to care for refugees and provide protection. It may be simply 
because they themselves are in a state of crisis needing help. 
Giving protection, providing food, housing and safety is a way of tending toward and caring for the 
needs of a person who had to flee her home and has lost everything except her bare life. The notion 
of care grounds such arguments in the universal condemnation of exploit and hurt by attempting to 
activate shared human feelings. Most people will be able to think of themselves in a situation where 
they have been exploited or hurt and were without protection and maybe even unable to provide 
for themselves. Typically, this is a situation most of us want to avoid or get out off due to the hurt it 
induces and detrimental effects it has on us and our relations. Thus, most people will be able to 
relate to mature care deeming it to be a responsibility of every able state to actively provide such 
care. If the state refrains from doing so it violates mature care’s extended principle of not hurting 
(actively work to prevent harm, promote human flourishing). The relation between a state and a 
refugee seeking refuge is a typically asymmetrical relation where the state is the carer - the one able 
to provide care - and the refugee the caree - the one in need of care. Nevertheless, it could not be 
expected of the state to provide unlimited care to all the refugees coming to this state seeking 
protection. The state would also have the obligation to take into account the interests of its own 
citizens (even if they would be motivated by xenophobia), but first and foremost to uphold stable 
political conditions guaranteeing the preservation of conditions necessary for its existence. Only if 
such conditions are preserved will the state be able to provide care now and in the future. In other 
words, it could not be expected of that state to sacrifice itself for the sake of caring for refugees. 
That being said, mature care would demand of that state to participate in providing care for 
refugees as much as it is able to.  
Hence, bigger and economically more robust states would have to carry a larger burden of care than 
smaller and economically fragile states. Every state would have to participate, but mature care 
would not demand unrealistic sacrifices from states. On the contrary, it would even demand of the 
robust and economically powerful states to care not only for help seeking refugees, but for the 
needs of the more fragile states as well, and to assist them in their caring. All, of course, within the 
limits of their possibilities.215 Reciprocity with regard to the wider web of relation within which 
                                                          
215 Again, we get to the question of what these limits are. The care perspective does not claim to be able to 
determine these limits and is open to, for example, employing economical and utilitarian approaches for 
determining the real possibilities for and limits to care. Care ethics does not attempt to replace other ethical 
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states, citizens and refugees are, additionally demands an active contribution to achieving the 
common goal of providing protection and care for refugees from all the involved parties. This means 
it would also demand from refugees seeking protection to actively contribute to this goal as long as 
this promotes human flourishing and is within the limits of mature care’s expanded principle of not 
hurting. In other words, refugees must not be treated as passive receivers of help, but are to be 
active parts of finding solutions. Anyhow, the expanded principle of not harming would forbid 
treating refugees as mere “resources” that can be moved, allocated and redistributed (deported). 
Care’s analytic gaze also turns a mature carer’s attention toward the wider web or relations and thus 
to the relational causes for why there are so many refugees. The violent and abusive relationships of 
refugees to their “home” state that is not able to (or does not want to) care for them, that is, to 
provide protection and stable conditions promoting human flourishing, anymore, are not simply a 
cause that is to be accepted as given by the mature carer. Rather, mature care would require to 
analyze why these relationships have become detrimental promoting suffering and hurt require to 
actively work to turn such damaged relations into relations favorable for human flourishing. 
Before moving on from the above discussion of how care can function in a political context to the 
discussion of a political notion of care let me sum up the ethical concept of care. Carol Gilligan 
resurrected the notion of care in her book In A Different Voice, thereby laying the foundation for 
introducing care that had traditionally been a minority tradition of philosophical thought (see 
chapter I) into mainstream philosophy. Gilligan’s goal was to show that the care perspective is 
typically representative for how women tend to understand and solve moral problems and that this 
is merely a different way of comprehending ethically demanding challenges, not inferior as, for 
example, Gilligan’s mentor Lawrence Kohlberg argued. Tove Pettersen took Gilligan’s account of 
reflective or mature care and developed it into a full-blown account of care ethics by providing a 
theoretical foundation grounding care ethics in a relational ontology, developing a morally guiding 
principle of mature care and limiting its scope by incorporating the extended principle of not 
harming into its core. Care ethics, Pettersen argues, is a powerful moral perspective that can draw 
attention to empirical realities of moral situations to which other moral theories might be blind. At 
the same time the care perspective does not attempt to replace other moral theories such as 
utilitarianism or justice theory.216 Rather, it is realistic about its own limitations, retaining 
                                                          
frameworks. Rather, it attempts to get the agent to change her perspective so that moral problems can be 
understood from different angles. Care does not solve all the challenges regarding a concrete moral or political 
problem, but draws the agent's attention to the complexities and various perspectives pertaining to a concrete 
situation.    
216 Cf. Pettersen, 2008, p. xiv.  
68 
 
uncertainty and fallibility at its heart, and being open toward employing different perspectives to 
better understand and respond to moral problems.  
It emphasizes “empathic association with others, being responsible and caring”217 and perceives 
agents as connected in relation to others. “[T]he others” are comprehended in the context of the 
particular situations they are in. Care ethics typically construes moral problems as issues of 
relationships and response, thus changing the moral question from what is the morally right, just or 
useful thing to do to “How should I respond?”. This does not mean that care ethics views questions 
of justice, righteousness or usefulness as irrelevant. Rather, mature care incorporates these 
perspectives into its response framework. Thus, moral problems are analyzed, evaluated and acted 
upon from a perspective of care and the attempt to maintain and promote connections and relations 
to others, at the same time actively preventing harm, hurt and suffering. When deciding how to 
respond or evaluating the decision leading to a response mature care will draw the agent’s attention 
toward asking questions such as what will happen or has happened, how will things work or have 












                                                          
217 Ibid., p. 8. 
218 Cf. Ibid.; Gilligan, 1988, p. 35. 
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CHAPTER III - THE CARE FOR THE COMMON: A POLITICAL 
NOTION OF CARE 
The notion of care, it has been claimed, has the power to change the way we traditionally think 
about ethics and morality. Tove Pettersen developed the notion of care into the concept of mature 
care for ethics. Mature care, Pettersen argues, through changing the ontological foundation and 
following epistemological implications, from an ontology based on the concept of the individual to a 
relational ontology219 and to mutual recognition of interests of both self and others220, changes the 
ethical question from what is the morally right, just or useful thing to do to the question of how to 
respond221 in a way that avoids hurt and promotes human flourishing.  
I have indicated some political implications of the notion of care during the discussion in chapter II. 
Most of the examples I discussed with regard to care were in fact not taken from the private 
domain, but pertaining to relations and moral challenges which are typically classified as being 
within the domain of the political. Relations such as between states and individuals or groups of 
individuals (refugees) or professional relations (teacher-student, nurse-patient). This, I see as an 
indication that the notion of care can address political questions and thus possesses an application 
value extending beyond the pure ethical domain. Due to its ability to draw on and activate 
universally shared human experiences, feelings and emotions, as well as it being concerned with 
creating favorable conditions for reducing hurt and promoting human flourishing and enhancement, 
across generations and traditional boundaries222, care truly seems to be a political undertaking at 
heart. Therefore, I will now turn toward one political thinker who has attempted rethinking the 
political from a perspective of care.  
Hans Sluga in his book Politics and the Search for the Common Good (2014)223 critically analyzes and 
discusses advantages and limitations to politics understood as “the care of the common”, a concept 
he takes from the pre-Socratic thinker Protagoras. Since Sluga’s main aim in the book is to rethink 
politics and the concept of the political he spends most of his time discussing, deconstructing and 
criticizing what he calls the “classical” normative concept of politics that extends from Plato to John 
                                                          
219 Pettersen, 2012, p. 376. 
220 Pettersen, 2011, p. 57. 
221Cf. Pettersen, 2008, p. 8, 135. 
222 See chapter I on the history of care. 
223 Which I will refer to as simply Politics. 
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Rawls. Sluga contrasts their “normative theorizing” with what he calls politics as “diagnostic 
practice”. Thus, most of his early thoughts on the significance of care for politics can be found in an 
earlier work, in particular The Care of The Common (2011). Here Sluga offers deeper insights into the 
Protagorean concept of politics as care of the common by the common224, which he views as 
essential for coming to a new understanding of politics as the ongoing search for a common good, 
not universal or absolute in character, but temporary and ever negotiable.225 
Sluga wants to revive the care of the common in order to overcome the individualism and liberalism 
inherent in modern politics.226 The background for this project is Sluga’s reading of Wittgenstein227 
and Foucault228who he thinks are focusing too narrowly on an ethics of the self. According to Sluga, 
both thinkers fail to recognize that any ethics of the care of the self presupposes an ethics of the 
care of the common. It is a different way of saying what I discussed in chapter II, that there can be 
no other-care without self-care and that care is a reflective activity. Foucault, Sluga argues, did arrive 
at his notion of the care of the self from his study of ancient Greek ethics, but failed to see that the 
Greeks did in addition operate with the notion of the care of the common through which Greek 
thinkers such as Plato and Protagoras attempted to comprehend politics.229 Sluga repeatedly states 
that in order to generate an adequate ethics of our relations to others, any concept of “the care of 
                                                          
224 Although being the working title of his latest book, Sluga has never published The Care of The Common 
(2011) and the passages I am referring to are not included in Politics (2014). The reason why I choose to refer 
to unpublished material is that Sluga’s working paper will provide the reader with a deeper understanding of 
how to understand and conceptualize different kinds of caring both from a philosophically historic as well as 
from a relational ontology point of view. Furthermore, it will add some background to Sluga’s project in Politics 
(2014) and his project of rethinking the political. The material contains many of Sluga’s thoughts that, as I 
believe, significantly contribute to understanding care in a political context. I realize that Sluga may not be 
committed to these thoughts anymore and thus my reading of his work will aim to be as charitable as possible. 
My goal is therefore not to criticize what is in the unpublished work, but to draw from it. Sluga’s unpublished 
thoughts do not possess the philosophical momentum to replace normative political theory, but serve as a 
steady point of departure and important contribution to further develop the notion of care into a tool helping 
us to understand politics under current circumstances and a political concept guiding our political actions.  
225 Sluga, 2014, p. 69, 234, 249. 
226 Read against the background of being a philosophical undertaking, the overcoming of philosophical 
individualism (with the individual being the starting point of our theoretical models of understanding politics) 
and philosophical liberalism (the understanding of freedom as the ability to do what is right or what one 
wants) seems all too familiar to Pettersen’s project. The difference being that Pettersen attempts to rethink 
ethics from a perspective of care, while Sluga wants to rethink politics from a perspective of care. Both 
struggle with the traditional ontology and epistemology of their respective fields, but can be read as 
complementary to each other where the one fills in the blindspots of the other. 
227 Sluga, 2013, p. 16. 
228 Sluga, 2014, p. 198. 
229 Cf. Sluga (2014) on Foucault on the care of the self, pp. 194 - 198. 
71 
 
the self must be grounded in an ethics of the care of the common”230 and that these two concepts 
are mutually interdependent.231  
Although, there are no references to care thinkers to be found in Sluga’s work and he thus does not 
seem to be acquainted with the literature on care ethics232, his way of comprehending care adds to 
Petterson's discussion of reciprocity and mature care.  On the one hand Sluga argues that all human 
relations and interactions and consequently all care contain a political element. On the other hand, 
he specifically attempts to limit the scope of politics of care to only encompass certain relations. 
Furthermore, and in utilizing the care of the common to rethink politics, Sluga adds an important 
dimension to Pettersen’s discussion of self-care vs. other-care, and argues that enlarging the care 
perspective to include an understanding of the care of the common is necessary for the notion of 
care to become a political concept. Thus, Sluga views the care of the common as a complementary 
concept to the care of the self, which he has borrowed from Foucault, who in turn has taken it from 
Plato. Sluga himself has taken the concept of the care of the common directly from Plato’s 
Protagoras and Statesman.233, 234 
 
FROM THE CARE OF THE COMMON TO A GENERIC NOTION OF CARE FOR 
POLITICS 
The most explanatory passage from his current book on how Sluga understands the care of the 
common can be found in the introduction of Politics. Here, Sluga briefly explains that both 
Protagoras and Plato had their own understanding of the care of the common. According to Sluga, 
since the time of Plato, mainstream political philosophy has understood politics as rule over a 
territory with its people. While Plato thought that politics should be comprehended as the rule of 
the polis (city-state), the modern alteration of this thinking is that politics is government of the state. 
Sluga thinks that the notion of politics as rule over a territory is problematic. It defines the legitimate 
categories in which one thinks about politics and the concept of the political, thus, making it difficult 
to comprehend politics in alternative ways, such as politics understood as a search for the common 
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good, which, Sluga argues, “stands at the beginning of our entire Western tradition in political 
thought”235. It is, he argues, the one comprehension of politics from which all other philosophical 
conceptions of politics have sprung and precedes even the notion of politics as rule of the polis, or 
government of the state, as we now have learned to say. 
Anyhow, there is only a short section on how Sluga comprehends the care of the common in the 
introduction to Politics. For him, it seems, the care of the common is a certain way of doing politics 
understood as search for a common good and thus he spends the rest of the book analyzing what 
kind of good this common good should be. In the introduction Sluga provides the reader with a 
negative definition of how he understands the care of the common in which he describes it as not 
being about rule, administration or government of a territory and its people, but a searching activity, 
that is, an activity or practice, for a common good, which is temporary and negotiable. He highlights 
these features because he thinks that they sound quite alien to the political philosopher, especially 
the traditional normative theorist who might tend to ground the common good in a universal and 
absolute good, nature, reason or conceptual truth.236 
However, according to Sluga, this traditional normative view is not how most people comprehend 
politics today. Rather, he explains that during the past 200 years the understanding of politics has 
changed and is understood by most people of the 21st century as a shared undertaking in which 
everyone can potentially participate, through one’s own voice and action. Experts, such as political 
theorists, scientists, or professional politicians still have importance but are merely one voice among 
many others in this undertaking.237 
Sluga justifies the temporary character of the common good by appealing to the fallibility and 
uncertainties inherent in all human and indeed political life. Due to the contingent and 
unpredictable character of politics, he argues, a political philosophy that takes upon itself to 
understand politics and even provide us with some orientation to how we may act in the face of our 
situated and existentially uncertain position, cannot be preoccupied with the search for universal 
truths, norms or standards by which to judge political actions.238 One can witness the same impulse 
in Pettersen who wants to retain human vulnerability, fallibility and uncertainty with regard to ethics 
in her theory of mature care. Pettersen does not believe that moral dilemmas can be decided by 
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universal and absolute moral principles and emphasizes that the actual judgement and decision of 
how to act in a concrete situation is left to the agent.  
Politics understood as the care of the common, Sluga speculates, may very well be a conception of 
politics much older than what we generally consider the beginning of western philosophy.239 He 
identifies the search for a common good in Plato’s writings who, Sluga argues, put it in the mouth of 
the pre-Socratic philosopher Protagoras. Protagoras who was labeled a Sophist by Plato argues that 
we are forced to take care of ourselves, our human business, because the Gods have abandoned us 
and are no longer interfering in the dealings of humans. Consequently, we have no choice but to 
take care of our own business and to engage in politics. The problem; nature has left us outfitted 
badly and with very limited tools to do this. According to the Protagorean myth, we are left “naked, 
unshod, unbedded, [and] unarmed”240 with only an underdeveloped capacity for fairness. The 
proximity of Sluga’s reading of Protagoras to care ethics becomes evident when he explains that if 
we are to successfully live together in political (human) communities we have to learn the care of 
the common through a life of tending and nurturing.241  
According to Sluga, this is the reason why Protagoras proclaims democracy to be the best way of 
organizing a political community for the search of the common good.242 It is crucial to emphasize 
that for Sluga Protagoras does not understand democracy here as the rule of the people, but as a 
concerted practice or worthwhile activity, that is, an ongoing search by the people for the best way 
to live together in a community. The view of democracy being the rule of the people was critiqued by 
Plato. Plato used Socrates as a mouthpiece to express the fear of democracy being a mob rule, a 
perverted form of the rule of the demos.243 Plato’s Socrates sarcastically, calls it "a noble polity [and] 
delightful form of government, anarchic and motley, assigning a kind of equality indiscriminately to 
equals and unequals alike"244. 
Sluga points out that thus the Protagorean view of politics as the care of the common stands in 
contrast to three other conceptions of the common good. The common good as delivered by 1) 
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divine inspiration, 2) as a good chosen for us by an elite, or 3) as passed down by royal ruling. The 
Greeks knew all of the above views. Nevertheless, they were rejected by the Athenian democrats as 
well as Protagoras in favor of a conception of politics as a cooperative undertaking aiming not at the 
justification of politics as rule grounded in an absolute truth, but at a social understanding of the 
common endeavor in which the common good was “to be determined through a shared 
engagement of essentially equal partners not through an appeal to authority, intellectual or 
otherwise”245. 
The intriguing relevance of the Protagorean notion of politics as the care of the common for our 
understanding of politics is revealed to us by analyzing how Plato adapted this concept to his own 
needs. According to Sluga, Plato agreed with Protagoras that politics concerned the επιμελεια του 
κοινου, the concern with public issues, or the more literal translation, the care of the common. They 
both agreed on that we have to discover the care of the common for ourselves because the gods 
have disappeared from our lives and do not take care of us anymore, if they ever did at all, by 
intervening in our human affairs. Anyhow, Plato, in contrast to Protagoras, argued that expertise is 
needed in politics and that only experts should commence the search for the common good. Thus, 
attempting to free the care of the common from the democratic ethos that Protagoras had attached 
to it.246 
In The Statesman Plato writes that "no other art would advance a stronger claim than that of 
kingship to be the art of caring for the whole human community”247. Sluga takes Plato to have 
reinterpreted the “art of tending [...] or caring” for the whole human community into the skill of 
“managing them”248 and into the art of “ruling all mankind"249, thus, influencing our understanding 
of politics in two decisive ways. First, he paved the way for an understanding of politics as the 
government of the state, or the rule over a political community (polis), as Plato would say. According 
to Sluga, this understanding of politics has become our “classical” concept of politics passed on to us 
in its various forms through Plato and Aristotle.250 Second, Plato spinned the notion of politics as a 
search for the common good in the Protagorean sense, that is, as the care of the common, an 
including and specific human undertaking in which everyone could potentially participate, into 
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politics being a domain for experts.251 In other words, that there are experts for the search for the 
common good and that it should better be left to them to determine such a good, in the same way 
other activities within various fields that require certain specialized knowledge should be left to 
experts in the respective fields. The experts that Plato saw most fit to do this job were philosophers, 
more precisely a philosopher king. Thus, Plato advanced the understanding of politics as the rule of 
the expert philosophers. Sluga thinks that the same idea is still alive today in the attempt of some 
political philosophers trying to devise universal principles, norms and standards for political life252.  
 
FROM THE CARE OF THE COMMON TO CARING FOR THE COMMON: A NOTE ON TRANSLATION 
The observation that Plato’s own agenda has colored his way of framing the political opens up the 
possibility that Sluga’s translation and interpretation of the επιμελεια του κοινου might actually be 
influenced by Plato’s thought and way of conceptualizing politics. Therefore, I want to propose a 
different reading of the επιμελεια του κοινου from Sluga’s. This proposition is not grounded in any 
expert knowledge of ancient Greek and the change I propose is minimal. While Sluga translates the 
επιμελεια του κοινου as the care of the common, I believe that this reading already represents the 
understanding of politics as a potentially paternalistic and top down activity, the rule of someone in 
power over a community. I can only take care of something or someone if I am in the position to do 
so, that is, if I have the power and resources. The preposition of objectifies the noun (that which is to 
be taken care of) and signifies distance and dissociation253, 254. Furthermore, taking care of something 
entertains the perception that care-taking is something which can be easily done in the same way as 
one can take care of a broken car, a bag of rubbish or a problem that can simply be “fixed”. It 
describes an activity with a concrete goal that is easily limited in time and space. By contrast, 
interpreting the επιμελεια του κοινου as the care for the common, rather than the care of the 
common retains a richer sense of care that may have certain benefits when discussing political 
activity. The preposition for supports the comprehension of care being a process, a caring activity, 
which cannot as easily be defined in time and space, but requires reflection and attention. Care of, it 
can be argued, is consequently narrowed down into being an administrative, paternalistic and 
                                                          
251 Ibid. 
252 A comprehensive discussion of the “classical” understanding of politics and how Sluga pictures it is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. For Sluga’s discussion see Sluga, 2014, Part I. 
253 "of", Harper, Douglas R, ‘Online Etymology Dictionary’ ([Lancaster, Pa.]: D. Harper, 2015) 
<http://www.etymonline.com> 
254 "of", OED Online. Oxford University Press, September 2015. Web. 23 September 2015. 
76 
 
distant activity. This is especially problematic when thinking of human beings or a political 
community. Such demerging care loses much of its connotative richness and multi-directiveness. For 
that reason, I propose to translate the επιμελεια του κοινου as the care for the common or caring 
for the common. The preposition for captures a different meaning of care, especially it being a 
process of caring, a related and directional activity of concern or solicitude retaining a sense of 
attentiveness, conscientiousness, and devotion. 
 
THE GENERIC NOTION OF THE CARE FOR THE COMMON 
Although, there have been various and uniquely different political experiences over the course of 
history255, Sluga thinks that Plato and Aristotle have “stabilized for us the parameters for any 
concept of the political we might consider”256. But, he is concerned that in the wake of global 
terrorism, the financial, economic, social and climate crisis the “classical” concept of politics has 
become unfit of “carrying a positive significance” under current circumstances. To Sluga, the classical 
concept of politics today persists as a “dreary reality” with government and the state being more 
about erection and compounding of boarders, about absolute and sovereign rule over and 
administration of a territory, but alien to the idea of politics being a search for the best way to live 
together. Thus, Sluga argues, that from a historical point of view the time has come to investigate 
alternative understandings of the political and “what being political can mean for us today and under 
current conditions.”257  
To this end, he initially turns to three political thinkers who were dissatisfied with the Plato-
Aristotelian understanding of politics and have thus thought to develop a “new” concept of the 
political. Carl Schmitt, who attempted to show that a friend-enemy schema was the foundation of all 
politics, Hannah Arendt, who wanted to show that the concept of the political corresponds to that of 
free action, and Michel Foucault, who argued that politics is to be comprehended as a system of 
circulating power relations. All three of them, Sluga argues, fail in generating “a viable concept of the 
political.”258 In Politics he dedicates a whole chapter to each thinker where he discusses in length 
what they contribute to political philosophy and where they fail to provide a feasible concept of the 
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political. In summary, he thinks that while Schmitt’s friend-enemy schema fails to explain the 
positive interactions of those who share a form of life and thus can be considered political friends259, 
Arendt’s concept of the political seems to lose focus on the content of politics which thus mutates 
into a “strange luxury” due to Arendt’s sharp separation of free action from satisfaction of need260. 
For Foucault, human beings are through and through in the grip of power which determines his 
concept of the political. Such an understanding of politics is unsatisfactory because it merely allows 
for the unexplained and unjustified hope that power (politics) always permits resistance261. Finally, 
Foucault rethinks politics from a perspective of the care for the self262, which he took from his study 
of ancient Greek ethics. He argues that in order to care for oneself, one has to engage oneself 
politically. What Foucault overlooked was, according to Sluga, that the Greeks had an additional 
concept to the care for the self. The care for the common, which accompanied and complemented 
the care for the self.263  
For that reason, and since he thinks that all three thinkers fail in providing a viable concept of the 
political, Sluga proposes to turn to politics understood as the care for the common. Even though 
Sluga realizes that such a proposal may seem initially quite eccentric he still deems it necessary in 
order to rethink politics, because he, too, as Pettersen does, thinks that the kind of knowledge, that 
is, the categories and concepts in which we think, as well as the language and words with which we 
describe the world around us, determine to a large degree how we understand, conceptualize, 
explain and solve (political or ethical) problems.264 Sluga does however not propose to go back to a 
specific pre-Socratic or Platonic-Aristotelian concept of the care for the common as a “participatory 
form of politics”265 or rule over a polis, respectively. This is mainly because the circumstances under 
which the specifically ancient Greek concept of the care for the common worked, have changed and 
the current conditions for politics in a global world are quite different from the conditions the old 
Greeks found themselves in.266 Rather, Sluga employs the care for the common “as a generic 
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characterization of politics”267 in order to construct a “new” concept of the political. While the 
historically specific version of the Protagorean notion of the care for the common is limited to a 
determinate structure of politics as well as a specific understanding of the notion of care and the 
common, the generic interpretation opens both the notion of care and the common up to 
interpretation. The generic character of the care for the common is the reason why the 
understanding of politics, that is, the interpretation of both care and the common could be changed 
from the Protagorean notion of politics “being specifically a participatory activity” by the people and 
for the people, to politics being understood as “rule of the best” over a polis by Plato and 
Aristotle.268  
Generically speaking, care can thus take many forms, such as “traditional rulership, messianic 
dictatorship, bureaucratic administration or even corporate governance.”269 However, the notion of 
the common can accommodate several interpretations, too. It may be understood as the polis (as it 
was understood by Protagoras, Plato and Aristotle) or as a “common fiefdom, state, empire, 
federation, union, or more loosely as community, group, or tribe”270. 
Hence, Sluga thinks that the Protagorean version of the care for the common should be of interest to 
us for three reasons. First, it can be seen as the root of the Platonic-Aristotelian conception of 
politics as rule of the best. Second, it provides a historical model to which we can compare our own 
politics. Third, the model can also be seen as an ideal for our own political practice. Consequently, 
the Protagorean model can be taken to be a historical source, a point of comparison, and a 
normative standard. Anyhow, these uses differ from the generic notion of the care for the common. 
Sluga argues that there are three different uses for the generic formula. First, it may be helpful in 
revealing characteristics of politics that have been lost or obscured by the “still dominant Platonic-
Aristotelian concept of the political”. Second, if there exist features of the political that have been 
lost along the way, so to speak, the generic notion of the care for the common may provide an 
analytical tool to “bring out deep and pervasive features of all human politics”. Finally, Sluga thinks, 
that it may also be used as a template in order to construct “a concept of the political that is fully 
adequate for our time”.271  
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As I have shown in chapter I and II, the notion of care and its significance for ethics and politics, does 
have a history that can be traced. Furthermore, with the help of Warren Reich and Tove Pettersen, I 
have argued that the notion of care has had influence on how to meaningfully understand human 
existence and interaction from a relational ontology. Thus, I agree with Sluga, that the notion of care 
may help us in identifying features about the political that draw on ideas and insights into human 
existence that might be characterized as universal in the sense that they pertain to all human beings. 
The notion of care conveys what is important in living a human life, that we all depend on care, and 
that we are what we are only through care. While Reich (1995) does not mention care with regard to 
Protagoras272 at all, Sluga elaborates on an account of care that provides a foundation for politics 
that is not based on the conception of the rule of a territory/community, but on the existential 
significance of care for living a human life. 
Thus, Sluga agrees with Reich and Pettersen that it is “one of the most pervasive characteristics of 
human life that we extend care”273. Without trying to score heavily philosophical points, he observes 
that human beings care for each other, parents care for their children, that most societies and 
political communities care for their members, and that there are structures in place that support 
caring for the sick, the old and the dying. We care for people that are close to us and we even have a 
capacity to care for strangers in need. This human capacity and wish to care for those who have 
suffered spectacular misfortune and who have almost entirely lost the ability to care for themselves, 
has been one of the overwhelmingly positive human impulses during the 2015 European refugee 
crisis.274 A crisis where individual persons together with help and aid organizations representing civil 
society have expressed and acted on a political will to care for the many refugees coming to Europe 
and other countries. In many instances, such care has been organized and extended without the 
help of the respective governments or governmental institutions, and in many cases against the will 
of the state that did not want to or was not able to help.275 
However, the 2015 refugee crisis also shows various other basic human emotions and impulses 
motivating human conduct. Such as fear turning into anxiety and hatred against “the others”. I do 
not wish to argue that human beings care all the time and that care is the single overriding human 
capacity or first impulse. I do not even want to claim that care is the strongest motivator in our 
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emotional make-up or for that matter political actions. Neither do I want to argue that human 
beings can do without our basic emotions of fear and anxiety. All these emotions, feelings and 
impulses can play a positive role in protecting human life. Sometimes hateful responses and radical 
action may be the only defense we have left as individuals and communities in the face of an unjust 
and overpowering situation. What I do however claim is that human beings, societies and political 
communities can do better without furthering fear, anxiety and hatred among their own population 
and against others, but by promoting care and building care structures. Pettersen’s notion of mature 
care gives us a tool for analyzing and evaluating the political landscape. Politics based on fear, 
anxiety and hatred promotes violent, harmful and deteriorating relations, rather than it supporting 
human flourishing and thus such politics must be the least favored alternative when facing political 
problems. Moreover, mature care with its principles of reciprocity and the extended principle of not 
harming can provide guidance where to look for political solutions that promote human flourishing. 
It is by taking into consideration the interests of all involved and by actively working to reduce fear, 
anxiety, hatred and the hurt they do to relations. Creating care structures and institutions that deal 
with the conditions that promote harmful politics and facilitate a politics of care can be a good 
starting point.  If sowing fear and hate reaps more fear and hate, then truly it might be that sowing 
care will reap more care.276 
But, human care is not only political in the sense that it extends to other human beings now and in 
the future. Rather, our capacity to care includes caring for other sentient beings such as animals 
(especially our pets), caring for plants, and even dead material things. Thus, one could argue that 
care is a pervasive feature of the human condition. That does not mean that human beings 
necessarily care for each other. A mature notion of care actually demands to limit the extent of our 
capacity for care and to make sure to care for ourselves, and our communities too. Nevertheless, 
most humans care for someone or something on a very basic level. Such care, concern, compassion 
or love can extend to people, animals, or even material as well as non-material things such as a 
much beloved car, the work we do, the songs we sing, and what kind of life we live. On a personal 
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level, cognitive and emotional states play a major role for whether we engage in caring acts or not. It 
is indeed likely, Sluga argues, that we will be more inclined to engage in acts of care taking “[when] 
we are in a caring state of mind”277. But what about the political state a society, community or 
nation is in? If Sluga’s argument that a caring state of mind is more likely to facilitate acts of care 
taking is true, it may be a worthwhile thought experiment to extended it to the political. It can be 
argued that societies, political communities or states that are in a caring state, that is, that 
prioritized to include as many interests as possible in their political system, laws and politics may be 
more inclined to actively engage in creating conditions favorable for human flourishing and reducing 
violent and harmful relations. 
Nonetheless, to Sluga, emotions, sentiments and states of mind are not the important thing with 
regard to a political notion of care. Neither is it the subjects and objects for which we care. Sluga’s 
crucial claim is rather that we “frequently and normally [engage] in acts of care-taking”278. This 
“pervasive and normal” feature of human life is supported by the insight that “we are who we are 
only through caring”279 and the care structures provided for us by the community we live in. Here, 
Sluga’s perspective on politics falls in line with the existential tradition that understands care as 
essential to being human280 and consequently to politics being an exclusively human enterprise. 
Thus, he notes that human babies cannot flourish without their mother’s nurturing. That human 
beings are to a certain extent products of the care their parents, teachers and mentors extend to 
their education. That one depends on care services extended by other people and institutions and 
that others depend on care services extended by oneself. In order to create progressive relations 
and facilitate human development a teacher cares for his pupils, a lecturer for his students, a doctor 
or a nurse for his patients, a lawyer for his clients, a salesperson for his customers, a community for 
its members and a state for its citizens. At the same time the teacher, the lecturer, the doctor and 
the nurse, the lawyer, the salesperson, the community and the state are themselves pupils, 
students, patients, clients, customers, members of a larger system, and agents in a world or 
international society at different times and various stages in their existence. It is another way of 
saying that agents are always already within a web of relations and that these relations can be 
beneficial to creating development and human flourishing if they are characterized by care 
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(Pettersen). Thus, Sluga agrees with one of the basic principles of care ethics, that “human culture is 
pervasively a structure of care”281. He attempts however to narrow down the scope a mature 
concept of care politics should have in order to avoid care turning into being too broad a concept 
and thus becoming irrelevant.  
 
FROM SIMPLE CARE TO GUIDING 
In order to think on politics from a care perspective Sluga focuses on the three major forms human 
care can take. He distinguishes between care as “simple care”, “guiding” and “attending”. This is 
important for developing a political notion of care because care politics does not relate to all three 
forms of care in the same way. If one is to develop a mature concept of care politics one must 
indeed limit its scope to avoid making the concept too general for being relevant. Sluga attempts to 
limit care politics by arguing that it is only a certain form of human care that is directly relevant to 
developing a notion of care politics. 
Generally, simple care is concerned with the “life and (physical) wellbeing [sic] of someone or 
something”282. Sluga portrays this as the most basic form of care, the form we usually think of when 
we talk about care and that can be found in the way we extend care to babies, the sick, the old, but 
also to animals or plants. We care for them because they could not survive, or their condition would 
be drastically worse and deteriorate without care. I discussed this in length in chapter I & II. Anyhow, 
It can be argued that such simple care is not only limited to living beings, but does indeed extend to 
immaterial things such as cars, houses and other possessions. By caring for them, we are in a certain 
way interested in their condition. Even though these things do not possess life of their own, at least 
not in the sentient sense, they can have a shorter or longer lifespan (time of usefulness and 
effectiveness), depending on how much we actively care for them. For our tools to last long and our 
cars to have a long life, we want them to be in an excellent condition. Thus, it can be said that by 
extending a form of simple care to immaterial objects we are concerned with their condition. And 
since care is a reflexive activity, extending simple care has the potential to enhance the well-being of 
the carer, too. If I keep my car in a perfect condition I feel happy, if my house is beautiful and cozy I 
feel comfortable, if my tools are working properly I may feel less frustrated and my life quality 
increases. The obvious difference in caring for material things is that these things cannot actively 
participate in the caring relationship. They do not have interests or goals of their own. Here, 
                                                          




Pettersen’s discussion of mature care does give us a useful guide for limiting our care for material 
things. Because the simple care for persons, animals, plants or things must be kept in check. If it 
turns into burdensome and down pulling concern, it becomes an extreme form of care with 
detrimental effects to ourselves and the persons and things we care about. Thus, for Sluga, taking 
care of oneself, that is, being concerned with one’s own life and well-being, is essentially an instance 
of simple care.283 
In addition to simple care, Sluga speaks of a second form of care that is not directed at bodies and 
their well-being, but at actions. He calls this form of care “care as action-guiding or simply [...] 
guiding”.284 Guiding is in some way similar to simple care in that it is a form of action. At the same 
time it is different from simple care because it is an action (the act of caring for) directed at other 
actions. Guiding is typically extended when one is concerned with someone else's behavior or 
quality of actions. Thus, for Sluga, teaching is the prime instance of guiding. The need for guiding 
arises because most things human beings can do have to be learned at some stage. Even though a 
newborn has certain biologically hardwired reflexes that are to ensure the satisfaction of the most 
basic needs, the satisfaction (by a parent) of these needs falls within simple care because the parent 
is concerned with the physical well-being of the child. First, when the parent becomes concerned 
with the actions of the child, that is, when the parent teaches the child “to speak, or to eat properly, 
or to be polite”285, the parent starts guiding the child’s behavior.  
Sluga’s underlying assumption here is that most human actions require skills that have to be learned. 
And even though some of these skills may be acquired autodidactically, most skills have to be taught 
by someone who knows how. They require “instruction from someone who already possesses the 
appropriate skills”286. Such instruction or guiding typically requires a whole set of skills itself. In order 
to be learned an action may need to be demonstrated, verbally described and explained, supervised, 
encouraged and motivated, and sometimes even disciplined, controlled and restricted. Sluga, here 
too, agrees with Pettersen that care as guiding may occasionally require “direct and indirect forms of 
force or violence”287, for example, political coercion when coercion is legitimate. Moreover, Sluga 
points out that human actions are not always straightforward. They are rather complicated and thus 
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need “planning, regulating, supervising, as well as reviewing and assessing”288. Actions may turn out 
to be too dangerous to execute, or detrimental and harmful to others and may thus require 
despisement, restraint and even prohibition. Hence, Sluga thinks that it is the qualities of our actions 
that are the main motivator for engaging in care as guiding of both our own actions and other’s 
actions. Since guiding requires and contains various actions and skills itself it is not one single, but “a 
multi-form” activity. 
Care as guiding is thus a form of action that is directed at other actions which are themselves 
typically directed at actions or bodies. It is a qualitatively different form of care that contains and 
involves simple care. However, another category of actions or care is particularly important for 
comprehending politics through the lens of care. It is the caring actions directed at a special form of 
actions, specifically human interactions.  
For Sluga the care directed at human interactions is a special form of guiding, which he calls “tending 
or also attending”289. While Sluga thinks of guiding as directed at actions that require skills in order 
to achieve a material goal, for example, the building of a boat, the fixing of a car, the destruction of a 
document, or excellence of an action, for example, speaking properly, running fast, or writing well, 
that involves guiding the action of a single person, tending or attending directly involve and engage 
more than one person. This however complicates things. While building a boat by using tools seems 
to be a somewhat straightforward goal where excellence of performance, effectiveness and success 
can be measured relatively easily by the outcome, and guidance can be given with regard to possible 
improvement of either outcome or process, human interactions typically do not have a common 
goal. At this point Sluga might be more helpful than Pettersen290 in discussing what happens when 
people do not agree on a common goal for their actions, as is usually the case in politics.  
Different people with different goals take different courses in life in order to achieve their goals. It is 
only when the courses people are embarked on intersect that interaction happens. The outcome of 
such interaction is, however, anything but straightforward. It may lead to “course corrections” that 
were not intended by either person. Sluga uses an example from Physics to explain this. He describes 
people’s life courses as trajectories.291 When the trajectories intersect, the outcome can be 
visualized by a parallelogram of forces. Neither of the persons on a trajectory will continue on their 
original course but through interaction, their courses may change. That does not mean that they 
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have to change into the same direction. Rather, all involved will change course into a different 
direction. The figure below attempts to visualize Sluga’s thinking. 
 
Figure 1      Figure 2 
 
 
Figure 1 and 2 are not to be taken literally. They are, of course, a simplified visualization. In reality, 
there may be more than two people interacting and their trajectories are influenced by all kinds of 
internal and external motivations, goals, wishes, hopes, emotions, knowledge, societal structures, 
cultural and political factors, as well as relations. Neither do human beings when they interact keep 
on interacting and pulling in the same direction as in figure 1. Human interaction is not 
straightforward and does not play out along perfect lines. Many times interactions will be limited in 
space and time and after the interaction has taken place, people will simply go their ways and 
continue on their courses, although the interaction may have altered the bearing (cf. figure 2). Thus, 
Sluga points out that for all those interacting with one another “the interaction may constitute 
something different”292, that it may have a different goal, and a different purpose. Hence, human 
interaction is more problematic than simple actions and calls for a different form of care that is more 
intensive and prolonged. Such tending or attending includes the  
“establishing and maintaining of dialogue, negotiating, coordinating conducting, reconciling, the 
formulating [of] terms of agreement and difference, producing of compromises or alternatives, the 
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drafting of agreements and contracts, the telling of stories that can unite the different parties, 
enticing and threatening the breaking or resistance, the enforcement of actions, etc., etc.293 
Naturally, this requires many different skills from the interacting parties. Especially the earlier 
discussed knowledge and understanding of others as well as one’s own needs, desires and interests. 
It requires the agents to be able to communicate with one another which in itself requires the 
understanding of a language and to learn to speak appropriately as well as it necessitates some form 
of cultural understanding with all the signs, gestures, customs, rules and laws that come with it. If, 
moreover, concerted action is the goal of interaction, “constant correlation, coordination and 
conducting”294 is required. 
In the face of the complexities of human interaction, Sluga argues that the goals of care as tending 
can be reduced to three different kinds of objects. One can tend to or care for one, “one’s own 
interactions with others”, two, toward the “interactions of individual others”, or three, toward the 
“interaction of whole groups and communities”295. It is tending or care with regard to the third 
objective that narrows down the object of a political notion of care and represents what the Greeks 
called the care for the common. This important distinction has significance for developing a notion 
of care for politics. While tending or care for one’s own interactions with others was called “the care 
[for] the self” epimeleia heautou by the Greeks, the care for interactions of individual others, that is, 
“the care [for] others”, was known to the Greeks as paideia. To clarify this distinction one can think 
of the care for the self as attending to one’s own interactions with others, for example, in order to 
become more understanding, more patient or more forgiving in one’s relations to others. Equally, 
one can picture the care for others as a parent tending to his or her child’s interactions with others 
by participating in the child’s play and encouraging or constraining the child’s interplay with other 
children. Finally, the care for the common is the kind of political care, for example, a state can 
exercise by tending toward the interactions of its citizens “when it makes laws to circumscribe their 
commercial, social, and political behavior”296. Thus, for Sluga, the care for the common contains all 
the “variety of action” and actors that can be found in politics but has a particular object, that of 
attending the interactions of whole groups and communities. 
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From this it seems that Sluga holds a special place for political care, tending, or the care for the 
common in contrast to Pettersen’s notion of mature care that is to provide a somewhat middle 
ground between the care for the self and the care for others. In other words, Pettersen provides 
principles that are to inspire and regulate our caring relations with regard to whom we care for and 
to which extent (reciprocity, expanded principle of not hurting). These principles are to address 
some of the uncertainties and negative features of care, especially that care can also be abusive and 
fallible. Without such principles care itself cannot “single out a morally admirable class of actions”297, 
as Sluga correctly points out. 
Remember, Pettersen argued that we fail to care in a mature way when we fail to care for ourselves 
because we care too much for others (altruism), or just as much when we fail to care for others but 
only ourselves (egoism). However, Sluga argues that we also fail to care in a mature way when the 
care for ourselves or a very narrow group of others keeps us from engaging in the care for the 
common.298 I want to pause here, because Sluga points to a very important dimension of care. That 
politics understood as care for the common always includes an element of tending (care), and that 
care when concerned with human interaction is always political. This goes beyond care having a 
political element in that it is understood as a generational task, as I discussed in chapter I. Rather, 
Sluga takes the argument further by saying that we actually fail to be political and fail to care in a 
mature way when we let purely our own interests (care for the self) or other’s interests (care for 
others) define our concerns, actions, and conduct. In other words, even though Sluga thinks that 
“the notion of care does not [...] single out a morally admirable class of actions”299, due to its 
fallibility, he deems it to be “the only response we have to the uncertainty of the human 
condition”300. An uncertainty that is grounded in universal human vulnerability and the complexities 
of human interaction.301  
While Pettersen provides principles to guide care, Sluga reinterprets Pettersen’s core principles of 
care (reciprocity, promote human flourishing, expanded principle of not hurting) as being political at 
heart.  This is quite significant for comparing the two thinkers.  To Sluga the notion of care 
transcends traditional moral perspectives much in the same way Pettersen claims mature care does, 
in that it is unable to provide rules for action. Thus, the core principles of care are practical but 
                                                          
297 Ibid., p. 10. 
298 Ibid., p. 9 
299 Ibid., p. 10. 
300 Ibid. 
301 Sluga calls this the hyper-complexity of the social. See Sluga, 2014, p. 238ff. 
88 
 
fallible guides, open to negotiation within the context of the situation. The care for the common and 
mature care both capture this fundamental uncertainty. Care’s indeterminacy can be formed into 
guiding principles302, as Pettersen has shown, and that may very well be the most any political notion 
of care can do for us; to provide a “hand-drawn sketch of paths we might travel”303. I think that 
Sluga’s metaphor of the map is very illusive in order for us to understand how both thinkers 
comprehend the ethical and the political from a perspective of care. A map is a simplified version of 
a complex reality representing features of it that might be of importance for making decisions. But, 
as Sluga correctly points out, “a map does not tell us how”304 to travel and it certainly does not 
provide “rules” for traveling. Rather, a map is a practical guide showing possibilities of “where we 
can and cannot go”. Anyhow, a map is not infallible and thus it “leaves us with a degree of 
uncertainty” and unanswered questions. Can we be sure that we have the right map for our 
purposes, is it detailed enough and does it show the details that are important for us to make good 
decisions? Is the map reliable, is it up-to-date, or does it need to be supplemented or corrected in 
any way? 
In my reading, both Pettersen and Sluga have to a certain extent a similar philosophical project. They 
both attempt to rethink the ethical and the political from the perspective of uncertainty. Uncertainty 
which they believe is one of the, maybe the most, determining features of human life.305 The most 
adequate response to meet the human vulnerability that springs out of this uncertainty, to reduce 
violent and harmful relations, and to promote human flourishing is care.  This may be the main 
agreement between Sluga and Pettersen. They both think of care as a necessary response to human 
vulnerability and uncertainty. Furthermore, both think that care has an existential character and is 
fundamental to human life. Indeed, that due to its vulnerability “human life calls for care”306. But 
from this insight both draw different conclusions, or rather, follow different impulses. While 
Pettersen attempts to provide principles to guide caring actions, Sluga thinks that care politics, that 
is, the care for the common is the “recognition that uncertainty” and human vulnerability are “the 
constitutive moment[s] of politics”307. In other words, that the need for politics is grounded in our 
human condition and that politics is the very real attempt to deal with the uncertainty of the 
situation and vulnerability of the human life. 
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However, such a conclusion does not give meaning as long as politics is understood as the experts’ 
rule over a territory and its people. Because care from this vantage point is always administrative, 
management, top-down and concerned mainly with the people bound to a certain territory. 
Anyhow, it makes sense when one presupposes an understanding of the political as the care for the 
common. A comprehension of the political that blurs the lines between the purely social and the 
purely political and regains politics not as something that is solely concerned with the state and its 
institutions, but with human interaction. Such a broad concept of the political is indeed wider than 
mere state politics or international politics and entails features one may more commonly attribute 
to the social sphere. This does not need to be a problem, for Sluga draws on the Protagorean notion 
of a care for the common, and for the ancient Greeks there was not as clear a separation between 
the political and the social as there is for us in the 21st century.308 Indeed, Sluga thinks that one can 
learn a lot about the scope of politics in the 21st century when thinking the notion of the political as  
care for the common. 
And he may be right in doing so. When looking at global political problems that need to be solved a 
broader understanding of both politics and the common seems to be required. It is impossible for a 
single state to attempt to solve the current refugee crisis or global warming by itself. Such problems 
are not created by only one state, and can (most probably) not be solved by one state alone. In the 
case of global warming the whole human community is affected, all human beings in all corners of 
the world. But global warming affects the planet, animals, plants and other non-sentient beings, too. 
At the least it affects the very conditions for us to live on this planet. Hence, it can be argued that 
our concern and care for the common must not only extent to human beings, but to all that is in 
relation to it and without which the human community cannot survive and flourish.309 Global 
warming may affect people living in different places and at different times in different ways and to 
various degrees, but every person will be affected in one way or another. Thus, a national or state 
bound understanding of the common will mainly be obscuring the way the world needs to respond 
to such a universal (existential) threat. It leads some states to think that they might not be affected 
to the same extent as others and thus do not need to care about the problem. Such non-care and 
non-participation would nevertheless be a failure to understand and respond to the problem in a 
“mature” way. It would be a failure to care because it would violate the principle of reciprocity with 
regard to the interests of all involved parties as well as the expanded principle of not hurting that 
demands to promote human flourishing (which is surely not promoted if global warming destroys 
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the very conditions for human existence on the planet) by actively working to avoid human suffering 
and hurt. 
The same can be said about more common and everyday problems. The food we eat is indeed 
affected by decisions that may be made in other countries on the other side of the globe. The 
political system in these countries, which is hard to influence for most people that are not citizens of 
that state, might e.g. allow the use of harmful chemicals in production of foods that are to be 
exported and may eventually end up on my plate.310 This is the case in well developed countries as 
well as in developing countries311. Outlawing harmful GMOs in one country and at the same time 
pushing them, including their harmful effects, onto another country can indeed only be defended 
politically based on the perception that human beings in that country are considered unequal and as 
of lesser worth. It is possible only by a distinction between “we” and “they, between “us” (citizens) 
and “the others” (non-citizens) and consequently looking at “the others” as being instrumental to 
our own benefit. Both Sluga and Pettersen are clear that such self-interest can be characterized as a 
failure to care in a mature way and for the common. In contrast, an inclusive understanding of 
community rendered in terms of a universal human community would provide the grounds for 
taking into account the harmful effects not only to a state's own population or a political 
community’s members, but also to human beings in general. All inflicted hurt even to human beings 
in another corner of the globe would be hurt inflicted on the same community, our community. The 
notion of mature care can thus throw some light on how to understand Sluga’s notion of “the 
common” and promote the realization that there is really only one human community in a globalized 
world by drawing on shared human feelings, emotions and experiences.312 Mature care’s core 
principles of reciprocity with regard to the involved parties’ interests and the expanded principle of 
not hurting would thus apply not only to a local, regional, national or cultural group, but to the 
whole of humanity. 
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This holds true with regard to the refugee crisis as well. The not caring for persecuted and 
existentially threatened human beings is hard to defend when categories of citizen/foreigner, 
we/they, us/them are overcome and every human being is considered as being of equal worth.313 
Thus, in all these cases, it does not make much sense to think of the common good as a good within 
a territorial bordered community such as nation state (or a polis). Simply because such an 
understanding would be based on the very same conception of the political that has created the 
problem in the first place (states acting out of self-interest with little or no regard to other states). 
Rather, the common needs to be understood as the whole human community. Politics will promote 
human flourishing if it is understood as mature care for the whole community, by the community. If 
we fail to engage in politics understood as a participatory practice in order to determine and act on 
shared as well as special responsibilities and a common good, we simply fail to care. We fail to care 
in a political sense, but we fail to care in a human sense, too. Because we fail to care for our own as 
well as others’ interests in a reciprocal way that promotes human flourishing. From the discussion of 
egoism vs altruism in chapter II, we know that any failure to care for oneself is at the same time a 
potential failure to care for others, while any failure to care for others is a potential failure to care 
for oneself. If Pettersen and Sluga are right, then this is true because both the care for the self as 
well as the care for others are linked together in the care for the common. Any relations, decisions 
and actions that are made with regard to the whole human community and at the same time 
promote human flourishing would be considered mature caring decisions. At this point it is 
important to remember that such decisions cannot be based on some sort of essentializing 
humanity, rather they must be based on as much empirical complexities as possible. One may even 
take such reasoning one step further and argue, that since care is essential for human beings to live, 
indeed to live well, to develop, to flourish, to become part of and build flourishing communities, and 
to participate in finding common grounds on how to live together, that human beings including their 
societies would not be what they are and where they are without care, that when one fails to care, 
one fails to address what is most important, most basic, most complex and essential in human 
lives.314 
Nevertheless, care, as I argued above, does have a dark side, is fallible, and comes in many different 
forms. It is surely not a controversial claim that we sometimes fail to take care of ourselves, that 
parents can fail to take care of their children and that even a state may fail to take care of its citizens 
or other human beings seeking its care (refugees, migrants, etc.). It can also be argued that care can 
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be “flawed or weak, ineffective, unreliable, or irrelevant [,] wrongheaded, perverse, [...] destructive, 
unneeded, unwanted, dictatorial, or oppressive”315. Therefore, care is not (morally) good in itself. 
Rather care is always in need of further caring, guidance in need of guiding, and attendance in need 
of attending. In other words, we have to learn to care (in an adequate way)316, thus, developing the 
capacity to care in human beings is essentially an educational or pedagogical project. 
 
LEARNING TO CARE – DOES A PEDAGOGICAL CONCEPT OF CARE POSE A CHALLENGE TO CARE 
POLITICS? 
Care, or the care for the common, that includes political care in the form of tending or attending, 
being a pedagogical concept does indeed pose some challenges for developing a political notion of 
care and is a clear exemplification of the potential dark side of care. For if, care must be learned who 
is to decide the structure and content of how we care and what we care for. The fallibility of care 
and its susceptibility for abuse become clear in care being dependent on education.  
Sluga takes the notion of the care for the common from his reading of Protagoras, Plato and 
Aristotle. As there was no strict line of demarcation between the political and the social for the old 
Greeks, education was considered to be a part of the political life, too.317 The pedagogical side of 
care pertains to its being at the heart of what it is to be human, that is, that we have to learn most 
skills and practices through a certain guiding care by others. In any educational system, there is 
someone who teaches, someone who is taught, and someone who decides on how (the rules) and 
what (the content) that is to be taught. This position can be abused and opens up care for the rule of 
the teachers (or those who tell the teachers what to teach and how).  
In its most extreme and perverted form such a pedagogical concept of care can be abused and used 
for indoctrination. Think of extremist branches of certain religions that teach that by killing non-
believers one cares for the spiritual community, what it truly means to believe in God or to be 
human. Or think of a state’s education system that teaches its citizens that they are worth more 
than citizens of other states and political communities. A softer version of a similar problem is at 
work in any educational system where one has to prioritize how much time is spent on teaching and 
learning certain skills. Should teaching mathematical and technical abilities be prioritized over 
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developing social and political skills? What is the balance between teaching rationality and care? If 
one is prioritized over the other, will this have effects on what kind of society that will emerge in the 
future?  
These questions are deeply political at heart and although truly worth its own extensive 
discussion318, I believe that most of the challenges pertaining to the pedagogical concept of care or 
the issue of the rule of the teachers have already been addressed in this thesis within the framework 
of mature care, especially with regard to the relational ontology of care.319 Changing one’s 
perspective from a mono-directive, top-down educational approach where teachers are seen as 
experts with regard to conveying knowledge to a relational understanding of education enables a 
more horizontal approach. It takes into account the interests of everyone involved in the 
pedagogical process, thus enabling the flourishing and education of both teachers and students at 
the same time by granting that teachers might be experts with regard to conveying knowledge in 
some fields, but that students are experts in other fields. 320 It facilitates the swapping of 
perspectives thus promoting teaching and learning as a mutually beneficial endeavor. If the core 
principles (reciprocity, promote human flourishing, extended principle of not hurting) of mature care 
are applied to the challenges a pedagogical concept of care poses to a political notion of care the 
most abusive forms of paternalistic care may be detected and thus can be avoided. 
 
CARE AND “CLASSICAL” POLITICS 
In the discussion of care having an educational core and thus being vulnerable to abuse the 
importance of Pettersen’s discussion of the relational ontology of the caring agent is actualized. For 
her the caring agent is defined by its relational ontology and his or her always already being in 
relationship to others.321 The relational agent who understands care as a multi-directional activity 
might be more susceptible to realizing that harming the relationships he or she is in will have a 
negative effect on him or herself, now or in the future. This may not be the case when the agent 
views him or herself as autonomous and separated from others. If the agent thinks that her actions 
are mono-directional and will not be reflected in the agent’s relations, the agent might be more 
willing to act in harmful ways. I believe this to be one of the main reasons why Pettersen advocates 
grounding care in a relational ontology. A relational agent, conscious of how his or her own actions 
effect the agent’s relations to her environment and thus his or herself will be less inclined to employ 
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care in an abusive way. This is true for the teacher that genuinely cares for her students as well as 
for the political community or state that care for its members or citizens. Thus, comprehending 
political actors such as states, political communities, organizations or corporations as relational 
agents has certain benefits in that it views these agents as possessing limited power and autonomy 
(or sovereignty) that is always dependent on the web of relations within which they are acting. 
Furthermore, it is a powerful argument showing how acts that harm these relations also hurt the 
agents themselves. I believe there to be two main responses to such interconnectedness and 
dependence. One, to reduce dependence by putting oneself above or removing oneself from the 
web of relations. This can be achieved by either isolating oneself or by attempting to attain as much 
power as possible so one can dictate the structure and rules of the relations and act as one likes. 
Two, by embracing one’s relational existence, interconnectedness and dependence on others and 
thus promoting the flourishing of all agents with whom one has relationships. 
Anyhow, when reading Sluga against Pettersen it would seem as if Sluga thinks that political care 
does indeed require the first kind of agent. That which employs care as a mono-directional activity 
and views itself as autonomous (sovereign) agent. Such an agent can be, for example, a sovereign 
state that views itself as having absolute power over its territory and citizens. At least for as long as 
politics is organized through a system of states. One can thus get the impression that Sluga develops 
a particular notion of care that can be simply adopted and employed by political actors such as the 
state and its institutions. This is nevertheless not true. Sluga’s outspoken goal is to rethink politics 
and what it means to be political by moving away from the tradition that renders politics merely in 
concepts of state, sovereignty, power, territory and government or rule. Both in his unpublished 
work as well as in his newest book he claims at several places that he attempts to deconstruct 
politics as rule over a polis or government of the state in order to give it new meaning.322 He 
specifically criticizes the idea of the state, and concepts such as sovereignty as being too narrow 
minded and only relevant under certain historical circumstances and conditions. Circumstances that 
he thinks are changing and thus require us to adopt a new understanding of the political.323 What I 
think Sluga fails to see is that in order to develop a political notion of care he has to adopt a 
relational ontology that is much more in line with how Pettersen thinks of the agent and its relations 
within her framework of mature care.  
Both Sluga and Pettersen have similar projects. While Sluga sets out to rethink the political, 
Pettersen’s aim is to rethink ethics. Both however choose to do this from the perspective of care and 
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both of them think that the notion of care has the power to reveal something fundamentally human 
about ethics as well as politics and thus reduce the level of abstractness and alienation from both 
fields. To me it seems as if they start from similar impulses but each of them in their own domain. 
While Sluga thinks that politics is too far removed and alienated from everyday life and ought to be 
made more accessible to the general population324, Pettersen believes that a lot of ethics can be 
diagnosed with the same sickness and needs to be re-evaluated and rethought under current 
circumstances325.  
The main difference between Sluga and Pettersen, as I see it, is their ontology. While Sluga attempts 
to rethink politics from the notion of care he largely understands care as a mono-directional 
activity.326 Only at a few places does he realize that reciprocity and interchangeability of perspective 
require a completely different, a relational ontology. Although he attempts to deconstruct the 
understanding of politics as government of the state based on sovereignty, that is, as the rule of an 
autonomous agent over a territory and its population, he does not employ the same understanding 
in his reflections on care. Equally, Tove Pettersen develops the understanding of agent and action in 
her ethics from a relational ontology that is not based on absolute autonomy of the agent but on the 
agent’s always already being in a web of relations to others, and actions being characterized as 
multi-directional activities. She then attempts to derive from this understanding implications for 
politics, but fails to see that this would require changing the ontology of politics, too. Thus, it can be 
argued that for as long as care is applied within a political system that is based on sovereign rule 
over a population bound to a territory, it will always tend to have the character of being 
paternalistic, top-down, or mere administration of resources and services rendered to passive 
receivers. This does not need to be problematic by itself, but it can explain a lot of the criticism, such 
as care always being paternalistic in a political context, Pettersen’s mature care is facing.  
I believe it is at this intersection Sluga and Pettersen can learn from each other; That a political 
notion of care requires not only a change in the understanding of the being of ethics (its ontology), 
but of the categories through which we comprehend politics, too. 
 
 
                                                          
324 Ibid., p. 146. 
325 Pettersen, 2008, xii. 
326 See chapter II, pp. 50-51 above. 
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THE CARE PERSPECTIVE – COMPREHENDING A POLITICAL NOTION OF CARE  
In chapter III, I have argued that Hans Sluga contributes to the care perspective by rethinking the 
concept of the political drawing on the Protagorean notion of the care of the common. Furthermore, 
Sluga contributes to developing the political dimension of the care perspective in that he expands 
the element of uncertainty into the domain of politics and criticizes the “classical” concept of politics 
along similar lines Pettersen criticizes traditional moral theories. His main argument is that a concept 
of the political based on categories such as a sovereign state with absolute power over a territory 
and its people is not exhaustive but to a large degree fixes the parameters we think about the 
political. Nevertheless, he argues that many of the political problems we are facing today are a direct 
result of thinking and acting within the categories of state politics and that they cannot be solved by 
the same thinking that created them in the first place. Problems such as global warming or the 
current refugee crisis that is threatening to destabilize large parts of the European continent can be 
seen as empirical examples supporting Sluga’s analysis. 
As Pettersen, Sluga does not believe that the care perspective should be taken to provide absolutely 
true and secure principles determining political conduct. Rather, he views care as a perspective able 
to provide orientation for making political decisions. Where Pettersen uses the term guiding 
principles to describe how mature care can help us make decisions that promote human flourishing 
and avoid creating harmful relations and hurt, Sluga uses the picture of a map to explain how he 
thinks the care perspective can help us orientate in the topography of the political landscape.  
Sluga, in accordance with Reich and Pettersen believes care to be at the roots of what it means to be 
a human being and that all human interaction has a political element. In other words, care at its 
heart is political to Sluga. Nevertheless, Sluga in order to have a meaningful and workable concept of 
politics attempts to limit the scope of political care to attending to the interactions of whole groups 
and communities. Although, I believe that Sluga and Pettersen would agree on the care perspective 
providing a more adequate tool to understand and guide such interactions there is a major 
difference to their respective approaches. While Pettersen develops an ethical framework of care in 
order to apply it to political situations and decision making, Sluga argues that all politics can be 
stripped down to some form of care (for my family, group, community, tribe, nation, citizens, 
species, planet, and in extreme cases even for myself) and that it is the structure of this care that 
determines whether politics is authoritative, despotic, self-fish and destructive or whether it, to say 
it with Pettersen’s words, can promote human flourishing and avoid hurt. 
Sluga adds to Pettersen’s discussion of mature care that it is not enough to change the ontology of 
how we understand moral agents, but that in order to meaningfully expand the care perspective to 
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politics a change in the categories through which we comprehend the political is required. What 
Pettersen seems to see clearer than Sluga is that in order for our political categories to change, we 
need to change how we understand agents and relations from within a traditional framework of the 
autonomous agent and mono-directional activities toward a relational model where the agent has 
limited autonomy and is always already within a web of relations that work in all directions and 
where the guiding question is how to respond to a concrete situation. 
 
ELEMENTS OF A POSITIVE CONCEPT OF CARE POLITICS 
What then does a positive concept of care politics entail? At this point, it is possible to sketch out a 
political concept of care based on the discussion above. It is fruitful to combine Pettersen’s and 
Sluga’s discussion of care and politics into a single concept which I call expanded mature care or 
simply care politics. Thus, we arrive at the following simplified formula: 
 Reciprocity (Pettersen) +  
 Expanded principle of not hurting (Pettersen) +  
 Actively engage in care for the common (Sluga) = 





 Mature care +  
 Care for the common =  
 Care politics 
 
Care politics entails Pettersen’s two core principles of mature care, reciprocity together with the 
expanded principle of not hurting (to avoid harming and actively work to promote flourishing), and 
Sluga’s concept of politics as an active engagement in the care for the common. 
Such care politics contains many of the elements discussed in all three chapters. It is grounded in 
uncertainty and human fallibility. I called this the existential dimension of care. Furthermore, care 
politics is not limited to certain types of agents that are understood as autonomous or sovereign 
with absolute power and control over a certain domain or territory with its people. Rather, it opens 
up for a multitude of agents that are defined by their relational ontology, that is, that they are 
always already in relations with one another. Moreover, care politics views actions as multi-directed 
and thus, caring agents will not primarily be concerned with acquiring as much power as possible to 
rule over others, but they will be concerned with their relations to other agents, what kind of actions 
that harm these relations and which actions that facilitate their flourishing. In other words, care 
politics comprehends all the variety of political agents and actions and is especially concerned, with 
what hurts relations and what promotes flourishing.  
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Care as such is a multi-form activity that includes simple care, guiding as well as tending. Anyhow, 
care politics main focus is on tending toward or caring for interactions of whole groups and 
communities at the same time recognizing the role individual choices, institutions and societal 
structures play with regard to promoting human flourishing. In that way care politics dissolves 
traditional categories such as the distinction between the ethical and the political, or the private and 
the public domain. Care is not something that can exist without being in relations to others and 
without care structures in place. But these structures are in turn something a group, a community or 
a state must decide on through political evaluation and action. Care politics by being grounded in 
care ethics’ core principles of reciprocity and the extended principle of not hurting can provide 
points of orientation for such political processes.  
As an ethico-political concept based on a relational ontology care presupposes agency. That is, it 
contains elements of intentionality and is thus limited to agents that can, at least potentially, 
participate in relations. Requiring agency, care politics cannot capture the significance of non-agents 
such as the environment, nature, a tree or a beautiful view etc. We definitely relate to all these 
things, but within the care perspective they do not possess intrinsic value, but have worth merely as 
long as they are useful, meaningful, beautiful or in any way significant in relation to us. Thus, their 
worth is negotiable and their value something that must be taught.  
Care politics is deep-seated in experiences of care or effects of non-care that are rooted in shared 
human feelings that it has been claimed are universal in character. At the same time, care is 
pedagogical at heart and an educational project because we need to learn what adequate care is 
and how to care in an adequate way. Furthermore, care politics can be characterized as a searching 
activity for the best way to live together. Thus, it is a social understanding of politics, a cooperative 
undertaking that is tied to concrete political situations (situatedness). At the same time, it is a 
generational task in that it is grounded in the insight that our (political) actions effect relations that 
extend not only through place, but through time. It is a different way of saying that some of our 
political actions do not only affect ourselves and the ones closest to us, here and now, but future 
generations in distant corners of the globe, too. The fact that the need for political action can be 
both bound to a concrete situation, but require action grounded in a trans-generational perspective 
was captured by UN Secretary General when stating that “[w]e are the first generation that can put 
an end to poverty and we are the last generation that can put an end to climate change”327. It takes 
into account that the nations of the world are now in the very able and concrete situation, that they 
have come to a state of development, where they have acquired the means of production, resources 
                                                          
327 Ki-moon, 2015, p. 2. 
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and ability to finally end poverty on a global scale. But in order to do so, concerted political action is 
needed. Nevertheless, we are also collectively at a point where if the nations of the world do not 
agree on concerted political action to avoid extreme climate change the point of no return might be 






















CONCLUSION – THE CARE PERSPECTIVE: A COMPASS TO 
GUIDE MORAL AND POLITICAL DECISIONS 
The question I have investigated in this thesis is whether the notion of care can be developed into a 
full-blown concept of the political or care politics. I started by discussing the etymological, historical, 
and existential significance of the notion of care, analyzing both structure and important ingredients 
to care. In chapter I, I was able to trace the notion of care all the way back to the generative myth of 
Cura and pre-Socratic thought. Throughout the thesis, I have discussed the notion of care and its 
significance with regard to some of the most pressing global political problems, focusing my main 
argument around the current refugee crisis (as of 2015/16).  
As I have argued in chapter I and II, the notion of care can indeed play a role within the current 
constellation of politics in providing guiding principles to the question of how to respond to the 
uncertainty, human vulnerability and realities with regard to politics. Mature care, as developed by 
Tove Pettersen, provides a point of orientation (ideal) for our political actions as well as guiding 
principles for how our decisions and actions may avoid exploitative and harmful relations and 
promote human flourishing at the same time. 
Furthermore, in chapter III, I argued that the notion of care is no stranger to politics. Pettersen 
comes a long way in developing a practical notion of care that extends to many political questions, 
decisions and actions. Hans Sluga adds to this by specifically attempting to rethink the political from 
a perspective of care. He does so by going back to the pre-Socratic concept of the care for the 
common and employing it as a generic notion. In his attempt to rethink politics I encountered 
several challenges and difficulties, such as, care being a pedagogical concept, or care traditionally 
being perceived as a mono-directional activity delivered by one agent to another and thus open to 
paternalism and abuse. Nevertheless, care in its political form as the care for the common can 
contribute to a new perspective on politics. A perspective that combines the ethical and political 
dimensions of care and provides an alternative way to understanding politics and the concept of the 
political, indeed, what it is to be political, in terms of care politics. Most of the difficulties and 
criticism I have come across in the discussion of Sluga can be addressed within the framework of 
mature care, but require moving away from the “classical” understanding of politics and a complete 
change of the categories through which we comprehend politics. This change of perspective requires 
rethinking the autonomy of states, that is, the principle of sovereignty in terms of relational 
autonomy, rethinking rule or government in terms of participation and attending care, rethinking 
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territory in terms of a caring community, and rethinking the concept of the citizen in terms of the 
human being.  
The necessity of changing the way we comprehend agents and the relations they have to other 
agents, as well as including uncertainty and human vulnerability into the core of the care perspective 
in order for care to be a meaningful notion for both ethics and politics, is something both Pettersen 
and Sluga are aware of. It manifests itself in Pettersen’s writings as the critique of traditional moral 
theories that according to her have preferences for abstract and deducible principles of justice and 
right. It also becomes clear in Sluga’s critique of the classical concept of politics that is based on the 
framework of disconnected agents (separated by borders) being autonomous (sovereign) with 
power over their own bodies (territory) and actions.  
In summary, by investigating the historical, etymological, ethical and political dimensions of care, I 
was able to argue three things. One, that care is a pervasive feature of human life and that its 
existential character has always been significant to understanding human life and relations, although 
not necessarily in mainstream philosophy or politics. Two, that by developing a care perspective 
based on a relational ontology, it is possible to sketch out a map, or guiding principles that can serve 
as a compass to orientate ourselves in the topography of moral and political decisions. Tove 
Pettersen’s core principles of mature care, reciprocity and the expanded principle of not hurting, can 
serve as a good starting point for further discussion on how the notion of care can guide us in our 
relations with one another. Three, I argued that the notion of care can be expanded into a care 
perspective that encompasses a meaningful notion of care politics, although with some limitations. 
Much of the criticism against the care perspective both with regard to the ethical as well as the 
political notion of care can be addressed when grounding care in a relational ontology rather than an 
ontology based on traditional philosophical concepts of autonomous agents.  
It could be very fruitful to further explore the theoretical foundation and implications of the care 
perspective. Does the notion of care make unique contributions to ethics and politics (as I have 
argued) or can the same results be achieved by a theory of relational autonomy? What role does the 
concept of universality play for a comprehensive understanding of care or may a more fruitful way of 
understanding care be as a family resemblance concept?328 What implications would such an 
understanding have for the practice of care politics? Furthermore, it would be truly interesting to 
see what results the care perspective and care politics can achieve when applied to a wider field of 
                                                          
328 Family resemblance is the idea that things that are thought to be universal are in fact connected by a series 
“of overlapping and crossing - cutting similarities” Sluga, 2013, p. 76, rather than by one essential feature 
common to all of them. 
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political and economic decisions. Does, for example, care politics have implications for how we 
understand economics and what role it can play in reducing violence and harmful relations and 
promoting human flourishing? 
The strong side of the care perspective is that it does not want to replace other moral and political 
theories. Rather, it includes principles such as reciprocity with regard to the interests of all the 
involved parties and facilitates a change of perspective drawing critical attention to structures and 
empirical realities embedded in the context of particular situations that produce dissociation and 
hurt rather than promote connectedness, empathic association and human flourishing. Thus, the 
care perspective employs various approaches and analytical tools to make the most flourishing 
promoting and least harming decisions and actions possible. 
I have also argued that a change in the categories that frame our comprehension of ethics and 
politics, can contribute positively to creating conditions and relations that further actions promoting 
human flourishing and mutual respect among persons and peoples. At the same time, employing 
mature care can reduce hurt and harmful relations. All this may sound too utopian, idealistic or 
simply unrealistic. How are we to change the way mainstream politics is defined and conducted 
throughout the world? How are we to change ideas and categories, such as the state, sovereignty, 
government, and citizen, that have grown and empirically manifested themselves for over two 
millennia and that our leaders are willing to defend with all the might and force of the modern 
nation state? 
On the one hand, I agree with these critical questions and skeptical outlooks in that such change 
may seem unfeasible without physical and external motivators. After all, why should we change 
something that has worked for two thousand years? On the other hand, it can be argued, that there 
are globally changing circumstances that render these old categories obsolete for organizing how 
human beings live together on all scales. The human species seems to have arrived at a point where 
we threaten to negate the very conditions for the flourishing of human and most other life on this 
planet. Global problems such as extreme climate change, the world's largest refugee crisis since 
World War II, and keeping in check the seemingly unlimited potential of technological development 
with all its positive and dangerous implications cannot be solved by a single agent such as the state 
or a powerful corporation. It does not matter how powerful that agent may be. However, such 
challenges may be managed by realizing that even agents such as states have limited autonomy and 
limited power. That they are always already in relations with other states, corporations, persons, 
legal entities, and various agents. That this web of relations is made up of all kinds of interests that 
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are held by these agents, and that through recognizing the interests, hopes and fears of all those 
involved will it be possible to organize an adequate and effective caring response.  
History will determine whether we need to change the way we understand the political and organize 
ourselves politically. I believe there to be strong empirical indications that it will not hurt to think of 
and discuss alternatives to our current approach toward politics and toward how we solve issues 
that potentially affect all human beings. Nor will it hurt to adopt a more caring perspective taking 
into account as many as possible interests and promoting human flourishing with regard to national, 
regional and local politics or private relations. The empirics tell us that care works.329 Judging 
whether changing the categories and language through which we comprehend and deal with these 
realities is feasible and whether the care perspective is the best approach available to us, or at least 
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